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ABSTRACT
Over the past decade, China has witnessed a rapid growth in its information and
communications technology (ICT) sector. The subject of this thesis specifically focuses
on the telecommunications infrastructure equipment industry in China. This sector is an
interesting one to study given that some of the leading domestic companies have mostly
emphasized developing their own capabilities in product development, rather than calling
upon formal technology transfers through foreign direct investment (FDI) initiatives. A
significant challenge faced by local firms, however, is that foreign equipment
manufacturers possessing deeper technological resources dominate their domestic
market. Nevertheless, Chinese enterprises have recently begun producing high-end
equipment such as core/backbone routers and DWDM optical transmission systems. The
basic question this thesis seeks to answer, therefore, is how can Chinese companies
become technologically competitive within the high-end segments of the telecom
equipment market?
A case study methodology was used to address this question, focusing on two leading
domestic firms: Huawei Technologies, a privately owned company, and ZTE Corporation
(Zhongxing), a state-owned enterprise. The findings show that four factors have
contributed to the competitiveness of domestic firms. Firstly, they are able to
successfully leverage the configurational nature of communications technology.
Secondly, the substantial investment made by the case study firms to develop their own
R&D capabilities has enabled them to become 'close followers' of the world
technological frontier. Thirdly, the global trend towards a less vertically integrated
equipment industry has produced a base of suppliers from which Chinese firms can
procure world-class component and subsystem technologies. Lastly, the role of the
Chinese government has been instrumental in building technological capabilities at the
national level and expanding market demand. Reciprocal arrangements and performance
requirements established between government and domestic firms have encouraged the
latter to upgrade their technological capabilities.
These combined observations provide a perspective on firm competitiveness in high tech
industries that is somewhat different to the models proposed under 'second mover
advantage' theory. Furthermore, the analyses made of technology acquisition at the level
of the firm highlight the importance of independent development (where possible),
compared to FDI, as a vehicle for technological developmtent within late industrializing
economies.
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1 Introduction
My initial interest in the topic of this thesis arose from wanting to understand how a late
industrializing country such as China has been able to successfully develop a high
technology sector. The Chinese telecom infrastructure equipment industry revealed itself
to be a particularly interesting case to investigate because of the considerable challenges
faced by domestic firms. These include the task of acquiring technological capabilities in
a very technology-intensive industry, and competing against foreign companies with a
dominant and entrenched position in the Chinese market.
One of the initial sources of inspiration for this research was a book by Xiaobai Shen -
The Chinese Road to High Technology (Shen 1999). His work was particularly relevant,
as it is the only study that analyzes in depth the acquisition of technological capabilities
by Chinese firms for the production of telecommunications equipment. At the time of his
initial research (carried out in 1992), digital switching systems were considered to be the
height of telecommunications technology in China, and his research focused on the
different experiences and strategies of Chinese firms in acquiring this particular
technology from abroad. Since then, the field of telecommunications technology has
seen an explosion in the types and uses of equipment including mobile, optical and data
communications products and systems.
Another dramatic change that has occurred has been the dominance of foreign firms,
particularly in the high-end communications technologies. Therefore, I wanted to bring
Shen's research up to date by understanding how far Chinese firms have evolved since a
decade ago, and what strategies, if any, they have employed to become competitive. In
particular, the main question I set out to answer was how can Chinese companies
compete against foreign firms in the high-end segments of telecommunications
equipment?
Given the time constraints, I decided to tackle the question of competitiveness from a
technological standpoint. This is because the possession of relevant technological
capabilities is a requirement for entry into the lucrative high-end market for this type of
equipment. Preliminary research on the industry revealed that certain Chinese firms had
managed to manufacture products of a very advanced standard. Therefore, three
hypotheses were proposed to explain how domestic firms have achieved their current
level of technological capabilities, and how they might use these strategies to
successfully compete against their more advanced foreign counterparts:
H1 Heavy investment in internal R&D capabilities is increasingly becoming an
important drivi g force behind the success of certain Chinese companies.
H2 Chinese firms are leveraging the 'configurational' nature of communications
technology to avoid the need for costly investment of resources in building
technologies from scratch.
H3 International supplier relationships established by Chinese companies have had an
important impact on their technological, and hence commercial, competitiveness.
The availability of - and ability to purchase - technologies from international
sources has been an enabler for Chinese industry.
Research Methodology
A case study methodology was designed to test these hypotheses. The objective of these
case studies was to look at the question from the perspective of the firm. This was seen
as the best way to understand the detailed process of technology acquisition. Information
for these case studies was collected through performing semi-structured interviews in
China throughout the month of January 2001 (see Appendix 1 for the list of interviewees).
Two domestic companies were used as subjects for the case studies: Huawei
Technologies and ZTE Corporation'. Interviews were performed with managers and staff
from these companies as well as those in other domestic and foreign firms in China. This
was done in order to obtain both a firm-specific and a sector-wide perspective on the
issues.
Thesis Structure
Chapter 2 begins by introducing some basic concepts and frameworks that are useful in
understanding the acquisition of technological capabilities. Because foreign companies -
be they suppliers or competitors - have an important impact on the Chinese industry,
Chapter 3 covers the telecom equipment sector from an international perspectiv... This is
also used as a basis from which to draw some key implications for Chinese firms that are
referred to in later chapters. Chapter 4 specifically looks at the telecom equipment
industry structure in China, and also provides some background on the origins of the
sector and its key players. Chapter 5 discusses the impact that Chinese government
policies have had on the domestic industry, particularly with respect to technological
catching up. Chapter 6 presents the two case studies that are the focal point of this thesis,
examining in detail the R&D processes and supplier relationships of Huawei and ZTE.
Chapter 7 synthesizes and analyzes the findings of the previous five chapters in order to
answer the above hypotheses and thesis question. Chapter 8 draws some wider
conclusions from this research with respect to theories of development in late
industrializing countries.
' Also known as Zhongxing.
2 Theoretical Concepts of Technology Development
This chapter discusses some of the basic concepts and definitions relating to
technological development at the level of the firm. It specifically looks as the issues of
technological capabilities, learning, and innovation as they apply to firms in late-
industrializing economies.
2.1 TECHNOLOGY AND LEARNING
What is Technology?
In order to understand technological change in the context of a late-industrializing
country such as China, it is necessary to gain a basic grasp of what "technology" itself
means. The term "technology" refers to both a collection of physical processes that
transforms inputs into outputs, and knowledge and skills that structure the activities
involved in carrying out these transformations. A good definition of technology is
provided by Linsu Kim (Kim 1997), whereby "technology is the practical application of
knowledge and skills to the establishment, operation, improvement and expansion of
facilities for [the transformation of inputs into outputs] and to the designing and
improving of outputs therefrom".
An important part of technology is differentiated, tacit, ever-changing and often firm-
specific knowledge, accumulated in the process of design, investment, production and
marketing (Shi 1998). However, although technology is often firm-specific, it may also
have the quality of public goods in that firms benefit from the general stock of
technological knowledge. In modem societies, technological knowledge is well
articulated and may be codified in the form of blueprints, prototypes, instructions and
designs which can be easily understood by experts. Even when technology is not
codified (such as skills and know-how), it can often be learned through personal
exchange, learning by doing and watching, and other means. Furthermore, firms can
learn from other firms through various channels such as reverse engineering or
technology licensing. These issues will be further discussed below.
Technological Capabilities, Absorptive Capacity, and Learning
Kim (1997) provided the following succinct summary of what "technological
capabilities" mean:
The term "technological capability" refers to the ability to make effective use of
technological knowledge in efforts to assimilate, use, adapt, and change existing
technologies. It also enables one to create new technologies and to develop new products
and processes in response to a changing economic environment. It denotes operation
command over knowledge. It is manifested not merely by the knowledge possessed, but,
more importantly, by the uses to which that knowledge can be put and by the proficiency
with which it is used in the activities of investment and production, and in the creation of
new knowledge. For this reason, the term "technological capability" is used
interchangeably with "absorptive capacity": a capacity to absorb existing knowledge and
in turn generate new knowledge.
Both Kim and Amsden (2000) define technological capabilities according to three
categories: production, investment and innovation capabilities. These are further
explained in Table 2.1. Although "technological capability" is used to describe a firm at
one point in time, the term "technological learning" refers to the dynamic process by
which companies acquire technological capabilities.
Yizheng Shi (1998) further elaborates on the issue of technological capabilities by
arguing that strategic planning demands a certain level of technological knowledge and
understanding of current technological developments. Developing countries therefore
need properly qualified manpower to assess competing technologies on their own merits
and to select those that are found to be most suitable under the circumstance. Moreover,
the recipient's knowledge about the technology concerned will be an important factor
influencing its bargaining strength, e.g. the information it has about alternative sources of
supply, the resources it prepared to expend on getting such information, and,
paradoxically, how much it knows about the knowledge it is buying.
2.2 DEFINING RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT: IMITATION OR INNOVATION?
Because of the highly technical nature of telecommunications equipment, one of the
major themes that pervades the discussion of technological 'catching up' by Chinese
firms is the nature of research and development (R&D) that they perform. Therefore, in
order to help the reader navigate through the various references to R&D undertaken by
the firms studied, it is necessary to establish what the term really means in different
contexts.
Imitation
Invariably, industrializing countries have begun their paths of technological development
through imitating foreign technologies. This includes both legal and illegal imitation, and
differs according to the amount of effort needed to develop these products (depending
upon the maturity of the product and the ease with the technology can be acquired).
Schnaars (1994) provides a useful classification with which to analyze the type of
imitation undertaken by a firm: counterfeits; knockoffs or clones; design copies; creative
adaptations; technological leapfrogging; and adaptation to another industry.
Counterfeits and knockoffs are both examples of duplicative imitation (counterfeits being
illegal whereas knockoffs are generally legal). Duplicative imitation does not necessarily
require specialized investment in R&D and information channels. Nevertheless, because
in some cases the product technology cannot be obtained through simply looking at the
Table 2.1 Technological Capabilities
Production Capability
Production Management - to oversee operation of established facilities
Production Engineering - to provide information required to optimize operation of established facilities,
including the following:
1. Raw material control: to sort and grade inputs, seek improved inputs
2. Production scheduling: to coordinate production processes across products and facilities
3. Quality control: to monitor conformance with product standards and to upgrade them
4. Trouble-shooting to overcome problems encountered in course of operation
5. Adaptations of processes and products: to respond to changing circumstances and increase
productivity
6. Repair and maintenance of physical capital, according to regular schedule and when needed
Investment Capability
Manpower training - to impart skills and abilities of all kinds
Preinvestmentfeasibility studies - to identify possible projects and ascertain prospects for viability under
alternative design concepts
Project execution - to establish or expand facilities, including the following:
1. Project management: to organize and oversee activities involved in project execution
2. Project engineering: to provide information needed to make technology operational in a particular
setting, including the following:
a. Detailed studies (to make tentative choices among design alternatives)
b. Basic engineering (to supply core technology in terms of process flows, material and energy
balances, specifications of principal equipment, plant layout)
c. Detailed engineering (to supply peripheral technology in terms of complete specifications for
all physical capital, architectural and engineering plans, construction and equipment
installation specifications)
3. Procurement (to choose, coordinate, and supervise hardware suppliers and construction
contractors)
4. Embodiment in physical capital (to accomplish site preparation, construction, plant erection,
manufacture of machinery and equipment)
5. Start-up of operations (to attain predetermined norms of innovation capability)
Innovation Capability
The skills necessary to create new products or processes, the type of skills depending on the novelty of the
new technology.
1. Pure science: the searich for intrinsic knowledge
2. Basic research: the search for radically new technology
3. Applied research: the search for differentiated products
4. Exploratory research: the search for refinements of differentiated products
5. Advanced development: the search for optimum manufacturability of refined products
Source:. Amsden (2000).
production process involved, it must be acquired through other means. At one extreme
lies reverse engineering, where the production involved may be a novel combination of
highly standardized technological elements. In this case, reverse engineering efforts may
result in the identification of those elements and the nature of their combination, resulting
in an economically successful imitation. At the other extreme, the technology may be so
idiosyncratic and firm specific (or the technological capabilities of the imitator so poor),
that substantial help is required by means of a formal technology transjfer from the
originator. In both cases, considerable internal capability is needed to identify the nature
and source of relevant technology, to negotiate its transfer or reverse-engineer, and to
assimilate it'.
Design copies, creative adaptations, technological leapfrogging and adaptation to another
industry are creative imitations. Creative imitations aim at generating similar products
but with new performance features, and involve activities such as benchmarking and
strategic alliances. In addition, these types of imitation involve learning through
substantial investment in R&D.
Innovation
Innovation can be defined as a pioneering activity - rooted primarily in a firm's internal
competencies - to develop and introduce a new product to the market. As the first firm to
establish itself in the market, an innovator benefits from 'first mover advantages' that are
unavailable to imitators2. However, an important insight that is useful to the context of
this thesis is that the distinction between innovation and imitation can be blurred. Many
skills and activities required in reverse engineering have easily been transformed into
activities called 'R&D' as a firm approaches the world technological frontier. Kim
(1997) describes this with respect to the Korean industry:
Reverse engineering involved activities that sensed the potential needs in a market,
activities that located knowledge or products which would meet the market needs, and
activities that would infuse these two elen ent into a new project. Reverse engineering
also involved purposive search of relevant information, effective interactions among
technical members within a project team and with marketing and production departments
within the firm, effective interactions with other organizations such as suppliers,
customers, local R&D institutes and universities, and trial and error in developing a
satisfactory result. Skills and activities required in these processes are in fact the same in
innovation processes in R&D (emphasis added).
This insight helps us understand the nature and implications of R&D within firms in late-
industrializing countries (such as those studied in this thesis). Thus, although R&D may
be defined in the majority of these cases as relating to reverse engineering activities, they
may substantively approach certain types of innovation efforts undertaken by 'first
Duplicative imitation conveys no sustainable competitive advantage to the imitator technc logically, but it
supports competitive edge in price if the imitator's wage cost is significantly lower than the imitatee's.
2 These include image and reputation, brand loyalty, an opportunity to pick the best market, technological
leadership, an opportunity to set product standards, access to distribution, experience effects, and an
opportunity to establish an entry barrier of patents and switching costs (Kim 1997).
movers'. This view is also echoed by Shi (1998). Shi states that the process of
unpacking, mastering and assimilating imported technologies requires firms to solve
numerous problems, the answers to which are not always provided by the supplier of the
technology. Therefore, he argues, the assimilation and reproduction of technology itself
involves a process of technological innovation, to a greater or lesser degree.
Amsden et al. (2000) propose a system of classification in order to draw international
comparisons of R&D activity. This is summarized in Table 2.2. The classification
follows the five types of innovation capabilities outlined in Table 2.1: pure science; basic
research; applied research; exploratory development; and advanced development. This
system is designed primarily to compare R&D activities of first movers and therefore
does not incorporate the features of R&D relating to imitation and reverse engineering
discussed above. However, this framework is still a very useful one to use for guidance
on assessing the type of R&D undertaken by firms in late industrializing economies (even
if it is imitative).
2.3 THE SOCIAL SHAPING OF TECHNOLOGY
One of the key ideas used in this thesis relates to the theory on the Social Shaping of
Technology (SST), as applied by Xiaobai Shen (1999) to the early telecommunications
equipment industry in China. Shen draws upon SST theory to analyze the acquisition by
Chinese firms of the capabilities to develop switching systems for telecommunications
networks. Because he uses SST theory within the context of telecommunications
equipment production, it is useful to review these ideas in order to draw from them later
in the analysis.
The theory behind the Social Shaping of Technology was developed as a reaction to the
linear models of technological innovation which saw this process as a one-way flow of
information, ideas and solutions from basic science, through R&D, to the distribution of
finalized products through the market to consumers. In essence, SST stresses the fact that
certain technologies can be flexible enough to be 'shaped' by users, and this shaping is
influence by social, economic and technological aspects of the host environment.
SST sees complex modem technologies as heterogeneous assemblages that are capable in
principle of being reconfigured in their implementation and use. In particular, an
important feature of information and communications technologies is their
configurational nature, whereby the combinations of both standard and customized
components are configured to meet specific needs.
All this translates into the fact that, when a firm seeks to develop a product which
exhibits the characteristics just mentioned, it is able to make certain choices over what to
develop itself (and thus learn how to design), and what to simply purchase (and thus
leave as a technological 'black box'). The particularly configurational nature of
telecommunications technology suggested by Shen means that a firm can combine
components it has learnt to design with those purchased from suppliers (for which
Table 2.2 New Typology ofR&D Characteristics
6.0 Pure Science 6.1 Basic Research 6.2 Applied Research 6.3 Exploratory 6.4 Advanced
Development Development
Search for Intrinsic knowledge New knowledge for Differentiated product Prototype in a system Prototype for
radically new "on paper" manufacture
marketable product
Research objectives Uncover new scientific Same as 6.0 but with Transfonn, variate and Implement concept as Reduce costs,
principle (unknown) application re-apply known engineered system uncertainties of
to gain monopoly rents application manufacturing
Output Concept-based IP Product-based IP for Differentiated product Detailed product design Manufacturable product
(papers, patents) transfer to 6.2, 6.3 for specific market or prototype
(papers?, patents?)
Time horizon Infinitellong-term Long-term Medium/short-term Short-term Immediate
Techniques Scientific, experimental Same as 6.0 Scientific techniques (New) engineering Same as 6.3 plus testing,
and mathematical (formulation of design tools, including Quality Control
techniqu~s equations, algorithms) simulation
Interaction of Both in unexplored Same as 6.0 but limited Uncertain with respect Application of known Surprises from
technique/problem space space under study to extension or tools to known problem manufacturing
application into new variabilities
system
Qualifications and PhD in fundamental Same as 6.0 plus BSIMS/PhD fresh Same as 6.2 but PhD Same as 6.3 plus
skills science, mathematics or n~nagementexperience recruits but with unnecessary people-related
engineering and oversight experience, up-to-date management skills,
training process know-how
Size of effort Depends on piece of Scale economies related Smaller critical mass Scales up with size of Related to production
knowledge under study to whole product; appropriate for the system
critical skill mass; exploiting niche hand-
specialization and me-down from 6.0
integration
Location of activity: Near skills (in academic Near skills Near market (sufficient Near production (or Near production
or other liberal research skills) market?)
environment)
Source: Adapted/rom Amsden, Goto and Tschang (2000)
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domestic firms may not have the technological capabilities to produce themselves).
Thus, not only can a producer of telecommunications equipment potentially 'punch above
its weight' in terms of technological capabilities, but it can also choose which of these
capabilities to master (as well as when to do so). This insight has implications for late-
industrializing countries such as China both in terms of technology strategies at the level
of the firm, as well as government policies seeking to develop national industries.
Shen classifies the potential for local shaping of foreign technology by latecomer firms
according to their form, scale and complexity. He therefore distinguishes between three
types of technologies: discrete technologies; systems technologies; and configurational
technologies.
* Discrete technologies. Are stand-alone technologies designed to carry out specific
and common functions independent of context. An example is a word processor or
computer-controlled machine tool.
* Systems technologies. These typically relate to a wider range of activities than
discrete technologies, and are thus more tightly linked to particular application
settings. Typically, system technologies need to be adapted for use in developing
countries in order to fit them to the their different requirements and circumstances.
System technologies tend to be rather rigid in their construction and may be difficult
or costly to adapt, an example being certain telecom switching systems .
* Configurational technologies. These technologies match the complexity of systems
technologies (in the range of applications they can be used for), but are designed to
allow great flexibility in development and application. Development costs are
reduced by drawing upon existing components technologies which can be selected
according to the particular uses of the final product. This makes it more flexible for
developing countries to reconfigure such solutions to their local needs and exigencies.
According to Williams (1997), information and communications technologies (ICT) in
particular are increasingly taking the form of configurational technologies since both
modular design and the use of open standards can facilitate the substitution of internal
components. The selection of components and design for flexibility in application can
make it easier to adapt them to meet the specific needs of a wide range of users. SST
theory suggest that, because foreign technologies can be locally configured (in the
developing country) to meet local criteria - such as being suitable for local production
and local markets, using local resources, etc. - configurational technologies extend the
scope for recipient-side innovation.
3 Such as the System- 12 public digital switching system described by Shen (1999).

3 An International Perspective on the Telecom
Equipment Manufacturing Sector
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In order to place the strategies employed by Chinese telecom equipment companies - and
the government policies designed to foster their growth - in their proper context, it is
necessary to first consider the dynamics of this industry in the West where it is more
established. This chapter therefore deals with the international models of industrial
structure within the telecom infrastructure equipment industry. The relevance of looking
at these models also comes from the fact that most, if not all, of the large OEMs in these
industries are direct competitors of domestic firms in the Chinese market. Furthermore,
some of the major component suppliers in the industry are either beginning to establish
supplier relationships with Chinese firms, or starting up operations within China.
The material discussed here will focus on the optical equipment industry and the
router/data networking industry, which are the main focus of the two case studies
examined in Chapter 6. This chapter also looks at the wireless equipment industry since
this is a major area of growth for Chinese companies and is useful in later drawing
conclusions from a sector-wide perspective.
3.2 OPTICAL COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT
Figure 3.1 shows a simplified version of the supply chain structure within the optical
communications equipment industry. The optical equipment industry is broadly divided
into two segments: the OEM systems providers, who manufacture entire pieces of optical
systems and equipment, and the component suppliers, who design and manufacture the
specialized components needed by the former. As can be seen from the diagram, certain
companies are both systems providers and component manufacturers. Appendix 2a
presents a diagram illustrating the network of relationships between component suppliers
and systems providers.
As will be explained below, there are five major trends currently occurring within the
optical equipment industry:
* Industry consolidation;
* an active components sector rapidly sprouting new entrants and new products;
* an emphasis on manufacturing skills and expertise as a key to success;
* better component integration being offered by suppliers to the systems providers; and
* less vertical integration, with a cleaner separation between optical components
suppliers and systems providers.
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Optical Systems Providers
The 'Big Three' optical systems providers are Nortel, Lucent and Alcatel which occupy
33%, 13% and 11% of the global market, respectively' (Merrill Lynch 2001). Table 3.1
lists the major systems providers and their market shares, for all optical systems
categories combined.
Table 3.1 Global Market Shares of Publicly Traded Optical Systems Providers
Company* Ticker NMarket Share
Nortel Networks NT 33%
















- Sycamore Networks SCMR
Companies under 'other' are ordered alphabetically.
Source: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (2000)
Nortel has made a series of acquisitions over the past years which include both smaller
competitors with desirable technologies (Cambrian, Xros and Qtera) and components
manufacturers (Core Tek) (Merrill Lynch 2001). Alcatel is another among the three
whose operations also include component manufacturing, although this is in the form of a
subsidiary - Alcatel Optronics - which also supplies other systems providers with
components. Of the smaller systems vendors, Hitachi also includes a component
manufacturing division which is well regarded despite the fact that the company has a
small share in the systems market (Merrill Lynch 2001).
Given that key breakthroughs in optical technology occur at the component level (see
below), systems providers seem to have adopted either of two strategies in order to
compete. The first is typified by Sycamore Networks, which is to leverage the work of
Nortel has a 51% share for terrestrial DWDM and 30% for SONET/SDH systems. Lucent leads the
market in Asia-Pacific with a 25% market share of the WDM market and 15% of the SONET/SDH market.
These figures do not include submarine optical systems. When included, Alcatel takes second place overall
with a 20% market share (as it leads the submarine market with a 41% market share). Merrill Lynch
(2001).
several component suppliers and then to add value - and product differentiation - mostly
through system level architecture and software. The second strategy, followed by Nortel
and Ciena, is to use some in-house components to provide advanced level functions while
outsourcing to others for the non-differentiating features. The most proven method to
date is that of Nortel (given its success). However, industry analysts believe that, as the
industry matures, component suppliers become stronger (in technology and
manufacturing), and the need for intensive R&D increases, it will be harder for strictly in-
house component shops to compete (Merrill Lynch 2000a).
Sycamore Networks: Example of an Outsourcing Strategy
A key strategy of Sycamore is to outsource component development and manufacturing,
while directing its energy on software, intellectual property and marketing. Sycamore
purchases components from suppliers such as Comrning and AMCC, and purports to work
closely with its suppliers to develop the needed components. They do not place
restrictions on their suppliers to limit sales of co-developed components to other
companies. Although Sycamore may lose some competitive advantage because of this
strategy 2, it is believed that they are able to win with time to market and by being able to
purchase many piece-parts at commodity prices (Merrill Lynch 2001).
Sycamore also outsources the manufacturing of its systems, which has helped them scale
up without enormous capital investments. In order to do this, Sycamore has enlisted
contract manufacturers such as Jabil Circuit and Celestica to assemble, test and ship its
systems. Although some early hiccups were reported as the manufacturers ramped up the
assembly of their products, it is believed that the processes are improving (Merrill Lynch
2001).
Core Competencies: Software and Systems Engineering
The core competencies of optical systems providers are in systems engineering and
software engineering - not component or even module manufacturing. Software, or 'soft
optics', that i integrated around the optical systems is what differentiates competitors'
products. A portion of the software acts as the 'brains' of the network element, while
other functions include databases for storing user information, communication protocols,
and network management systems. Arguably the most intensive engineering activities
relate to software development (Merrill Lynch 2001).
Optical Components/Modules Suppliers
Component companies play a critical role in supporting the optical equipment supply
chain. It is at the component level that many technological breakthroughs have been
achieved, such as EDFAs, tunable lasers, AWGs and RAMAN amplifiers, which are the
crucial building blocks for the systems providers. By incorporating these key 'enabling'
2' Although this may have helped the company's rapid growth, a possible draw-back of this is a lowered
zaility to differentiate its products from the competition.
technologies into their product portfolios, systems providers can offer the technical
capabilities within their equipment which is demanded by their service provider
customers (Merrill Lynch 2000a).
The leading component suppliers, and their respective market shares, are JDS Uniphase
(28%); Nortel Optoelectronics (27%); Lucent Microelectronics 3 (13%). Table 3.2
provides a summary of the publicly-traded component manufacturers and their market
shares. The leading companies support strong product portfolios and it is believed that,
as the component arms of the systems providers become more independent, they will
introduce more competition into the merchant market for components (Merrill Lynch
2000a).
Table 3.2 Publicly Traded Optical Components Suppliers
Companvy Ticker Market Share"
JDS Uniphase JDSU 28%
Nortel Networks NT 27%
(Optoelectronics)
Lucent Technologies LU 13%
(Microelectronics)
Coming GLW 10%
ADC Telecom ADCT 9%
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Companies are ordered by market share, when this information is available (from Merrill Lynch 2000a).
A dash ('-') indicates companies whose market share is not known but which are smaller publicly
traded players, in which case they are listed alphabetically (from MSDW 2000b).
Recently floated as Agere, its new name.
Acquired by JDS Uniphase.
Source: Merrill Lynch (2000a) and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (2000b)
JDS Uniphase is viewed as the most competitive in the component space as it supports
the broadest product portfolio in the business, including both 'passive' and 'active'
components. The 'spinouts' of the systems providers are still primarily focused on
'active' components and have a concentrated customer base with the respective parents
3 Now known as Agere, it has been recently floated as a separate company.
representing a substantial portion of sales4. Corning's Photonics business has
significantly broadened its portfolio of active and passive components like EDFAs. It has
also benefited from the need of the systems providers to have an alternate component
supplier (Merrill Lynch 2000a).
The future holds a growing number of new entrants in the components business, many of
which are on the IPO track (see Appendix 2b).
The Strategic Role of Components
It is believed that innovation in optical networking will be driven by components and it is
these suppliers who will enable the technologies for the systems providers. Merrill
Lynch (2000a) claims that the optical component suppliers are "closer to science" than
any other communications equipment sector, and possibly more than any other IT sector.
Components are thus the key enablers of more wavelengths, faster data rates, longer
optical reach, and more flexibility at the wavelength layer5.
Industry Trends
One of the significant trends in this sector is the separation of component manufacturing
from systems provision. There are numerous players within the optical components
industry. Several of the large systems providers are now spinning off their internal
component arms as separate business entities who will join the ranks of pure-components
companies. Examples of this are the spinning off of Lucent Microelectronics, and the
establishment of a tracking stock for Alcatel Optronics6 (Merrill Lynch 2000a).
Although a division of labor between systems and components manufacturing is
becoming evident, component manufacturers are providing more integrated modules to
their systems customers (rather than just raw components). Driving this trend is the fact
that newer systems companies such as Sycamore, ONI Systems and other start-ups are
relying on component suppliers to provide greater integration, further up the value chain.
Currently, a greater degree of outsourcing of component manufacturing by systems
companies is occurring, and it is predicted that component companies will also become
more module-level suppliers (MSDW 2000a). A further stage in the division of labor is
expected to produce three types of companies in the optical industry (Merrill Lynch
2000a):
4 JDS Uniphase, however, supports Lucent and Nortel as the largest customers, representing less than 40%
of sales combined, with the balance from a number of systems houses as well as other component
manufacturers.
5 It was Southampton University's EDFA that enabled the beginning of the optical revolution. It was also
Nortel's ability to make 10G componentry that has given it substantial leadership in core optical networks.
The ability to amplify, combine, separate, control, switch and measure wavelengths are what will fulfill the
future technological leaps in optical networking (Merrill Lynch 2V00).
6 Industry analysts propose three reasons for this trend. The first is that component companies need their
own equity in order to take part in mergers and acquisitions, which is of strategic importance within this
industry. Secondly, becoming an independent public entity provides companies with stock options which
are essential for retaining talent. Thirdly, market valuations for independent component companies are
much higher than those which are attached to parent companies.
* Hardware development by component/module suppliers
* Manufacturing assembly by outsourcing companies7
* Software and systems development by optical systems companies
The impact of greater reliance by systems providers on their suppliers is that the latter
will have to provide broader product lines (in order to offer a greater integration role), or
provide platform technologies that can be used to integrate discrete devices. In order to
boost product lines, a wave of consolidation has been occurring in the components sector
led by JDS Uniphase and Coming. JDS Uniphase has acquired 11 companies at a cost of
US$ 60.6 billion between June 1999 and July 2000, including SDL Inc (Merrill Lynch
2000a).
R&D will be key to component suppliers as these companies are expected to become the
originators of breakthrough technologies which ultimately impact the performance of
optical systems. Merrill Lynch (2000a) believes that the importance of R&D is
increasing as the industry matures and that this will ultimately lead to two types of
innovators, very large innovators and upstart innovators. Very large innovators are the
likes of JDS Uniphase and Coming as well as the in-house divisions of Lucent and
Nortel. Upstart innovators are the newer companies with a limited set of new products,
which could ultimately be the mergers & acquisitions targets of larger companies.
In the optical systems sector, systems providers are continuing to diversify their product
lines in order to tap into new high-growth markets and to leverage their existing
technology and customer bases (MSDW 2000a). For example. Sycamore announced the
integration of Sirocco's edge and access switches into its own management system, and
ONI Systems unveiled a new regional transport product.
Technology Trends
Although demand for SONET/SDH systems will continue, their use is moving to the
edge of the network. Taking their place are DWDM systems which are considered more
efficient for optical communications 8. The market for DWDM systems is expected to
increase dramatically over the coming years as demand and product features increase
(Merrill Lynch 2001). The major DWDM systems providers and their respective global
market shares are Nortel (51%); Lucent (9%); CIENA (9%); NEC (8%); Alcatel (6%);
Sycamore (4%); Cisco (3%); Fujitsu (3%); and the remaining 7% is distributed among
smaller players (Merrill Lynch 2001).
7 Already, JDS Uniphase has been outsourcing some of its manufacturing to Celestica, a contract
manufacturer.
8 SONET/SDH is an older technology, whereas DWDM is a newer method of optical transmission which
has not yet reached maturity (especially in terms of the software used to ensure system stability and
maintenance).
Other cutting edge products being developed and marketed include optical cross-connects
and optical switches. The North American market shares for optical cross-connects are
CIENA (50%); Tellium (19%); Sycamore (19%); Cisco (6%); and Lucent (6%). Optical




Scientific, engineering and manufacturing talent is the most scare resource in the optical
industry as it has not been able to keep up with the enormous growth witnessed in the
past years (Merrill Lynch 2000a). The industry requires people with relevant Masters or
Doctorate level degrees and few schools are able to produce them. According to Merrill
Lynch, the battle for talent will necessitate companies to provide equity incentives (stock
options), offer the prospect of working on cutting-edge technology, and provide attractive
working conditions.
The importance of Manufacturing
In spite of leading science and products, it is the ability to efficiently and effectively
manufacture optical components which sets companies apart. In particular, given the
large demand, it is crucial for companies to have scalable manufacturing capabilities.
The following issues need to be addressed in order to achieve this (Merrill Lynch 2000):
* Design for manufacturability in R&D
* Physical manufacturing space
* Sourcing and training manufacturing personnel at reasonable cost
* Sourcing, installing and maintaining manufacturing equipment
* Sourcing materials and other basic components
* Use of mechanization and automation
* Process engineering
* Use of outsourcing at appropriate times
The labor-intensive nature of manufacturing optical equipment (due to the current
inability to automate) is encouraging companies to open facilities in low-cost countries
such as in the Far East and Mexico. One example is JDS Uniphase, which is establishing
a manufacturing base in China9 . Due to the technical difficulties of achieving efficient
manufacturing, many companies view their processes as trade secrets and are unlikely to
share them with third party manufacturers (Merrill Lynch 2000).
9 See Chapter 4.
3.3 INTERNET ROUTER EQUIPMENT
The manufacturers of Internet routing equipment fall within a broad range of companies
classified under networking equipment providers (sometimes referred to as 'data-
communications' equipment). This type of equipment includes routers, LAN/WAN
switches, media hubs, etc. - all of which are integral parts of the Internet infrastructure.
Over the past two years, the Internet router category has changed considerably, with the
emergence of three separate sub-segments of the market (MSDW 2000b):
* Core Routers. These are used in the backbone of the networks. They are developed
for maximum throughput and capacity.
* Edge Routers. These are used for line aggregation such as broadband (DSL and
Cable) and corporate access (TI, T3, OC-3). These routers have smaller footprints
and highter interface densities and flexibility.
* Service Routers. These are used by telecom carriers to deliver services to customers.
They are generally smaller boxes with a greater amount of application software.
The technology employed for core routers is the most advanced due to the capabilities
needed to handle vast amount of data at high speeds.
Internet Router Vendors
By far the market leader in all router categories is Cisco Systems. Table 3.3 shows the
other market contenders in two broad categories: the general edge/service routers and
'next generation' core routers. In the first category, Nortel is the main second contender
(through its acquisition of Bay Networks). In the second category, Juniper Networks is
the only other company with serious market shareo .
Table 3.3 U.S. Market Shares for High-End 'Next Generation' Internet Routers
Company Ticker Market Share
General Edge Routers Next Generation (Core) Routers
Cisco CSCO 89% 69%





Source: Merrill Lynch (2000b) and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (2000b)
0to The reason that market share in next-generation core routers is less tilted towards Cisco is that customers
for these types of routers - namely telecom carriers - customarily employ 'second sourcing' as a policy.
That is, ensuring another source of supply for router equipment in order to decrease price and ensure
adequate supply. This therefore provides an opportunity for other entrants to build market share.
Cisco Systems
Cisco is the dominant supplier of the routers and switches that run the Internet. One of
the most remarkable attributes of Cisco is its unparalleled record of acquisitions - a total
of 71 acquisitions between 1993 and 2000 (MSDW 2000b). Each of these acquisitions
have been strategic in that they have generally brought three types of benefits to Cisco:
(1) entry into new, lucrative and fast-growing markets by instantly acquiring a range of
marketable new products; (2) technological expertise through the assimilation of the
target companies' engineers and in-house R&D; (3) more management talent by
integrating target companies' managers into the company structure.
Cisco is not known within the industry for producing breakthrough technologies on the
strength of its in-house capabilities. It is, however, expert at acquiring them by buying
companies". A look through the list of assimilated companies reveals that eight of these
acquisitions were in the area of router technology, some of which specifically related to
either software or ASIC development - the two key technologies for router systems
producers.
Within the broad definition of networking equipment, Cisco has a relatively diversified
product range (see Table 3.4). Recently, it has also entered the optical equipment market
through several acquisitions (see Section 3.2 above).
Table 3.4 Cisco's Market Share for Selected Products (N. America)
Product Category C3QOO Share
Ethernet switches 59%
Low-end routers 88%
Mid-range voice routers 93%
High-end routers 95%
Gigabit routers 70%
Cable - CMTS 64%
Remote access 27%
SONET/SDH muxes 5%
Core ATM switches 19%
Source: MSDW (2000b)
The Importance of Software and ASICs
Two key elements of intellectual property involved in router production are the software
and ASICs (Application-Specific Integrated Circuits). Advances in ASIC technology
undertaken by router manufacturers have been responsible for important improvements in
router performance. These ASICs are highly proprietary and a substantial proportion of a
SJudicious company acquisitions have become one of Cisco's core competencies, along with the ability to
rapidly integrate the newly-acquired products into its sales channel. Traditionally, the most important
currency in making these acquisitions has been the offering of its highly-valued stock (stock options are
also an integral part of employee incentive schemes along with clear lines of accountability).
vendor's intellectual property is contained within them (BT Alex.Brown 1999a). Both
Cisco and Juniper have in the past acquired ASIC development teams (MSDW 2000b).
Similarly, creating the operating system software' 2 for the router has been a key
differentiator in the market and has contributed much to Cisco's success. It is believed
that, despite the important role of advanced ASICs in the router's functioning, the success
or failure of individual products is largely determined by the robustness, feature richness
and cleanliness of the vendors' routing software (BT Alex.Brown 1999a). Furthermore,
certain companies such as Avici are making their software interoperable with that of
Cisco and Juniper in order to sell to customers who already have an installed base of
equipment from these companies (MSDW 2000b).
Technology Trends: Today's Core is Tomorrow's Edge
The requirements of Internet infrastructure are drastically increasing. This poses a threat
to equipment vendors whose products could face obsolescence in a matter of months as
bigger and faster products are introduced. In the router market, products that are
originally introduced as core routers are inevitably moved to the edge as technological
advances in core networking are implemented.
Router Components Suppliers
Many component suppliers for router equipment are similar to those generally used
within the IT and electronics industry. The extent to which router vendors rely on them
depends upon their internal capabilities. For example, Avici outsources several
components, including its proprietary ASICs, from single or a limited number of sources.
Examples of components purchased include optical components, field programmable gate
arrays, and a variety of ASICs (MSDW 2000b). With respect to ASICs, larger
companies such as Cisco may purchase entire ASICs design houses, as described above,
thus obviating the need to source them from suppliers.
Because of the recent boom in Internet infrastructure construction, supply of certain
components has been constrained. In such conditions, some of these components are at
times subject to allocation (MSDW 2000b).
3.4 MOBILE VINFRASTRUCTURE EQUIPMENT
Mobile telecommunications' 3 is an R&D-intensive, rapidly evolving sector with
numerous companies, large and small, involved in the development, manufacture, and
marketing of equipment and services. The mobile infrastructure equipment markets are
dominated by a relatively small number of large OEMs who have the size, financial
12 Operating Systems run the router hardware and allow it to effectively operate within its network
environment.
"3 Also referred to as wireless, cellular, or PCS.
strength, global reach and technology leadership to maintain a strong presence in regions
throughout the world. Mobile service providers contract with OEMs to plan,
manufacture, integrate, install, and in many cases to manage their mobile networks.
Although the OEMs manufacture a number of subsystem products for use in their
networks, an array of independent subsystems suppliers provide the OEMs with hardware
that is complementary and/or competitive to their internal capabilities. It is believed that
many large systems providers will turn to outside vendors for more of their subsystem
products 14 (BT Alex.Brown 1999b). However, the dominance of the OEM in the mobile
infrastructure market remains paramount (BT Alex.Brown 1999b). Figure 3.2 shows a
schematic of the mobile infrastructure supply chain.
Figure 3.2 The Mobile Communications Industry Structure
Source: BTAlex.Brown (1999b)
14 Less frequently, the network operator will also purchase individual components directly from a
subsystem provider.
Mobile Infrastructure Systems Providers
There are five leading OEMs in the mobile infrastructure market: Ericsson, Lucent,
Motorola, Nokia and Nortel. In addition, there are several regional and second-tier
OEMs such as Siemens, Alcatel, Hughes Network Systems, NEC, Hitachi, Fujitsu,
Samsung, Hyundai, and LGIC.
Ericsson is the market share leader globally based on its leadership in two important
segments, GSM and TDMA (where it holds the top position in both)' 5 . Nokia has also
gained market share in the GSM market (it is number two), based in part on its
dominance of the GSM 1800 segment' 6 (BT Alex.Brown 1999b).
Lucent is strong in CDMA (number one position) and TDMA (number two position),
which are the largest digital standards in the U.S., but has been less active in international
markets. In the case of Motorola, it has been a pathfinder in the mobile industry and has
won significant GSM and CDMA contracts. Although Motorola has had problems due to
its lack of an internally manufactured switch, it is addressing these issues through closer
partnerships with Alcatel and Cisco, who supply them. Nortel has also been a significant
player in all digital standards, and recent reports are that the company's mobile
infrastructure business is gaining momentum (BT Alex.Brown 1999b). Table 3.5
summarizes the major OEMs and their respective market shares.
















Source: BT Alex.Brown (1999b)
Technology Trends: Third Generation Networks
The major OEMs (and their suppliers) are developing new mobile network equipment for
the advent of third generation (or '3G') wireless communications. 3G is based on a new
communications standard (of which there are several competing versions) which allows
the transmission of greater amounts of data. Although many networks will upgrade to 3G
via an intermediate '2.5G' standard, technologically speaking it is a large step-change in
5 GSM is the largest digital standard accounting for over 50% of all global cellular/PCS subscribers. GSM
is deployed exclusive of any other digital standard in Western Europe and is the most widely deployed
standard in China. TDMA is a smaller, but rapidly growing standard in North and South America.
16 GSM systems deployed at 1800 MHz, the European equivalent of PCS frequencies in the U.S.
I
the industry and has necessitated much R&D effort and cooperation among OEMs,
suppliers and telecom carriers.
Mobile Infrastructure Component and Subsystems Suppliers
Component and subsystems suppliers exist as either independent companies or business
units within the large OEMs. Furthermore, there are several privately-owned companies
appearing on the market with new component and subsystem technologies which will be
particularly useful as networks evolve to 3G. Table 3.6 shows a selection of the leading
suppliers and their principal products.
Table 3.6 Mobile Infrastructure Components and Subsystem Suppliers
Company Ticker Main Products
Digital DMIC Leading independent manufacturer of point-to-point wireless microwave
Microwave communications systems. Products include microwave radios for low,
Corporation medium, and high capacity applications, available for a wide range of
frequencies and transmission capacities.
Powerwave PWAV Designs, manufactures and markets ultra-linear radio frequency power
Technologies amplifiers, which are integral components of wireless communications base
stations in cellular and PCS networks.
Qualcomm Inc. QCOM Developer and manufacturer of digital wireless communications products
and services based on CDMA digital technology. Major business areas
include CDMA phones, ASICs, technology licensing, and satellite-based
systems. Recently sold its infrastructure segment to Ericsson. Is a leading
provider of CDMA chipsets for phones and base stations.
Tekelec TKLC A leading supplier of innovative network switching solutions and advanced
diagnostic systems. Tekelec's Eagle platform is designed to meet the
complex requirements of the converged IP/SS7 network and traditional SS7
networks, enabling wireline, wirless and IP network operators to deliver
intelligent network services.
Conductus - Develops, manufactures and markets electronic products based on High
Temperature Superconducting (HTS) Technology. It has developed HTS
filters for wireless base stations. The company also undertakes contract
research programs, mainly for government.
Illinois Develops, manufactures and markets high performance front end equipment
Superconductor products for the wireless market based on its proprietary high temperature
Corporation superconductor materials. It is focussing on tower-mounted HTS filter
systems capable of operating under harsh conditions. In May 2000 it
acquired Spectral Solutions Inc. (SSI).
Metawave Provides capacity enhancement solutions to the wireless industry. It
Communication designs, develops and manufactures smart antennas for CDMA 800 MHz
Corp. and GSM 1800 MHz networks. The company is viewed as a leader in the
smart antenna technology. In September 2000, acquired Adaptive Telecom
Inc which develops embedded array technology for use in 3G networks.
Superconductor Develops, manufactures and markets electronic products based on HTS
Technologies technology, focussing on HTS filters for wireless base stations.
Source: BTAlex.Brown (1999b), and Hoefer & Arnett (2001).
3.5 TRENDS IN COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY TOWARDS GREATER CONFIGURABILITY
OF THE NETWORK
Chapter 2 described a framework presented by Shen (1999) that communications
technology is 'configurational' by nature. Shen used this framework to describe the SPC
switching technology being developed by Chinese firms in the early 1990s. It is
therefore necessary to bring this concept up to date.
Two papers describe the general trend towards greater 'configurability' (alternatively
referred to as modularity, compatibility, or inter-operability within various contexts). It
is relevant to discuss the issue in this chapter as these technological trends are affecting
firms globally as well as having an impact on the industry structure.
The first paper, by Bjorkman et al. (2001), describes the movement that is occurring from
'monoliths' to 'component-based network elements'. It states that, historically,
equipment vendors have provided telecom operators with monolithic equipment built to
provide one or several related functions. This was a reasonable approach from the
vendor's perspective, since many of them were only in a single business area (i.e., router
companies or telephone switch companies). In general, this was also fine with the service
providers as well, since they were often themselves in a single industry (i.e., Internet
service providers, ISPs, or telephone companies). With the advent, of convergence
between communications services involving voice and data, it is no longer true that
service providers provide a single kind of service. Similarly, equipment vendors are
beginning to provide equipment for a diverse range of services. It is difficult, however,
for vendors to provide all the services a customer might desire as the permutations of
possibilities becomes too large and is very dynamic over time. Instead, the vendor will
have to choose one or two services that fit nicely together and bundle them into its new
units. However, from the service operator's perspective, this means that it will need to
deal with a variety of vendors offering equipment that do not necessarily combine
seamlessly to provide the required range of services it wishes to implement. Because of
these changes, the traditional monolithic approach in which the success of the operator is
tightly coupled to the decisions and capabilities of a single equipment vendor is starting
to break down.
Replacing the monolithic model is the component-based system architecture. Although
different versions of this architecture are being proposed, one common feature is that
'critical interface points' are open and defined in detail. These open definitions allow for
diverse equipment vendors to build function-specific equipment able to be matched with
equipment from other vendors. This leads to flexibility for operators who no longer have
to make all-or-nothing decisions when building networks. At the same time, the potential
for market growth for equipment vendors is tremendous as operators previously tied to
specific suppliers become potential customers.
Bjorkman et al. State that both large and small service providers and equipment vendors
are aligning behind this new network model. Table 3.7 describes various forums that
have been set up to foster different aspects of the component-based network architecture:
Table 3.7 Forums to Promote Component-Based Architectures
Forum Purpose Members
Multiservice The MSF's mission is to accelerate the Founded by Cisco, Bellcore and
Switching Forum deployment of open communication systems MCI Worldcom in 1998, and
(MSF) using the flexible support of a full range of currently has 57 members.
networks services over multiple infrastructure
technologies.
Opensig and Begun by Columbia Unversity in 1996, the
OpenArch first OpenSig workshop was held to promote
research on open network issues. In 1998 the
IEEE Communications Society integrated
OpenSig into its OpenArch conference.
IEEE P 1520 IEEE established P1520 as a standardization
group for programmable networks. The goal
is to make the network as programmable as the
PC through a set of standardized application
programming interfaces (APIs).
The International The ISC's objective is to promote open Approximately 150 members.
Softswitch architectures, protocols, and APIs. The
Consortium (ISC) Consortium focuses on inter-operability and
certification of voice and other real-time
services.
Parlay The purpose of the Parlay Group is to enable AT&T, BT, Cegetel, Cisco,
enterprises to control a range of network Ericsson, IBM, Lucent,
capabilities and access information within the Microsoft, Nortel Networks,
network operator's domain. Siemens and Ulticom BT. It is
open to all interested parties.
IETF The IETF has taken many initiatives to allow -
external control in the following areas: Media
Gateway Control; Common Open Policy
Service; General Switch Management
Protocol; and Simple Network Management
Protocol.
Source:. Bjorkmnan et al (2001)
In a more forward-looking paper, Peter Cellarius (1998) discusses the establishment of a
Global Information Infrastructure (GII). The GII is actually a 'network of networks'
which must function as one, with all the component networks working together and inter-
operating. Cellarius points to a number of global trends leading towards the realization
of the GII. For example, he argues that the opening of telecommunications markets
through de-regulation, and the removal of barriers through free-trade agreements, will
result in a significantly more competitive and expanding marketplace. Thus it can be
expected that both the number of service providers and product suppliers will increase.
He states that in an increasing number of cases, end-to-end services will no longer be
provided by a single organization, nor will the totality of equipment needed for a service
be supplied by a single manufacturer. This agrees with the trends discussed in the more
recent paper by Bjorkman et al. (2001).
3.6 SUMMARY
This chapter highlights that much knowledge and technology lies within component
suppliers in the infrastructure equipment industry. It is at their level that breakthrough
scientific and technological innovation often takes place. The 'systems companies' - the
large brand-name companies which manufacture equipment - also develop intellectual
property. This intellectual property arises from their own R&D and is materialized
within new configurations of components (such as ASICs) and, especially, in the design
of the software that runs their manufactured hardware. This model particularly applies to
the optical and wireless equipment industries, and to a lesser extent to the data
networking/router manufacturers.
Another issue that these models reveal is that there is a general trend towards making
equipment interoperable with that of other vendors. This is both a customer-driven trend
- as service providers want to be able to offer 'best-of-breed' solutions - and a
competitor-driven strategy, as smaller start-ups try to take market share from larger
incumbent OEMs.
Implications for China's Telecom Equipment Industry
The industry trends described in this chapter have several implications for Chinese
companies. The formation of a supplier base with advanced technological capabilities
may be favorable for Chinese firms since it gives them the option to outsource
component manufacturing. Thus Chinese companies may be able to concentrate on
cultivating the core competencies of systems providers described above: software
development, systems engineering, and ASICs development. The international industry
survey has produced certain models that Chinese firms might be able to emulate. At least
in the optics and Internet router segments, newer companies such as Sycamore Networks
and Avici have tended to outsource as much as they can. At the same time, they have
worked closely with component suppliers to develop the parts and modules they need to
use. The advantage of this model has been that companies can concentrate on their core
competencies while decreasing their time-to-market, which is critical in a fast-moving
industry. It should also be noted that the scarcity of talent in the technology-intensive
component sector that is felt in the U.S. (even though it has the universities that can
produce it) may indicate that Chinese firms will have difficulty finding this talent at
home. Even if it does exist, it will probably be attracted to the higher paying
opportunities abroad (e.g. in Silicon Valley). Thus Chinese equipment companies may
have no choice but to outsource parts of the value chain that require scarce specialist
skills.
The fact that component suppliers are beginning to offer greater integration to their
customers by moving into the supply of modules is also favorable to Chinese equipment
vendors. If they choose to follow an outsourcing strategy, they may now be able to
outsource a greater part of the value chain to companies such as JDS Uniphase. The
advantages of this are, once again, better time-to-market, as well potentially higher
quality products. Improved product quality derives from the fact that the assembly of
certain components is a very high-precision process (especially in optics), thus
outsourcing this to suppliers with the appropriate capabilities might be desirable.
The observation that most innovation generally lies within the high-tech suppliers of
components and modules also has implications for Chinese companies. Many of these
high-tech suppliers are increasingly on the look out for deals with companies that offer
the promise of large markets for their products, and China is one such market' 7. Thus
Chinese firms might be in a position to tap into the cutting edge technology within these
firms and incorporate it into their products.
Lastly, a phenomenon that has been growing over recent years is the rising importance of
contract manufacturers. These include companies such as Flextronics, Celestica and
Jabil. They have been mostly involved in the outsourcing of manufacturing services in
consumer electronics, but have been moving into other fields such as telecom
infrastructure equipment (e.g. manufacturing routers and mobile subsystems). JDS
Uniphase, as mentioned above, has been outsourcing some component manufacturing to
Celestica. Although manufacturing issues are not central to the arguments of this thesis,
the trend towards more contract manufacturing may have a potential impact on Chinese
firms, as all the major electronics contract manufacturers have a presence in China. From
a technology standpoint, contract manufacturers are repositories of manufacturing best
practice, as well as out of necessity gaining a certain understanding of the technology
they are being paid to manufacture 8. Outsourcing to these companies, or becoming them
may be alternative possibilities for Chinese equipment firms. In the former scenario, it
would let Chinese firms concentrate on the technology and liberate resources from
manufacturing. It has been discussed above that good manufacturing capabilities are
critical for this industry. Chinese telecom infrastructure equipment vendors must
therefore consider whether they are able to acquire these capabilities, or else outsource
them to contract manufacturers.
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'8 Professor Charles Fine, MIT Sloan School of Management (personal communication).
4 The Telecom Equipment Industry in China
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter will begin by discussing the origins of China's telecom infrastructure
equipment industry and its evolution to its present state. In a similar way to the
preceding chapter, it will then attempt to draw a picture of the telecom equipment
industry structure as it relates to China.
4.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA 'S TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGYAND
TELECOM INFRASTRUCTURE EQUIPMENT MARKET
In the early 1980s China's communication infrastructure was weak. Furthermore,
Chinese industry was unable to design or manufacture digital communications
technologies such as SPC switches', which were at that time considered to be relatively
advanced pieces of equipment. The government realized that the only way forward was
to import foreign technologies and to assimilate, innovate and develop Chinese products
on the basis of these technologies. In order to achieve this, the former Ministry of Posts
& Telecommunications (MPT) drew up a three-pronged strategy: to import, to establish
joint ventures with foreign counterparts and, in parallel, to conduct independent research
and development (Peng 1999).
Early Joint Ventures in SPC Switches and the Emergence of China's Telecom
Equipment Industry
In the early stages of China's opening to the West, the Chinese government encouraged
foreign companies to establish joint ventures in China. Shanghai Bell Co., Ltd. became
the first telecom equipment joint venture, manufacturing stored program controlled (SPC)
switches, and was a result of a partnership between the China Posts and
Telecommunications Industry Corporation (PTIC) 2  and the Bell Telephone
Manufacturing (BTM) Company of Belgium (now part of Alcatel). Production at
Shanghai Bell started in 1985 and, by 1998, it had produced a cumulative total of 33
million lines of its System-12 SPC switch - about a quarter of all switches sold in China.
By then, its component localization rate had reached 74%, and that of software
'SPC signifies 'software program controlled'. SPC switches are the digital equivalent of the analogue
cross-bar switches previously used in China. SPC switches can be programmed with a variety of
'intelligent' features according to customer needs.
2' The Posts and Telecommunications Industrial Corporation (PTIC) was the industrial unit of the MPT set
up at the start of the economic reforms to co-ordinate the activities of the MPT's 28 firms. It had
previously undertaken equipment provision for the MPT's public network.
development 90%. Total sales revenues over the 1985-98 period reached 28.2 billion
RMB (US$ 3.4 billion)3.
Shanghai Bell spawned the growth of over eighty electronic products enterprises (Peng
1999). In addition, large-scale integrated circuit production technology was introduced
by BTM (for use within the System-12 switches) through a joint venture with Shanghai
Bell (itself a JV), called Shanghai Belling Microelectronic Manufacturing Co. Ltd.
Since 1990, several major joint ventures were establish in China for the purpose of
producing switching technology. The largest of these are:
* Beijing International Switching System Corporation. Ltd. (BISC), in cooperation with
Siemens of Germany;
* Tianjin NEC Electronics & Communications Industry Co. Ltd., with NEC of Japan;
* Lucent Technologies Qingdao Telecommunications Systems, Ltd., with Lucent
Technologies of the U.S.;
* Guangdong-Nortel Telecommunications Systems Equipment Ltd., with Nortel of
Canada;
* Jiangsu Fujitsu Telecommunications Technology Co. Ltd., with Fujitsu of Japan; and
* Nanjing Ericsson Communications Co. Ltd., with Ericsson of Sweden.
Chinese-Developed SPC Switches and the Birth of China's Leading Telecom
Manufacturing Companies
The first Chinese-developed SPC switch, the HJD-04, was co-developed by the PTIC, the
Information Engineering Institute of the People's Liberation Army, and the Luoyang
Telephone Equipment Factory of the former MPT (Shen 1999). The relationship
between these three organizations began in 1988, then in September 1993 the HJD-04
was approved by the MPT for use within its network, and in 1994 the HJD-04 No. 7
signaling system was successfully completed4. In order to commercialize this system,
Julong (also known as Great Dragon Telecommunications Co. Ltd.) was founded in
Beijing in March 1995. By 1998, sales of its system totaled 17 million lines, translating
to a 17% share of the country's installed base of switches (Peng 1999).
Following in the footsteps of Julong's precursor and its HJD-04, Xi'an Datang Telecom
Co. Ltd. was founded in 1993 and launched its own, self-developed, SP30 super digital
SPC switch which passed production appraisal and obtained its network access license
from the MPT in 1995. Zhongxing Telecom Ltd. (ZTE) of Shenzhen was also founded in
1993 and its own ZXJI0 digital SPC switch obtained its license in 1995. Huawei
Technologies Co. Ltd. of Shenzhen also developed its own C&CO8 small capacity digital
SPC switch and high capacity switch which obtained their network licenses in 1994 and
3 Tuhis joint venture is currently diversifying its product range into four main categories: System-12 SPC
systems; mobile/data equipment; access network equipment; and multimedia terminals (Peng 1999).
4 The No. 7 signaling system is the system specifically used for communication within the Chinese
nationwide network.
1995, respectively. Lastly, Jinpeng Electronic Information Machine Co. Ltd was
established in 1996, the same year in which its ETM-601 digital SPC switch obtained a
network license (Peng 1999).
As of the end of 1997, there were 58 wholly owned Chinese companies manufacturing
local switches and related products with an annual output of 12 million lines. In addition
to the above companies, these also included Huaguang (producing the JSN-1), Legend
(with its LEX-500), Song Da (HJD-1000), and the Beijing Telecom Equipment Factory
(JSU2000-05) (U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1999).
Table 4.1 Local Switching Exchange Installed Base and Shipment by Model,
1996-1998
Installed Base Shipments
Supplier 1996 1997 1998 1996 1997 1998
Alcatel 34,826,309 40.526,909 45,792,851 8,257,859 5,700,601 5,265,941
NEC 8,884.900 9,573,760 10,405,200 1,534,854 688,860 831,440
Fujitsu 10.254,241 11,749,241 13,460,077 1,413,451 1,495,000 1,710,837
Siemens 10,765,417 11,431,080 15,127,765 3,220,505 665,663 3,696,686
Ericsson 8,702,498 9,012,464 9,797,992 504,943 309,966 785,529
Nortel 7,595,000 8,602,500 9,817,500 2,195,000 1,007,500 1,215,000
Lucent 3,451,086 4,400,000 4,840,001 964,136 948,914 440,001
Huawei 3,669,426 6,084,508 10,502,316 1,849.823 2,415,082 4,417,808
Datang 1,430,000 2,090,909 2,714,286 830,000 660,909 623,377
Julong 3,300,000 5,162,400 8,192,600 1,800,000 1,862,400 3,030,200
Zhongxing 1,023.570 1,653,272 3,513.867 528,524 629,703 1,860,595
Other 485.554 592,857 682,898 389,165 139,403 129,681
TOTAL 94,388,000 110.879,900 134,847353 23,488.260 16.524.000 24.007,093
Source: Pyramid Research 1999a
Today, Huawei, ZTE (Zhongxing), Datang and Julong form the core of China's domestic
telecom equipment manufacturing industry as 'pure' Chinese companies. They have
either grown out of state R&D and production facilities, or were independently
established by entrepreneurs with government backing.
4.3 OVERVIEW OF CHINA 'S FOUR LEADING EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS
The development of China's SPC switching market set the foundation for the growth and
diversification of its telecom equipment industry. This saw the emergence of four
leading domestic equipment firms: Huawei Technologies, ZTE, Datang Telecom Co., and
Julong. As discussed above, these companies all have common origins in SPC switch
manufacturing, although they are today establishing a more diversified range of telecom
products. Chapter 6 will focus on case studies of Huawei and ZTE.
Huawei Technologies
Huawei was set up in 1988 as a private company by Ren Zhengfei, a former officer in the
People's Liberation Army. It is the only large Chinese telecom equipment vendor that is
non state-owned. The company currently has over 15,000 employees, more than 80% of
Huawei's staff have university degrees and have an average age of 27 years (Business
Wire 2000b).
Huawei has 33 sales and marketing offices and 35 after-sales offices in China.
Internationally, it has 35 branch offices in five continents, and its products have been
introduced into over thirty countries including Africa (Algeria, Kenya), the Middle East
(Yemen, Iraq), Asia (Laos, Hong Kong), Russia, Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Lithuania,
Bulgaria) and Brazil.
In 2000, Huawei had recorded revenues of over US$ 2.65 billion, up from US$ 1.5
billion in 1999 and US$ 1.08 billion in 1998. Projected revenues for 2001 are expected
to be in the order of US$ 5 billion5 .
Huawei has the highest sales revenue of the four companies. Although a latecomer in the
telecom equipment manufacturing sector compared to Julong, it has rapidly risen to be
the 'star' of the Chinese infrastructure equipment industry and has been developing
technologies on several fronts.
ZTE Corporation (Zhongxing)
The precursor to ZTE was established in 1985 as the Zhongxing Semiconductor Co. Ltd.
under the sponsorship of three organizations. These were the No. 691 Factory (under the
former Ministry of Aerospace Industry, or MAI), the Changcheng Industrial Co. Ltd
(Shenzhen office), and the Yunxing Electronic Trading Co. Ltd. In 1986 the company
established its first research and development institute in Shenzhen. In 1990, Zhongxing
Semiconductor obtained the certification and licensing from the former Ministry of Posts
&Telecommunications (MPT) for its digital switch - the ZX500. This was followed by
ZX500 (A) digital switch for C5 end offices which obtained a license in 1991.
In 1992, the company registered under the name Zhongxing-Weixian Telecom
Equipment Co. Ltd. with the MAI as main shareholder and a capital of RMB 3 million.
In 1993, the company developed its ZXJ2000 digital SPC switch and obtained a license
from the MPT. In that year, Zhongxing-Weixian's switch succeeded in obtaining a 13%
market share in rural areas.
In 1993, the Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment Co., Ltd (ZTE) was registered
under the sponsorship of the No. 691 Factory, Guanyu Industrial Co. Ltd. (Shenzhen),
and Zhongxing-Weixian Telecommunication Equipment Co. Ltd. Thus ZTE was created
with an initial capital of RMB 3 million provided by its three shareholders. In 1997, the
5 Information obtained from Huawei website.
company listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 1997 was also the year in which ZTE
commercialized its flagship product, the ZXJl10 Digital SPC switch which, together with
its ZXA10 Access Server, were recognized as 'important new products' by the Ministry
of Science and Technology (MST).
The company has long been a recipient of local and national government support. In
1994 ZTE was designated by the Shenzhen Government as a High-Tech Enterprised and
received an AAA credit rating for bank loans. In 1996 it was designated by the State
Council as one of the 300 key state-owned enterprises (this group was later increased to
include 520 enterprises in total). In 1999, the company was chosen as a key enterprise to
be supported by the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) and the Ministry of
Information Industries (MIT).
ZTE has 26 sales offices and the same number of service centers throughout China. All
in all, more than 2,000 engineers and technicians are in charge of sales, commissioning
and technical support. Over 40 marketing and engineering service centers have been
established in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin
America and the USA.
In 2000, ZTE claimed sales revenues amounting to RMB 10.2 billion (US$ 1.23 billion),
with total assets of RMB 630 million (US$ 76 million). ZTE is considered to be in
second place among Chinese telecom equipment manufacturers in terms of revenues and
technology. It has also developed a series of successful products within several
categories of communications technology, and is aggressively expanding internationally.
Datang Corporation
Xi'an Datang was formed in 1993 and in 1998 the company became known as Datang
Corporation when it was listed on the Shanghai stock exchange. The company's
corporate headquarters and primary manufacturing facilities are located in Xi'an, with
other manufacturing sites being located in Shanghai and Shenzhen.
Datang's strategy is to invest heavily in R&D and works closely with research institutes
and universities. Datang has an R&D center in Shanghai and, in addition, it cooperates
on R&D with universities such as Dongnan University and Tsinghua University. Datang
became the first local company to develop CDMA mobile communications technology.
Julong (Great Dragon Telecommunications)
Julong was set up jointly in 1995 by the National Engineering Technology Research
Center and the China Post and Telecommunication Industry Corporation (PTIC). Julong
is in effect under the jurisdiction of the PTIC which functions as its holding company.
The formation of Julong brought together nine separate HJD-04 manufacturers as well as
some R&D institutes under one roof, and was an attempt by the Chinese government to
consolidate the extremely fragmented switching industry6.
Initially, Julong was very successful in the switching market and led the domestic
industry. It has also diversified into mobile communications and other telecom
technologies. However, in terms of technology and revenues, it is widely acknowledged
that the company is now relegated to fourth place. Reasons given for this by former
employees have been internal management issues (the company has a very complicated
governance structure), and wasting of resources7.
4.4 CHINA 'S TELECOM INFRASTRUCTURE INDUSTRY: OPTICAL, DATA NETWORKING AND
CELLULAR EQUIPMENT
Figure 4.1 summarizes the basic structure of the telecom equipment industry in China.
Because of the difficulty in obtaining precise data on supply chain relationships, an
aggregate view of the industry is presented encompassing the optical, wireless and data
networking segments.
Figure 4.1 Aggregate View of China's Telecom Equipment Industry Structure
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b By the mid-nineties, the HJD-04 technology had been widely disseminated and several small factories had
sprouted to manufacture and sell this equipment (the government had a policy to spread the fruits of R&D
behind HJD-04). Market entry by new competitors was done without consideration of efficient
manufacturing scale nor the excess capacity already present. In addition, cut-throat competitive mentalities
led to unsustainably low prices and unprofitable businesses.
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China's Optical Telecommunications Equipment Industry
Domestic companies are now manufacturing optical transmission equipment and have
developed WDM and DWDM products. However, it is proving difficult for domestic
firms to emulate their success in the switching market within the optical transmission
sector due to the higher technological complexity of this equipment. In 1999, foreign
manufacturers still commanded 90% of the optical transmissions market at the national
(backbone) level, and 70% at the provincial level, dominating with their SDH and WDM
systems. Nevertheless, Chinese companies such as Huawei and the Wuhan Research
Institute (WRI) have won some transmission contracts at the provincial and county level
with their PDH and SDH-based transmission products (Pyramid Research 1999a).
Foreign manufacturers are targeting the high-end of the market in order to stay ahead of
local competition, and are importing the latest transmission technology and localizing
production.
China is currently the third largest producer of optical cable in the world, with over 120
firms producing optical cable and an annual production of abut 300 thousand kilometers
(and a capacity to produce 500 thousand kilometers of cable per year). Chinese
producers claim 60% market share, however domestically produced optical cable is of a
conventional and relatively simple type. Thus over 90% of special products, such as
marine cable, need to be imported (AI Consulting 2000a).
Wuhan's 'Optics Valley': Fertile Ground for the Growth of an Indigenous Components
Industry
A key research, development, and production area for fiber-optic telecommunications
components is located in central China in the Wuhan East Lake High Tech Development
Zone (HTDZ) 8. This zone is part of an area of universities and enterprises the Chinese
government calls the "optics valley of China". The largest of several emerging optics
technology centers in China, this zone was originally established in 1991 to further the
research and development of optoelectronics, bioengineering, and software in China
(Richards 2000).
One of the key institutions within the Wuhan HTDZ is the Huazhong University of
Science and Technology, which established a national gas and solid-state laser lab in
1980. In the 1990s, the focus of the lab turned to fiber-optic communications as the
market potential of this technology became evident. In 1994 the first national optical
telecom research center was established, and a national photon-electron technology
center was built in 1999. As a consequence, the university's research in these areas have
given it a well-known reputation in laser technology.
Today, the Wuhan East Lake HTDZ includes 23 universities, 56 research institutes, and
59 optoelectronics-related companies. Among the most prominent of these enterprises is
the Wuhan Research hInstitute of Posts & Telecommunications (WRI), which is an
umbrella organization encompassing several institutes and companies. These include the
8 By 2005, this zone is planned to reach 50 square kilometers.
Wuhan Telecommunications Devices Corp. (a partner of Coming Lasertron), the Solid-
State Device Institute, and Fiberhome Optic Communication Corp. WRI developed
China's first 2.5 Gigabit(Gbit)/sec SDH system and also deployed China's first
4x2.5Gbit/sec DWDM system in the Haiko-Sanya fiber-optic route in April 1998.
Within close proximity to the East Lake HTDZ is the Yangtze Optical Fiber & Cable Co.
Ltd. (YOFC), the largest fiber and cable producer in China, owned by Draka/NC Cables.
Other companies in the area include Changjiang Ericsson Co. and Wuhan NEC Optical
Fiber Communications Industry Co. Ltd. Annual production of optical fiber within the
'optics valley' has reached 2.5 million kilometers of cable.
Like other high-tech development zones in China, enterprises in the Wuhan East Lake
HTDZ benefit from state-level preferential policies such as reduced income tax of 15%,
exemption from municipal level fees, and lower land charges. Furthermore, the local
authority - the Administrative Committee of the Wuhan East Lake HTDZ - is actively
pursuing foreign and domestic investment with a fair amount of success 9.
Guangdong's 'Photon Valley'
The Provincial Government of Guangdong is encouraging the growth of an indigenous
optoelectronics industry in Southern China. As part of this initiative, the local
government has signed a memorandum of understanding with Lucent Technologies
(China) for the U.S. company to provide advisory support in establishing this industry' °.
Lucent has separately set up a joint R&D lab with Huawei in Shenzhen to focus on
developing optical components for the Chinese company's products".
Participants in China's Optical Industry
There are about twenty manufacturers of PDH and SDH optical equipment in China,
seven of which are joint ventures with the major foreign companies - Lucent, Fujitsu,
NEC, Alcatel, Nokia, Siemens and Ericsson. The largest manufacturers are Lucent
Shanghai Transmission Equipment Co., Nanjing Fujitsu Transmission Equipment Co.,
Wuhan NEC Fiberoptic Telecom Equipment Co., and Huawei Technologies (Richards
2000). Foreign suppliers still command over 90% share of the transmission market at the
national (backbone) level, and 70% at the provincial level, dominating with their optical
SDH and WDM systems 12 (Pyramid 1999a). Tables 4.2 and 4.3 list the optical systems
and components/subsystems providers in China.
9 The China Construction Bank recently authorized its Hubei branch to grant loans of up to 8 billion yuan
(US $964 billion) to the Wuhan optics valley. The agreement represents 40% of the gross investment
intended for the optics valley. Separately. the Hubei branch granted a loan of 2 billion yuan (US $241
million) to a group of high-tech enterprises in the Wuhan HTDZ. of which 600 million yuan (US $72
million) will be used to invest in optoelectronic information companies (Richards 2000).
'0 Information obtained from Huawei's website (www.huawei.com).
" See Chapter 6.
12 China Telecom's main WDM suppliers were WRI, NEC, Lucent and Alcatel at the national (backbone)
network (Pyramid Research 1999a).
Table 4.2 Optical Communication Systems Providers
Company Owner Products Made
-ship'
Huawei C DWDM
Zhongxing (ZTE) C DWDM
Wuhan Research Institute C DWDM(WRI)
Nanjing Fujitsu Telecom JV SDH/PDH fiber-optic transmission systems
Equipment Co.
Lucent Technologies JV Optical digital transmission systems, including SDH
Shanghai
Wuhan NEC Optical Fiber JV SDH/PDH fiber-optic transmission systems
Communications Co.
Shenyang Nortel JV SDH transmission systems
C = Chinese (state-owned or private); F = Foreign (wholly-owned); JV = Chinese-Foreign joint
venture
Source: PTIC, Pyramid Reseach
Table 4.3 Components and Sub-system Suppliers for the Optical Equipment
Industry
Company Ownership* Products Made Customer
Component Suppliers
Fujian Casix Laser (acquired by JDS F Fiber-optic component processing and JDS Uniphase
Uniphase) assembly, optical design, fabrication and subsidiary
coating. Advanced crystal growth.
Luminent Inc. F Assembly and testing of passive optical Cisco, Marconi,
components (manufactured in Taiwan) JDS Uniphase
PTIC Houma Comm. Cable Co C Optical cable
Shanghai Posts & Telecom C Optical transmission equipment
Equipment Co. (PTIC)
Chengdu Cable Co. (PTIC) C Optic fiber, optical cable
Chongqing Communications C Optic transmission equipment
Equipment Co. (PTIC)
Lucent Beijing Optical Cable Co JV Optical Cable Lucent
Lucent Technologies Shanghai Fiber JV Fiber optic products Lucent
Optic Co.
Siemens Communications Systems JV 'Last mile' products for fiber-optic Siemens
networks.
Siemens Optical Fiber Cable Co. JV Entire range of fiber-optical cables, Siemens
including terrestrial and fiber ribbon cables
Wuhan Institute of Posts & Telecom C Optical cable
Science
Foshan City Zhongbao Enterprise C Optical fiber cable
Group Co.
Shanghai Huaxin Wire and Cable C Optical fiber cable
Zhejiang Tianyi Group Co. C Optical fiber cable
Yangtze Optical Fiber and Cable Co JV Optical fiber
Sub-system Suppliers
ADC Telecom Nanjing F Fiber optical distribution systems, optical
components, optical subsystems for the
China and international market.
Oplink Communications Shanghai, F Optical components and modules
Beijing and Zhuhai
Zhejian Eastcom Comm. Co (PTIC) C Wireless optical access network
Guangzhou P&T Equip. Co. (PTIC) C Optic transmission systems
Beijing Optical Comm. Technology C SDH optical fiber transmission system -
Co. (PTIC)
Guangzhou Nanfang Transmission JV PDH and SDH fiber-optic transmission Siemens
Systems systems
Alcatel Chengdu Communictions JV PDH/SDH fiber-optic transmission Alcatel
Systems Co systems
Wuhan Yangtze Ericsson JV SDH Optical equipment Ericsson
Lucent Shanghai Optical Fiber Co. JV SDH Transmission equipment, access Lucent
network equipment
Shenyang Nortel JV Development, marketing and production of Nortel
SDH transmission systems
C = Chinese (state-owned or private); F = Foreign (wholly-owned); JV = Chinese-Foreign joint
venture
Source: PTIC, Pyramid Research, various industry newswires
Fujian Casix and JDS Uniphase
In 2000, JDS Uniphase 13 announced that it had acquired Fujian Casix Laser, a Chinese
optical components group (PR Newswire 2000b). Fujian Casix Laser was a profitable
operation previously owned by FEH, a private holding company controlled by the Fujian
provincial government. Casix, which is ISO 9001 certified, now operates as a wholly-
owned subsidiary of JDS Uniphase and employs 750 staff, primarily at its principal
offices in Fuzhou, Fujian.
Fujian Casix supplies crystals, fiber-optic components and optics for telecom networks.
The company's key technologies include fiber-optic component processing and assembly
as well as optical design, fabrication, and coating. Fujian Casix also engages in advance
crystal growth and processing 14. The advanced materials obtained by JDS through this
acquisition are used to make interlevers 15 . This is a prized technology in the components
segment which JDS claims will give it the ability to become more competitive in the
interlever marketplace.
"The acquisition represents an important move in our global manufacturing strategy.
The Casix management team has demonstrated strong leadership skills which we expect
will serve us well for our first venture in China. We believe that the advanced materials
science expertise at Casix is a key to new generations of components for optical
networks."
JozefStraus
JDS Uniphase Co-Chairman, President and Chief Operating Officer
The acquisition is an indication that JDS Uniphase is betting on a booming fiber-optic
market in China. It also provides the U.S. supplier with a strategic manufacturing
location in a low-wage region and, according to company executives, will serve as a
platform for the global market. According to statements made by the company, JDS is
planning additional investments to increase Fujian Casix Laser's manufacturing capacity.
13 See Chapter 3.
14 The crystals produced or processed by Casix include YVO4 and Lithium Niobate, both of which are used
in the production of various advanced fiber optic components. Fiber optic components produced by Casix
include basic assemblies such as fiber tips ("pigtails") and jumpers, and components such as collimators,
isolators and polarization beam splitters. Casix also performs significant production and processing of
basic optical elements such as etalons, waveplates, prisms, isolator cores, windows and filters, and the
application of anti-reflective coatings to various optical elements.
Interlevers are devices designed to, for example, separate a 40-channel fiber optic system with 50-Gbyte
spacing into two streams with 20 channels each and with 100-Gbyte spacing. The advantage is that it
alleviates the need for multiplexing.
Challenges for Domestic Firms
According to Information Gatekeepers Inc. (IGI), a Boston-based consulting firm, optical
technology development in China lags about one year behind that of industry leaders.
Although it is technologically advanced, it is not at the cutting edge. For this reason
domestic manufacturers are trying to export to markets that are more price-sensitive such
as Russia, Southeast Asia, India and Eastern Europe.
China's Data Networking Industry
Foreign manufacturers have captured most of the data networking equipment market in
China (AI Consulting 2000c). China's local manufacturing industry is behind in remote-
access servers, and limited mainly to low-end routers (such as Cisco's 2500 service
routers). Local vendors also have a long way to go to refine their ATM switching
technology and, although they already have the switching fiber and ports, they have yet to
master the software technology. It has been argued that it is difficult for local vendors to
catch up as quickly in the data networking equipment market, compared to the switching
and transmission equipment markets, because the technology is changing so fast.
However, local ATM vendors are making aggressive attempts to lay a claim in this
market (Pyramid 1999a). Table 4.4 lists the major domestic participants in China's data
networking industry.
Table 4.4 Data Networking Systems and Component/Module Suppliers
Company Owner Products Made
-ship
Systems and Equipment Providers
Centel Telecom Co. (PTIC) C Access routers, ISDN terminals
Gao Hong (under the MII) C ATM switch (CS-1000). Was the first domestic supplier to
develop an ATM switch in 1998 with the China Academy of
Telecom Technology.
Huawei C Core, backbone, modular, branch and SOHO routers, ethernet
switches, access servers
Shanghai Bell joint venture JV Developing an ATM switch (with less than 10 switch nodes)
with BUPT
°
Shanghai Radio Comm. C IP switching systems
Equipment Co. (PTIC)
ZTE C Terabit IP router, access server, ISDN router, backbone switch,
access switch, service access equipment, access multiplexer.
Component and Module Providers
Nanjing P&T Equipment Co C Data communications products such as CDPD, POS, ISDN
(PTIC) adapter, desktop video conference
C = Chinese (state-owned or pri, ate); F = Foreign (wholly-owned); JV = Chinese-Foreign joint
venture
Beijing University of Posts & Telecommunications
Source: PTIC, Pyramid Research
Foreign networking firms such as Cisco and Juniper do not seem to have a significant
local manufacturing capability in routers, with most of their sales coming in the form of
imports (SG Cowen, 2001).
China's Mobile Equipment Industry
China began to import mobile communications equipment and provide mobile services in
1987, and adopted the GSM mobile standard in 1994. In 1992, Datang Telecom
Technology Group began undertaking R&D on mobile communications equipment and in
1996 produced the first domestic GSM mobile communications system. In cooperation
with Eastcom, Datang launched a mobile communications system incorporating it own
intellectual property in 1998 (the M30-G). Currently, Datang is able to provide a
complete range of mobile communications solutions, including base station controllers
and base stations (Peng 1999). In 1998, Huawei Technologies installed it first self-
developed GSM mobile communications system, the M900 and the dual band
M900/M1800 systems (U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1999). In June 2000, ZTE unveiled its
first complete CDMA system - including base stations, switches, and handsets - which is
ready for commercial development (AI Consulting 2000c). ZTE can also provide a dual
band GSM900/1800 system (U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1999). At present, Datang,
Huawei, ZTE and Jinpeng have obtained access licenses from the MII for their mobile
communications systems.
Participants in China's Mobile Telecom Equipment Industry
China has over 100 telecommunications plants producing mobile system parts and
equipment, the major Chinese GSM producers being Datang, ZTE, Huawei and Jinpeng.
These domestic firms compete with the leading foreign companies (and their JVs) who
currently dominate the market in mobile switches and base station equipment. These
include Tianjin Motorola; Hangzhou Eastern Telecommunications Company (or
EastCom, a Motorola joint venture); Beijing Nokia; Beijing Ericsson; Beijing Matsushita;
Wuhan NEC; Shanghai Siemens; and Shenzhen Philips (U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1999).
In 1999, the percentage of revenues that went to domestic players in mobile base stations,
handsets, and switches stood at 2%, 3% and 4%, respectively (Pyramid Research 1999b)
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 outline a selection of mobile systems providers, and sub-systems and
components suppliers. Note that many of the foreign JVs are classified under 'sub-
systems' suppliers as they provide these to their foreign parent company which is itself
the branded 'system' provider.
Table 4.5 Mobile Infrastructure Systems Providers
Company Owner Products Made
-ship'
Huawei C GSM mobile communication system
Zhongxing (ZTE) C GSM and CDMA mobile communication system, ZXC 10.
Datang C GSM mobile communication system
Jinpeng C GSM mobile communication system
Beijing Ericsson JV GSM mobile communication system
Hangzhou Motorola JV CDMA system infrastructure equipment and services
Beijing Matsushita JV GSM systems
Xi'an Fujitsu Telecom JV Radio and mobile communications systems
Equipment Co.
Xi'an NEC Radio Comm. JV SDH based large-capacity microwave communications systems
Equipment Co.
Guilin NEC Radio JV SDH based microwave systems
Communications Co.
Guangdong Nortel Telecom JV Design, engineering, manufacturing and installation services of
Equipment Co. advanced switching equipment, GSM900/1800 and CDMA
wireless systems.
C = Chinese (state-owned or private); F = Foreign (wholly-owned); JV = Chinese-Foreign joint
venture
Source.: PTIC, Pyramid Research, Nortel
Table 4.6 Components and Sub-system Suppliers for the Mobile Communications
Industry
Company Owner Products Made Customer
-ship
Component Suppliers
PTIC Xi'an Comm. C Wireless frequency amplifier, microwave -
Equipment Factory antenna, mobile station antenna
PTIC Jingdezhen Comm. C Fixed wireless access equipment -
Equipment Factory
PTIC Guilin Telecom C Microwave equipment
Equipment Factory
Shenzhen Kangxun Telecom C Wireless access system components ZTE
Co. Ltd. (ZTE)
Sub-system Suppliers
Huawei C GSM switching system Motorola
ZTE C CDMA switching system
Zhejian Eastcom Comm. Co C GSM communications system equipment
Beijing Taili Technology C Mobile communications equipment
Development Co. (PTIC)
Guangdong Nortel Telecom JV DMS Super Mode products and digital Nortel
Switching Equipment Co. access for CDMA
Siemens Shanghai Mobile JV Sets of GSM mobile equipment, including Siemens
Communications base station systems and mobile terminals.
Adapted BISC's EWSD switches for
cellular applications.
Siemens Communications JV 'Last mile' products for radio Siemens
Systems communications networks.
Beijing Ericsson JV MDI 10 PBX and AXE local and mobile Ericsson
Communications Systems exchanges
Beijing Ericsson Mobile JV GSM/TACS base stations, handsets, Ericsson
Communications mobile network design and
implementation
Dalian Ericsson Comm. JV CO switch and cellular system support for Ericsson
NE China
Shanghai Bell - Alcatel JV GSM base stations, control equipment, Alcatel
Mobile Communications mobile switches
Alcatel Chongqing JV DMW technology with Alcatel Telettra for Alcatel
1.5 GHz systems
Alcatel (Beijing) JV Small, medium and high-capacity DMW Alcatel
Transmission Systems Co. systems, including STM-I SDH
microwave
Nokia (Suzhou) Telecom Co F GSM base stations and cellular network Nokia
transmission products
Beijing Nokia Hang Xing JV Mobile digital switching centers, base Nokia
Telecommunications Co station controllers and fixed digital
switches
Beijing Nokia Mobile JV GSM digital cellular systems Nokia
Telecommunications
C = Chinese (state-owned or private); F = Foreign (wholly-owned); JV = Chinese-Foreign joint
venture
Source: PTIC, Pyramid Research
Challenges for Domestic Firms
Despite technological advances by Chinese competition and official stipulations that state
telecom service providers 'buy local', foreign mobile equipment makers have managed to
avoid significant loss of market share in high value-added products (Kynge 1999). Two
reasons that have been cited for this are, firstly, that companies such as Nokia and
Ericsson have made a great effort to localize their production, and now seem to qualify in
the eyes of Chinese regulators as "local". Secondly, foreign vendors have a mixture of
superior quality, track record and entrenched market position playing in their favor.
Indeed, the market for cellular systems remains heavily determined by relationships
developed early between PTAs and foreign vendors, with the PTAs particularly
preferring to hand out big contracts to companies they already know and trust (Pyramid
Research 1999b).
Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures
As can be observed from Tables 4.2-4.6 above, a major aspect of the domestic industry
structure is the presence of numerous foreign joint ventures. Joint ventures are a
common mechanism for foreign direct investment (FDI) in a country. Foreign companies
often seek local partners who have an intimate knowledge of the market as well as useful
links with government officials, suppliers, etc. which are very valuable when initially
operating in a new environment. Nevertheless, the very large number of JVs and near-
total absence of wholly-owned foreign enterprises (WOFEs), another form of FDI, can be
attributed to the government policy of "technology for market share". This policy
pressured foreign companies wishing to set up operations in China not to establish
WOFEs, but rather to form JVs with local players in a bid to encourage the transfer of
technologies to domestic companies.
In both the optical and cellular communications sectors, foreign JV equipment
manufacturers outnumber the domestic manufacturers. Furthermore, although many
Chinese firms have-been listed as components and subsystems providers, it is safe to
assume that the foreign JVs in this category collectively have a higher volume of
production of higher-technology components than their Chinese counterparts (who tend
to manufacture low-tech parts). Given the fact that foreign firms currently dominate the
telecom infrastructure equipment industry in China, and that foreign companies are
present through their joint ventures, the group of JVs describe above represents a
substantial segment of the Chinese equipment industry among themselves (at least in the
higher technology segments of optics, networking and cellular equipment).
Typically, JV relationships in this sector are of long duration 1 6 . Although extensive data
could not be obtained, it seems that JV contracts negotiated with the Chinese government
extend for long periods of time. For example the initial contract for Shanghai Bell, a JV
with Alcatel, was for a duration of 15 years. This was later extended for another 20
years, lasting until the year 2014 (Shen 1999). Another example of the long life of JVs in
this sector is provided by Nortel, who's three telecom equipment joint ventures in China
were established in 1988, 1994 and 1995 and are still presently operating.
Another feature of these JVs is that majority foreign ownership seems to be the norm for
many companies. Nortel, for example, claims to have ownership shares of betweenr. 55%
and 90% among its Chinese JVs. Reasons for this included the protection of its
intellectual property and the fact that only majority-owned JVs would be able to qualify
for Nortel's direct sourcing capabilities and transfer pricing arrangements 17 . AppendLr 3
contains a list of domestic and JV telecom equipment producers from which the above
tables were derived. It shows that many foreign companies typically have majority
ownership of their joint ventures, particularly when they involve the production of
relatively high tech equipment. Furthermore, even when foreign ownership falls below
50% the foreign company often reserves the abihlity to make the major management
decisions concerning the JV18 .
4.5 SUMMARY
The preceding account of China's evolving telecom equipment industry indicates that the
sector has evolved substantially over the past decade. In certain cases, such as in optical
components, China seems to have developed a critical mass of expertise - to the extent
that foreign companies have bought Chinese ones in order to access their technology.
DWDM optical communication and Internet router equipment are two fledgling
technologies that are also being rapidly developed (and are very lucrative segments of the
infrastructure equipment market). In fact, a trend has been observed in which the
technological development cycle for Chinese manufacturers is getting shorter, as
illustrated in Figure 4.2.
In response to the decreasing lead time between product introduction by foreign vendors
and the emergence of locally-produced equivalents, foreign manufacturers are quickening
the pace of technological innovation and product diversification. In fact, a paper by Li et
al. (2000) describes that, in order to stay ahead in China, foreign firms are using their
technological leadership to feed the latest products to the Chinese market. Only in this
way, it is argued, will they maintain a competitive advantage. Meanwhile, domestic
firms also benefit by being exposed to the most up-to-date technology, which they can
attempt to reverse-engineer.
6 This may at least be partly explained by the government policies encouraging technology transfer. It
would be unseemly for a foreign company to dissolve a JV before the end of a contract, and they are useful




Figure 4.2 Indigenous Technology Development Cycle
Source: Pyramid Research (1999a)
With respect to the industry structure, the market concentration of domestic companies
that are systems-level providers seems to be relatively high. The largest, technologically
diversified, domestic players number four in total. These are Huawei, ZTE, Datang and
Julong. Within the specific fields of telecom equipment (optics, data networking and
wireless), some other important domestic niche players a:ise that tend to specialize in
these segments (such as the WRI in optical transmission, and Jinpeng in wireless
communication).
When broadening the picture to include foreign-invested enterprises, one notices the large
presence of Chinese-foreign JVs across several communications segments. This is not
surprising, given the fact that foreign companies tend to dominate the market in many of
these areas, and that the world's major telecom equipment manufacturers vie with each
other to establish a presence in China. However, whereas foreign companies may have a
presence in several communications segments, their JVs (each of which is a separate
legal entity) tend to focus on a particular area of the communications market. Therefore
these JV companies swell the ranks of enterprises involved in specific areas of
communications which, taken segment by segment, have a large number of players and
thus a low market concentration.
KEY:
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5 Chinese Government Policy and Regulatory
Structure
5.1 INTRODUCTION
A primary goal of the Chinese government has been to be less dependent on telecom
imports. In order to achieve this, the former MPT stated that the government's strategy
for the telecommunications industry would entail a three step process: 1) import of
technologies; 2) establishment of joint ventures with companies that are leading the world
in specific areas; and 3) development of telecommunications products with Chinese
intellectual property rights. China also hopes to export its own telecom products to other
countries after meeting its domestic demand (U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1999).
This chapter will begin by reviewing the principal players in the policy-making process.
This will be followed by a discussion of the various policies that the Chinese government
has put in place to build up the country's telecommunications equipment sector.
5.2 GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY STRUCTURE
The Ministry of Information Industry
In March 1998, the Ninth National People's Congress (NPC) ratified a wide-ranging
restructuring of China' state bureaucracy. Among others, this saw the merger of three
ministries - the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), Ministry of
Electronics Industry (MEI) and the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television (MRFT) -
into a so-called 'super ministry', the Ministry of Information Industry (MU).
The MII's responsibilities are for drafting the plan, policy and regulation for the entire
information industrial sector. This encompasses the policy power previously possessed
by the MPT and the MEI; the network regulatory power over program content,
broadcasting networks and private satellite networks; the overall planning of all types of
public and private communications networks; the reasonable allocation of
communications resources (including frequency allocation and land rights); and the
guarantee of information security (Pyramid Research 1999b). A government statement
identifies the major responsibilities of the MII as:
* Revitalizing the electronic and information technology manufacturing sector, the
telecommunications sector, and the software sector.
* Promoting the 'informationalization' of the national economy and social services.
* Making plans, policies and regulations for the information industry.
* Conducting overall planning and regulation for the national backbone
communications networks (including both local and long distance
telecommunications networks), the radio and television broadcasting networks
(including both cable and non-cable TV networks), as well as the private networks of
the military and other sectors.
* Allocating resources to avoid duplicative construction and safeguarding information
security.
Other Important Government Bodies with a Stake in the Telecommunications Sector
Other institutions that are key players in China's telecom sector include:
The State Council
The State Council is a cabinet-level group with ultimate decision-making authority on
key policy issues in China. It also formulates laws and issues policies regarding any
macro-level policy decisions, such as the direction of China's five-year plans for
telecommunications development.
The State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC)
Formerly the State Planning Commission (SPC), the SDPC is the overseer of China's
various economic plans, including the five-year plans. Its current role is to review and
sanction industrial and other economic reforms.
The State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC)
The May 1998 announcement that created the MII stated that it would work closely with
the SETC to set policies for China's information industry, including policies regarding
the introduction of foreign investment and foreign technologies, and the elaboration of
strategic development plans. Together with the SDPC, the SETC claims responsibility
for such tasks as outlining industrial policy and deciding in which areas foreign-
investment is to be encouraged or discouraged.
5.3 IMPORT SUBSTITUTION AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER POLICIES
The Chinese government is determined to accelerate the localization of
telecommunications technology, both by encouraging the development of local players
and by forcing companies to localize production. In order to do this, it has adopted a
range of policies which fall under the broad umbrella of 'import substitution' policies, as
follows:
* "Buy local" policies. These policies encourage telecom operators to purchase
equipment manufactured by local industry, or make it harder to purchase imported
equipment. This has the double advantage of improving demand conditions for local
industry as well as encouraging foreign companies to localize in order to pass for a
"local" company.
* Localization policies. These include a variety of policies that directly require or
encourage foreign companies to localize production, management and/or research &
development. These policies are often embodied in regulations which make
localization a precondition for doing business in China, and are often tied to the
establishment of joint ventures as a vehicle for doing so.
* Trade policies for import substitution. These policies target the reduction of foreign
imports by a variety of means, including the imposition of quotas, higher tariffs, or
the granting of special licenses for the introduction and use of technologies within
China.
It must be noted that some of the policies under the first and third categories are
commonly referred to 'non-tariff barriers to trade' in the jargon of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Given China's intention to join the WTO, it will have to address
these issues which are illegal under the GATT' treaty.
"Buy Local" Policies
Part of the MI's strategy to strengthen domestic telecoms equipment manufacturers is to
encourage PTAs to "buy local" when possible. Although there are no written laws
specifying quotas or stipulating that local products must be purchased, the government's
preference for operators to purchase locally-manufactured equipment is no secret 2
However, the definition of"local" is vague since, depending on the MII's requirement at
any given moment, it can mean goods purchased from Sino-foreign JVs or from purely
domestic manufacturers only (Pyramid Research 1999a). For example, when domestic
production of SPC switches was first introduced by Shanghai Bell (a joint venture), the
former MPT decreed that its product - System-12 - was one of the principal switching
systems for use in the Chinese telecommunications network (Shen 1999). Only cutting-
edge products which are unavailable in China (e.g. high-end data switching gear) are
imported by China Telecom's PTAs with the central government's blessing (Pyramid
Research 1999a). The MII has been fairly explicit that equipment produced by 'favored
sons' should be incorporated into China Telecom's network. It is therefore likely that
domestic companies will receive preferential treatment in the awarding of 3G digital
cellular networks (Pyramid Research 1999b).
' General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
2 However, PTAs that generate healthy revenues wield a high degree of autonomy in procurement
decisions. PTAs with low revenues, such as those in inland provinces, depend on the MII for cash to build
networks and thus must accept the MII's procurement decisions.
To encourage the purchasing of Chinese-made equipment, the MPT/MII organized three
local vendor-carrier meeting since 1996, demanding the carriers China Telecom, China
Unicom and the PTAs to give priority to domestic products so as to support the
development of China's telecom manufacturinj industry. The 1996 and 1997 meeting
focused on fixed line SPC switching equipment . Due to the success of the previous two
meetings, a third coordination meeting was held in 1998 which centered on domestic
cellular systems, in particular the purchasing of mobile switches, base stations and
handsets4 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1999). Thus, through the MII (and formerly the
MPT), China's central government actively promoted the domestic fixed-line switching
and mobile communications industries.
Documents circulated by the State Council and the MII during the 1998 coordination
meeting outline certain policies for promoting the purchase of domestically-made
equipment (see Appendix 4). These include stipulations that Chinese telecom operators
should give priority to domestic products when the price and quality are similar to
imported products; and that, once products with Chinese intellectual property reach the
"network access standard", a procurement policy of giving priority to these products
should be adopted.
Countering central government's push for 'buying local' is the concern of provincial
PTAs to generate revenues as quickly as possible, particularly in rolling out cellular
services. Thus, at least in the near future, PTAs are rushing to purchase as much
equipment as possible from foreign companies to increase their capacities before they
face being squeezed by the center to purchase more locally (Pyramid Research 1999b).
Although this may not be a long-run problem, it probably aggravates the future challenge
to domestic manufacturers of overcoming the network effects of an installed base of
foreign equipment.
It is also important to note that the central government's "buy local" policy does not
necessarily limit the PTAs purchasing decisions since they still aim at incorporating
'world class' standards into their networks - and hold local companies to these standards
(Pyramid 1999a). For example, although domestic companies are very competitive in the
fixed line switching market, China's operators still purchase long-distance transmission
equipment from foreign companies as they believe these to be of better quality.
On the other hand, provincial network operators still like to buy from domestic
companies for pragmatic reasons. They view them as companies which have a long-term
3 During the 1996 meeting, representatives from China PTIC, Julong, Datang. Zhongxing and Huawei,
among others, met with officials from over 30 PTAs. Orders for purchasing over 5 million lines were
signed, and actual orders surpassed 7 million lines. The 1997 meeting included the same players plus
Jminpeng, and resulting in purchasing agreements for 17 million lines over two years (Peng 1999).
The 1998 national coordination meeting on mobile communications systems and equipment was held min
Beijing. Participants included China Telecom, China Unicom, the PTAs, Datang, Eastcom, Huawei,
Jinpeng, Zhongxing, Julong, Shanghai Bell Alcatel Mobile Communications Systems Co. Ltd., Beijing
Nokia Mobile Communications Co. Ltd., Nanjing Ericsson Communications Co. Ltd., and Siemens
Shanghai Mobile Communications Co. LTd. At this meeting, purchasing agreements for about 7 million
lines of mobile switches and 700,000 channels of base station equipment were concluded (Peng 1999).
commitment, entrenched interests in China, and a firm understanding of Chinese network
requirements. Domestic companies build their equipment with one main client in mind -
China Telecom - and therefore are closer to the market, offer Chinese standard
compatibility, and adhere to Chinese software protocols (Pyramid Research 1999a).
As a result of the MII's 'buy local' efforts, it claims that it has successfully helped
Chinese fixed line switch manufacturers to gradually dominate the market (see Section
4.2 for data on domestic producers' sales).
Government-Sponsored Vendor Financing and Financial Incentives for Equipment
Buyers
In conjunction with its "buy local" policy, the central government encouraged
commercial banks to offer loans to domestic vendors or directly to PTAs in order to
stimulate demand for locally-produced technologies 5 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1999).
This type of government-subsidized vendor financing is engineered to make domestic
firms more competitive.
For example, in the case of SPC switching equipment, financial organizations such as the
People's Bank of China and the Duty & Tax Committee of the State Council began to
support domestic producers by offering purchaser loans and reduced sales taxes.
Presently, Julong, Datang, ZTE and Huawei all benefit from purchaser loans from the
Commercial Bank of China (Peng 1999).
The government has introduced tax concessions to operators for upgrading network
equipment, and the MII has encouraged PTAs to continuously develop their networks in
terms of capacity, transmission speeds, and technology (Pyramid Research 1999a). This
encourages domestic manufacturers to develop and introduce more 'intelligent' and
higher-capacity equipment by promoting the market for such products. Furthermore, the
government is promoting Chinese-manufactured exports by offering tax breaks and other
financial incentives (Pyramid Research 1999a).
Localization of Production and Technology
The Government views the development of the high-technology industry with a long-
term perspective. Job creation is no longer the priority in China's localization drive in
this sector, rather, skills development and intellectual capital are more important
(Pyramid Research 1999a). The government's main requirement for foreign equipment
manufacturers is that they demonstrate their commitment to China through technology
transfers to local partners. To ensure this, Chinese-foreign JVs are subject to
5 During 1998-1999, state banks extended credit packages to domestic companies to help them finance
equipment deals nationwide. For example, in 1998 Datang secured a nearly $ 1 billion (RBM 8 bn) credit
from the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), over 85% of which was earmarked for
facilitating supplier credit for customers through 2000. The China Construction Bank and ICBC jointly put
together a package worth over $ 720 million (RMB 6 bn) to fund equipment sales in 1998-99.
performance requirements which they must agree to in order to gain approval for
establishment. The most relevant performance requirements concern local content and
technology transfer.
Local Content Requirements
Domestic content issues arise during the examination and comment period of the
approval process to set up a joint venture. Unlike export performance, local content
requirements are not statutorily imposed on WOFEs or JVs but are pressed on investors
informally. They are not a transparent statutory requirement but rather part of an internal
guidance for achieving a certain level of local sourcing6 .
The MII is very concerned with the process of localizing production in telecom
equipment manufacturing and makes funds available to promote this 7. The case of
Shanghai Bell, the Sino-Belgian joint venture producing SPC switches, illustrates the
process by which foreign JVs are encouraged to increase their localization. The target for
Shanghai Bell's localization was 20% of total components for the first few years of its
existence, gradually increasing to 70 per cent by 1993. The JV's performance was
regularly examined and linked to the renewal of its licenses to import certain
components. The government also required Shanghai Bell to set up a Domestication
Division within the company to deal with increasing the local production of components
(Shen 1999).
In 1987, the State Planning Commission internally issued the following method to be
used for measuring companies' achievement in import substitution (Shen 1999):
Total cost of all components - Total cost of imported components x 100%
Total cost of all components
The government's push for greater localization of manufacturing seems to have had some
success judging by the committed investments of some of the large foreign equipment
players. Motorola, in particular, even encouraged this trend as part of its strategy to
regain-market share - in 1999 it had a total of $1.2 billion worth of investments across a
range of telecommunications and electronics fields (Pyramid Research 1999b).
6 It is important to note that, unlike export performance requirements, local content requirements are on the
"illustrative list" of investment measures noted in the WTO's Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)
agreement as inconsistent with WTO policies (Rosen 1999). In line with its accession efforts, the Chinese
government has been proposing to remove local content requirements (CEInet 2001b). However, it has
been argued that local content policies can still be hidden behind policy regimes governing 'infant
industries' and the they may be subject to lengthy phase-out schedules (Rosen 1999).
7 Interviewee #18.
Technology Transfer
It is the stated goal of the Chinese authorities that the establishment of joint ventures
should encourage the transfer and acquisition of technology from abroad. Government
regulations contain references to the need for investors to introduce technology in order
to gain approval for their venture. However, similarly to local content requirements, no
statute plainly mandates that foreign enterprises must transfer technology. The rules on
foreign investment do require technology considerations for a firm to qualify
simultaneously for WOFE status (or in some cases gain majority status in a JV and hence
management control), and access to the China market. Therefore, technology transfer is
statutorily required only for the firms wanting to gain both (Rosen 1999).
China's technology transfer policy is guided by what is known as "market share for
advanced technology transfer". Thus a precondition for considering whether to allow a
company to establish itself in China is that it will make technology transfer a priority.
The advantage that the Chinese government has in the telecom equipment sector is that it
is able to play off the various firms such as Ericsson, Motorola, Nokia etc. against each
other when granting them licenses to do business in China (i.e. between who makes the
larger technology transfer commitment). Furthermore, a company's track record in
transferring technology is a very important factor for the government in considering
whether to allow it to expand its existing operations or set up new ventures. For this
reason, foreign firms undertake extensive &ovemrnment and public relations exercises to
emphasize the extent of their commitments . The MII itself is very active in overseeing
the progress of localization and technology transfer to domestic industry, and has
committed funds to support this process °.
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce (1999), the MII and Chinese JV partners
claim to be frustrated about the slow pace of technology transfer from their foreign
partners (and that what is transferred is often low-tech). Thus China is likely to continue
pressing foreign companies to speed up the process of technology transfer and impose
tougher conditions on companies seeking to enter the telecom equipment market. These
include higher levels of technology transfer, higher export ratios, and the establishment of
R&D centers in China.
Localizing Research and Development
The MII has come to realize that technology transfer over the past decade has failed to
allow domestic companies access to the 'core technologies' of foreign firms. Therefore,
the central government is beginning to encourage foreign companies to set up R&D
facilities in China". Local governments have been taking the lead in encouraging the
localization of foreign R&D, including this issue into policies promoting high-tech
Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Invested Industries. Approved by the State Council on 29
December 1997, and promulgated by the State Planning Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Trade




growth in their regions (CEInet 2001a). For example, the Shanghai government has
introduced regulations which state that foreign ventures whose spending on R&D in
China has increased by over ten percent from the previous year are eligible for income
tax cuts equal to fifty percent of the annual spending in their Chinese facility.
Furthermore, foreign R&D centers will be exempt from paying tariffs on imports of the
necessary equipment (AI Consulting 2001 a).
Trade-Related Policies Promoting Import Substitution
As of January 1, 1999, the MII introduced a new equipment licensing requirement:
without either a Network Access License or a Network Access Identifier, equipment
cannot be sold, advertised or used in China12 . The MII's rationale for the policy is that
former, looser licensing procedures were abused by foreign vendors. The MII is now
able to control what equipment is imported, and how much. The main implication,
however, is that local manufacturers have been given the opportunity to catch up with
their foreign counterparts, as the licensing process favors locally-developed equipment
(U.D. Dept. of Commerce 1999; Pyramid Research 1999a). In a report to the State
Council, the MIH has proposed using technology standards to support the growth of
Chinese telecom equipment producers (U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1999).
The account made by Shen (1999) of the Chinese government's efforts to promote
domestically manufactured SPC switching equipment is illustrative of the way in which it
has vigorously pursued its policy of import substitution. The government instituted a
range of related regulations and practical measures to compel companies to replace
imported components with locally produced ones, namely:
* applying tariffs to the direct import of components;
* granting exemptions or low import tariffs to individual projects which were
considered to be in the national interest, to ensure that the previous policy would not
drive away advanced foreign technology transfer to China;
* urging companies which were using imported components to gradually reduce
imports and replace them by locally produced ones in order to promote the spin-off of
advanced foreign technologies; and
* in order to help realize import substitution, government financial support was
available for promising projects
2 Licenses are valid for three years; a renewal application must be made three momnihs before the license
expires. The Teleconunmmunications Admimnistration of the MII has designated two 1 elecommunications
Equipment License Processing Offices (TELPO) to process applications. It is to publish a catalogue of all
license telecoms equipment, and operators will be barred from purchasing equipment not listed in the
catalogue. Vendors are expected to report data on annual sales, quality control and post-sales service to the
MII (Pyramid Research 1999a).
13 The former Ministry of Machine Building and Electronics Industry (MMEI) and the State Foreign Trade
and Economic Co-operation Committee were jointly in charge of controlling import licenses, granting low
import tariffs, setting up targets for import substitution and examining their implementation by companies
(Shen 1999).
In a move to curb imports of entire SPC switches, in 1995 the State Council cancelled the
preferential policies of reduced duties r.nd value added tax on imports of this type of
equipment. Furthermore, since 1994 the National Planning Committee stopped
approving SPC switch imports using foreign loans, except for special projects ratified by
the State Council (Peng 1999).
5.4 POLICIES FOR IMPROVING DOMESTIC TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES
('SUPPLY SIDE )
The Chinese government has introduced numerous policies to build technological
capabilities within telecom equipment manufacturers. Wu Jichuan, head of the MII,
recently summed up some of the government's desired outcomes to these policies in a
directive to manufacturers (Huan 1999). In this directive, he stated that equipment
manufacturers should aspire to:
* Set up efficient management structures for operation and innovation.
* Closely follow technology trends.
* Focus on internal innovation and turn the fruit of such innovation into commercial
applications.
* Raise the market share of domestically produced technologies.
A Historical Perspective: Reforming the National Science & Technology System
It is useful to first consider the wider efforts which the Chinese government has taken in
the past to encourage technological innovation and commercialization within the
information and communications industry. Under the centrally planned economy, the
industrial research system was parallel to industrial production instead of being integrated
into it, and was characterized as a "government-directed research system". During the
post-1978 reforms, policy-makers sought to transform this into an "enterprise-directed
research system", that is, reunifying the application of R&D to commercial goals.
In 1985, the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the
Reform of Science and Technology Management System was announced. Three major
points of this decision were (Yu 1999):
1. Reforming the appropriation system. This meant broadening the sources of funding
for R&D and encouraging investment by government departments and enterprises.
2. Developing a 'technology market'. This sought to promote the commercialization of
technology results from research and to provide monetary compensation for them
(rather than allocating them through administrative decisions).
3. Reorganizing the structure of China's S&T system so as to bring together research
and education-oriented organizations with the enterprise sector, and thus encourage
technology development and assimilation.
The effect that these reforms had in the telecom equipment sector was that the PTIC
(which controlled the majority of the telecom equipment factories), and former MPT's
R&D institutions, were allowed to become increasingly independent of the MPT. The
MPT used to have jurisdiction over 31 R&D institutes. In the past, any technologies
developed from these institutes were given freely to manufacturing firms. The reforms
changed this relationship, because technologies were now perceived as profitable goods
that were valuable in the market (Shen 1999).
Therefore, one of the main impacts that the reform of China's S&T system had on firms
in the telecom equipment sector was to highlight the importance of building internal
technological capabilities. They could no longer rely on technology being handed to
them from the State, since the state had devolved control over industrial R&D
management. Combined with the economic opening up of the country, companies turned
to joint ventures with foreign firms as a method for technology acquisition (which the
State tended to carefully orchestrate). Domestic manufacturers were also encouraged to
gradually improve their own internal R&D processes.
National Science and Technology Development Programs
Out of the goal to make technological development more market-oriented came the
'Torch Program' in 1988. This program was sponsored by the State Science and
Technology Commission and was aimed specifically at high and new technology
enterprises, including the telecom equipment manufacturing industry. The Torch
Program encouraged the spinning-off of R&D institutes from Ministries and other State
bodies by consolidating their capital, human, and intellectual assets, and then setting
them up as new high-tech businesses, or 'New Technology Enterprises' (NTEs), as they
were called (Gu 1999). The ultimate goal was to foster the application of science and
technology to commercial purposes and the building up China's high-tech enterprise
sector, which was viewed as a priority by the State.
As a counter-balance to the commercialization of technology, the 'China 863 Plan' was
established to foster high-quality fundamental research in China. The nature of this
research was seen as more strategic and long-term. The 863 plan has seven areas of
focus, including the development of "state-of-the-art" information technology and laser
technology. The former includes telecommunications technologies, and the latter has
important applications in the field of optical communications.
Promoting Home-Grown Intellectual Property
The Chinese government, and the MII in particular, is anxious to develop Chinese
intellectual property. The pragmatic reason for this is that using foreign technology
involves costly purchasing or licensing of intellectual property. For example, it is
estimated that China has paid nearly US$ 10 billion to overseas corporations for
obtaining and licensing technology related to first- and second-generation cellular
systems over the past 10 years (AI Consulting 2000f).
The government is therefore heavily sponsoring Chinese intellectual property within
various facets of telecom technology. Most notably, China has been granted by the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) the recognition of a Chinese standard for
third-generation (3G) mobile communication called TD-SCDMA. Third-generation
mobile communications is an area of technological expertise that the government wants
to promote within China's domestic industry (Pyramid Research 1999b).
Also in the area of mobile communications, the Chinese government has initiated a
'technical cooperation State Project' to develop 2.5G GSM (GPRS) mobile phones 14
Eastcom, China Huada Integrated Circuit Designing Center and Motorola (China)
Electronics will jointly develop this product. The target of the project is to successfully
develop 2.5G mobile phones with China's own intellectual property rights for large scale
production. In order to achieve this, Eastcom has formed R&D agreements with China
Huada and Motorola (China) Electronics (Al Consulting 2000d).
Performance Requirements and Incentives for Promoting Technological Innovation
and Commercialization
Disciplining and Encouraging the Growth ofHigh-Tech Enterprises
Chinese new and high technology enterprises are exempt from import duties and value-
added tax in importing key technologies and equipment. All investment projects that
conform to the Catalogue of Industries. Products and Technologies That Are Encouraged
by the State are eligible ibr this treatment. Among these are several types of
telecommunications technologies. Furthermore, Joint Ventures classified as high
technology companies under the 1979 Law on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign
Investment, JVs also qualify for tax holidays if they are "equipped with up-to-date
technology by world standards" (Shen 1999).
In addition to these regulations, the government has also shaped the incentive and
resource structures of enterprises by manipulating institutional structures of property
rights. One means of doing this has been the establishment of special high technology
and economic development zones (the Wuhan East Lake High Tech Development Zone
discussed in Chapter 4 is one example of many). Within these zones, the government has
14 2.5G is the generic name for intermediate standards to be used for graduating from first-generation to
third-generation cellular communication.
adopted institutional devices nested in the taxation process and investment processes that
redistribute resources to strategic sectors. In the taxation process, sophisticated tax
concession schemes have been devised to promote innovations in products and processes
for enterprises in targeted industries. In the investment process, the devices include
setting aside special venture loans in state banks with interest rates no higher and
sometimes lower than normal commercial loans for investment in innovative products,
lower equity-to-debt ratio requirements for bank loans, etc.
What is unique about the redistributive devices just described is the regulatory regime
imposed upon it. In granting telecom equipment companies special legal status as
'science & technology enterprises', the government obliges them to meet certain
requirements (Lu 1997). These include the following:
* percentage of technology personnel employed;
* percentage of sales contributed by new products;
* percentage of products exported;
* allocation of retained earnings; etc.
These institutional devices and corresponding regulatory regimes have been designed to
create incentive and resource structures to induce companies to pursue continuous
improvements in products and processes. Therefore the support which the Chinese
government provides to telecom equipment manufacturers (and S&T enterprises as a
whole), is combined with mechanisms to discipline industry according to State goals.
Incentives Targeted to Developing Specific Technologies
In order to encourage the production of larger-capacity transmission technology, the
Chinese government has implemented a policy that exempts local and foreign companies
from taxes if they produce transmission equipment with a capacity higher than 2.5Gbps.
This incentive has several implications: it promotes China Telecom's goal to have one of
the most advanced telecoms infrastructure in the world (in terms of network scale,
technology and quality of service by 2010); it is in line with an objective to have
advanced equipment with 20-40Gbps SDH or higher speeds deployed on the optical trunk
lines; and it encourages local companies to speed up the development and manufacture of
larger-capacity equipment and compete with foreign suppliers (Pyramid Research 1999a).
Promotion of Domestic Corporate R&D
The MII has established a special fund, part of which goes to supporting industrial R&D
in telecommunications equipment. The fund consists of about 3 billion RMB per year,
40% of which goes to supporting R&D within the mobile communications industry 15.
This part of the fund is mainly distributed to Huawei, Zhongxing, Julong, Datang and
Jinpeng. The government is also intensively funding fiber optic R&D and trying to foster
companies that can become suppliers of fiber-optic equipment (Richards 2000).
15 Of the 3 billion RMB, approximately half is obtained from installation fees and the rest is subject to
yearly budgetary approval by the SPC and SETC (Interviewee #18).
Promoting the 'Fundamental Industries'
The so-called 'fundamental industries' are those industries which underlie the
information and communications technology (ICT) sector, and include the semiconductor
and software industries. Policies promoting these industries are defined at the central
level and applied by local governments.
The State Council's Tenth Five-Year Plan, beginning in 2001, incorporates several goals
intended to encourage the development of software and integrated circuit technologies.
In particular, it seeks to develop Chinese intellectual property in "core technologies"
related to large-scale integrated circuits and large-scale systems software (AI Consulting
2001b). Furthermore, the State Council has also issued a regulation entitled Policies for
Encouraging the Development of Software and Integrated Circuit (IC) Industries (AI
Consulting 2001 a).
Local governments have sought to materialize these goals. For example, the Beijing
municipal government has released a series of preferential policies designed to encourage
the development of the city's software and integrated circuit industries. These include
the allocation of special funds, preferential land-use rights, and the loosening of
restrictions on personnel management. Beijing plans to establish four high-tech industrial
centers for software and microelectronics (Al Consulting 2001c). Similarly, the
Shanghai government will allocate 500 million RMB ($US 60.48 million) into special
software development funds, including the setting up of a science and technology venture
capital fund. Furthermore, newly established chip production projects will be granted tax
exemptions.
5.5 OTHER 'ifICRO-LEVEL' POLICIES FOR PROMOTING DOMESTIC HIGH-TECH
ENTERPRISES
Human Resources Policies
Before the economic reform process took hold in China during the early eighties, human
resources policies were governed by very rigid rules on remuneration, promotion, etc.
For example, in the past all the chief officials regarded as important to a telecom-related
firm such as the director, major department managers, chief engineer and accountant, etc.
were appointed by the former MPT (Shen 1999).
Similarly, recruitment of graduates from telecom universities and institutes (most of
which used to be run by the MPT) was orchestrated annually such that students were
assigned to work in particular factories and companies (Shen 1999). Today, graduates
with a good degree or from a reputable university can choose where they prefer to work
(Shen 1999). The rules surrounding work permits, or hukou, that used to constrain
individuals into working within certain geographical areas, have been considerably
loosened so that the supply of talent may meet the demand. The reforms which have
made science and technology industries more important have also increased demand for
qualified university graduates.
Furthermore, political controls upon private and joint venture companies were loosened,
so that many firms accepted new employees without official leaving certificates as long
as they had professional qualifications. Skilled workers and qualified engineers could
quit and leave their firm for better-paid jobs in a joint venture or private company (Shen
1999). This has considerably increased the free movement of labor (and often with it the
knowledge acquired from work-experience).
Lastly, powers have been considerably delegated to companies with respect to how they
organize and incentivize themselves internally. This first began with Chinese-foreign
joint ventures and has been extended to domestic companies. Thus, Chinese firms are at
liberty to determine material rewards such as performance-based salaries, the offering of
stock options, etc. These have been used by companies to spur internal innovation and
productivity and, in companies such as Huawei, have apparently been a success16 .
Establishing New A venues for Obtaining Capital
Traditionally, the only means for enterprises to obtain capital was from state banks.
Although these bodies still provide a lot of financing to telecom manufacturers (see
above), the government has sought to open up new sources of capital that are oftentimes
more appropriate for the risky nature of certain new high-tech ventures. The government
is also keen to alleviate pressure on the banks as the sole source of funding (other than a
company's own profits).
Thus, the central government has been building up China's equity markets over the past
years, and has encouraged some of the state-owned telecom firms to list and sell shares as
a means of obtaining financing for their operations. Companies that have so far listed on
the Shenzhen or Shanghai stock exchanges include Zhongxing, Datang and EastCom
(U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1999).
Venture capital will also be used to raise development funds needed by domestic telecom
companies. For example, the MII has signed a memorandum of understanding with the
U.S. company International Data Group (IDG) to set up a venture capital fund of $100




In other sectors of the economy, the government aims to transform the bigger SOEs into
world-class conglomerates, and will encourage mergers among leading firms in order to
achieve this (Pyramid Research 1999b). It remains to be seen whether this policy will
also be applied to the telecom manufacturers since, as a whole, domestic production tends
to be relatively decentralized when state-owned holding companies such as Datang and
firms under the jurisdiction of the PTIC (such as Julong) are taken into account. These
feature numerous factories and R&D institutes under a loose (and often confusing)
management structure which is partly seen as causing the recent loss of competitiveness
of the Julong company 17. As stated by an MII official, the government aims to establish
only a few large telecom equipment companies that are able to compete against the
dominant foreign firms. The government wants big companies, rather than allowing a
proliferation of smaller firms for which it would not have the resources to support.
Therefore, the policy is to promote a 'Top 10' or even 'Top 5' companies in the telecoms
equipment industry, as is being done in other sectors18 .
Promoting Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)
The government is also putting in place policies to promote the SME sector with a view
to encourage technological innovation. These policies, currently under consideration
within the draft SME Promotion Law, include the following (CEInet 2001a):
* incentives for technological innovation;
* establishing an SMEs development bank;
* encouraging SMEs to finance themselves through IPOs;
* promoting venture capital (VC) investment in SMEs; and
* encouraging the mergers and acquisitions of SMEs.
Industrial Licensing of Domestic Producers
The central government decides which domestic manufacturers are granted licenses for
the production of equipment. For example, the government initially granted licenses to a
small number of companies to produce SPC switching equipment' 9 . Similarly, the
government has granted licenses to produce CDMA equipment only to certain2 0
compamnies20
The government issuing of licenses is primarily a mechanism to control the level of
competition within the industry. This has been spurred by the detrimental effects that




' Interviewee # 15.
industry'. In the view of certain government officials, industrial licensing will continue
being used as a means to control the number of competitors within the telecom equipment
industry?2 . In particular, once Chinese manufacturers, including JVs, are capable of
mneeting demand, the door for newcomers is oftentimes closed. One good example is the
MII's November 1998 announcement prohibiting any new JVs from producing GSM
equipment.
5.6 CREATING FAVORABLE DEMAND CONDITIONS FOR THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
('DEMAND SIDE )
Technologically Sophisticated Government Purchasing Policies and National Telecom
Infrastructure Development
China Telecom procures the latest and greatest technology and continues to upgrade its
network, largely because of the important position the telecoms sector holds in China's
economic development plans. The former MPT - which created China Telecom - has
proposed a strategy of "high starting point with leading technology". This encourages the
introduction of the most advanced technologies into China, and is credited by the
government for having propelled the technological level of the domestic industry to a
much higher level than if the country had focused on older technologies (Huan 1999).
Under the government's goal to "informationalize" China (Al Consulting 2001 b), the MI1
is encouraging several initiatives that will spur demand for the most sophisticated kinds
of communications and information technologies. These include accelerating the
construction of next generation broadband telecom networks by adopting DWDM optical
technology 3 , third-generation wireless communication and Internet Protocol-based
communication.
Thus, in being a technologically sophisticated buyer and pushing for the incorporation of
the most advanced technology within its networks, the Chinese government is creating
the demand conditions for companies producing equipment at the higher end of the
technology spectrum. This, of course, makes it more challenging for Chinese companies
which have started from a low level of technology. However, in conjunction with the
localization policies described above, it is still providing the market opportunities for
domestic companies to pursue.
21 In the switching market, prices have been dropping on an annual basis. In 1997, Siemens BISC sold its
CO switches at 40% of 1992 pilces; in 1998, they sold for 32% of 1992 prices. Average switching prices
hovered round $110-$115 per line in 1995. By 1998, vendors were selling switches for $40-$60 per line.
22 Interviewee #17.
23 China began large-scale DWDM implementation in 1998 after signing its first DWDM contract with
Lucent Technologies in August 1997 to deploy the technology on its Xi'an to Wuhan network (Richards
2000).
Reform of the Telecom Services Sector
The reorganization and restructuring of government institutions described in Section 5.2
above announced the beginning of a new phase in the development of China's
telecommunications market. The former MPT - which is essentially at the core of the
MII - built, managed and operated domestic long distance and international services
through the Directorate General of Telecommunications (DGT). In an effort to separate
the regulatory powers of the MPT from its parallel function as the country's telecom
operator, the DGT was officially spun off as an independent body in 1994, and
incorporated as China Telecom in 1995 (Pyramid Research 1999b). Subsequently, the
monopoly-type powers exercised by China Telecom, and the fact that it still enjoyed the
patronage of the MPT/MII, brought it under the sights of government reformers.
Therefore, under a wide-ranging 'anti-monopoly plan', China Telecom is being separated
into four operating companies: fixed-line telephony, mobile telephony, paging and
satellite communications.
In the near future, it is expected that China Telecom will again be re-organized into six
regional areas. This geographical reorganization is widely expected to be the first step on
the path towards a regional divestiture of local or regional operating companies, possibly
along the lines of the 1984 divestiture of the Regional Bell Operating Companies in the
U.S.. The possibility of this happening has encouraged provincial telecommunications
administrations (PTAs) to vie with each other to take the lead in their respective regions.
A related aspect of this program would see a further separation of the transmission, data
communications and public switched-network businesses (Pyramid Research 1999b).
In an effort to promote competition in the telecom services sector, in December 1993 the
State Council authorized the introduction of competition by approving the establishment
of China Unicomrn as a second wireless operator. In August 1993, the former MPT
decided to allow domestic non-MPT institutions to operate in nine "non-basic" or "value-
added" telecom services sectors including paging services, data communications, and
value-added services (VAS). The latter include domestic VSAT communications,
telephone information services, computer information services, electronic mail, electronic
data interchange (EDI) and videotext. In 1999, the government gave approval to China
Telecom, China Unicomrn and Jitong Corp. to enter the internet telephony services sector
(Pyramid Research 1999b).
Thus, the past few years have seen the government approval and licensing of three new
national companies which did not originate from the MPT. These are China Unicom,
China Netcom, and Jitong Corp. As a consequence of reforms in the services sector,
there are currently six basic telecom companies operating in China 24 (Al Consulting
2000c):
24 A seventh company, China Railcomrn, has received a telecom license. However there are suggestions that
it may merge with China Unicorn.
* China Telecom - operating fixed line telephone, international telephone and data
services. Likely to receive a mobile phone license (possibly CDMA).
* China Unicom - second largest wireless communication company in China.
* China Mobile - mobile phone operator (spun off from China Telecom)
* China Satellite Group (spun off from China Telecom)
* Jitong Corp. - Internet access
* China Netcom - broadband networks
The central government is going ahead with plans to foster greater competition in the
country's telecommunications services sector - albeit under its own terms (CEInet 2000).
Upon joining the WTO, China will gradually open up to foreign competition in the
'basic' telecom services sector. According to its telecommunications agreement with the
European Union (which will be applied to all other WTO members) the process will
begin by allowing foreign companies to own 25 percent of domestic telecom ventures
upon China's accession to the WTO. This will be raised to 35 percent after one year, and
49 percent after three years. The market for 'value-added' telecom services will be
opened up more quickly and foreign companies will ultimately be able to own up to 50
percent of a venture's equity.
It is important to note that a fundamental characteristic of China's telecom services
market that differentiates it from most other countries is that it is essentially policy-driven
rather than market-driven (Sun 1999). Indeed, the government is strengthening its role in
guiding the telecom industry. One important implication of this for the domestic
equipment manufacturing industry is that the central government can control the issuing
of licenses for telecom services for the benefit of Chinese industry. It is widely
acknowledged that domestic companies 'missed the boat' with respect to mobile GSM
communications - leading to the overwhelming domination by foreign equipment firms
such as Nokia and Ericsson 25. In the future, the government will therefore seek to ensure
that domestic manufacturers have an established capability to produce equipment related
to a particular telecom standard before services using this standard are allowed. In effect,
the Chinese government is able to control the timing of the opening up of entire
equipment markets (hence the description of this sector being policy- rather than market-
driven). An example of this has been the recent postponing of Unicom's CDMA license,
while local manufacturers such as ZTE are establishing their capabilities in CDMA
systems manufacturing and implementation. It is predicted that the government will
practice this policy when deciding to implement third-generation mobile communication
standards (Chinese firms are currently trying to develop their own lines of 3G products).
25 Interviewee #21.
6 Product Development Strategies and Processes
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the experience of Huawei Technologies and ZTE Corp., widely
considered to be the top two Chinese telecom infrastructure equipment vendors.
Information for these case studies was gathered from interviews with managers and
engineers working at the companies' facilities in Beijing and Shanghai, as well as from
information found within industry news databases'.
The case studies deal with two principal aspects of technology strategy:
* Firm research & development capabilities and processes
* Technology supplier relationships
The first of these - firm research & development processes - discusses the most
significant aspects of R&D processes and strategies within the firms in question,
including organizational and cultural issues. It is important to understand the product
development processes of these companies as these provide an indication of their
technological capabilities. This was achieved by looking at how Huawei and ZTE go
about developing certain products that are considered to be technologically at the high
end of telecommunications equipment.
Secondly, supplier relationships with global technology vendors are an important factor
in the product development strategies of Chinese telecom equipment companies. The
case studies highlight two types of suppliers: 'platform technology' suppliers, and
product suppliers. The first type of supplier provides a 'platform' (either hardware or
software) to the buyer who uses this ready-made technological framework to develop
new products or systems based upon it. The platform typically integrates certain tools to
develop new hardware or software, and the supplier often provides technical support to
help the buyer implement these successfully. Product suppliers provide discrete pieces of
equipment which the Chinese company purchases and integrates into the systems it offers
to its customers.
Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe database.
6.2 C4SE STUDY 1: HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES 1
R&D Capabilities and Processes
The importance Huawei attaches to research and development can clearly be seen from
the numbers. Huawei employs over 6,000 researchers (40% of staff) spread among five
R&D centers in Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, Hangzhou, Xi'an and Chengdu.
Furthermore, 85% of its employees hold a bachelor's degree or higher, and 60% hold a
master's or PhD (Huawei 2000b). Most notably, Huawei claims to plow back 10% of
annual revenues into R&D. Given sales of US$ 2.654 billion in 2000, this could
potentially translate into a very high investment in R&D. Huawei also has an office in
Silicon Valley that helps the company keep abreast of the latest market and technology
trends, thus also playing an important role in the R&D process.2
Huawei's R&D structure includes a special department devoted to developing what it
calls "cutting-edge technologies" such as optical switching equipment. The research
outcomes from this department are subsequently passed on to the company's other R&D
centers for further development into commercial products.
According to a senior R&D manager at the company's Beijing research center, Huawei
does not view R&D cooperation with foreign companies as an effective mechanism to
gain technological competitiveness. The reason being that there is no reason for foreign
firms to transfer their most advanced core technologies to a Chinese partner over whom
they do not have management control3. It was stressed that, in order to become
technologically competitive, Huawei needs to carry out its own R&D. Furthermore, if
Huawei were ever to cooperate on research initiatives, it would only do so with
companies that could offer the latest technology The company is not interested in older
technologies or those which do not promise to generate much profit.
R&D cooperation between Huawei and Chinese universities is confined to the areas of
more basic research, the results of which are fed into the company's own R&D apparatus.
One of the main reasons behind research relationships with universities, it was said, was
that these functioned as valuable avenues for recruiting talent4 .
An important aspect of Huawei's R&D efforts is the company culture and management
processes it has set in place. This was emphasized by company researchers as one of the
keys to Huawei's success in developing its technological capabilties. Engineers have a
strong emotional motivation for Huawei to be the best, and demonstrate this through hard
work. For example, each researcher has his or her own bedroll in their office, given that
they put in long hours and often stay overnight. One chief engineer claimed to have only
Background information on Huawei can be found in Chapter 4.
SThe Silicon Valley office also acts as a liaison between Huawei and its ASIC chip suppliers in the US.
Personal view of a Huawei manager, confirmed in interviews with managers from foreign companies.
SIt is a known fact that Huawei places a lot of emphasis on aggressively recruiting students from top
universities, more so than other companies.
slept an average of five hours per night during the two years it took to develop a new
product for Huawei. Nevertheless, he described the pride he felt in contributing to the
company when the product became a commercial success.
In addition to the personal drive of Huawei's researchers, there also exists a tradition of
knowledge-sharing and cooperative problem-solving within the company. As one
engineer explained:
"Researchers are encouraged to share knowledge rather than keep it to themselves. This
accelerates learning and the rapid acquisition of technical experience by staff and new
recruits. After two to three months, a fresh graduate recruit should have become an
expert in some area".
Lastly, the company also encourages its researchers with financial rewards. Huawei's
policy is to "never disappoint in terms of salary" (no figures were provided, however it
was understood that salaries are competitive with respect to those found in foreign JVs in
order to attract talent).
Joint Research Relationships
In addition to its corporate R&D facilities, Huawei is undertaking joint R&D initiatives
with certain foreign companies on specific topics. Table 6.1 summarizes the nature of
these relationships.
Table 6.1 Huawei Joint R&D Facilities
Partner Purpose
IBM As part of an agreement whereby IBM will supply Huawei with key
components, the two companies have launched a collaborative R&D effort
to make their respective products and technologies work more closely
together, allowing customers to incorporate both in their products.
Intel Huawei and Intel have signed a memorandum of understanding in order to
establish a joint laboratory within Huawei's Shenzhen headquarters. The
laboratory will develop components based on Intel's 'Internet Exchange
Architecture'.
Lucent Technologies Huawei and Lucent announced in 2000 the establishment of a joint lab to
focus on microelectronics and optoelectronics. According to Huawei, the
two parties will enter into closer technical cooperation based on the
incorporation of Lucent's advanced components into Huawei's products.
The joint lab will also serve as a platform for both companies to exchange
technologies via a variety of technical seminars and conferences. The joint
lab will also work with Lucent's Bell Labs which has facilities in Beijing
and Shanghai.
Texas Instruments Huawei and Texas Instruments have established a joint laboratory within
Huawei's facility in Shenzhen to develop digital signal processors (DSPs)
for its equipment.
Development ofInternet Router Equipment
Huawei develops products in the fields of switching, optical, mobile and data
communications equipment. The following is an account of how the company produced
its first Internet router, a product that falls within the category of data communications.
Routers are a relatively new (and commercially lucrative) technology for Huawei.
History of the Router Development Process
Huawei has been developing data communication equipment since 1995. The decision to
develop routers was initially made when the company assessed that a large market
existed within China for this type of equipment. An R&D center devoted to router
development was therefore set up in Beijing to understand and produce this equipment.
Huawei took two years to develop its first product, a "2501"-type router which is the
most common type in use (similar to Cisco's 2501 model). In 1999, the company spent
roughly RMB 1 billion (US$ 121 million) on developing data communications
equipment, followed by RMB 1.5 billion in 2000 (US$ 181 million).
Today, Huawei's development efforts in the data communications field center around
three research institutes: the Beijing Research institute, the Shenzhen Research Institute,
and the India Research Institute. The three institutes have a combined research staff of
800, 600 of which work in the Beijing Institute. In April 1999, Huawei set up a 30,000
square meter site in Beijing. Within this site is located the Data Communications Center,
which includes the R&D Institute mentioned above as well as a Marketing Department, a
Technical Support Center, a Product Testing Department, and a Training Center.
The development process of Huawei's first router involved three main problems:
hardware architecture, software architecture, and microchip design. To tackle the first
issue, engineers disassembled a foreign competitor's router to understand the inner
workings and design of the hardware (such as the physical interfaces between the various
components). Researchers then turned their attention to the product's software, which is
actually the most important part of the router since it controls the running of the
hardware. At the time, they faced two choices: either to purchase the software or to
develop it themselves. Although the latter would take considerably more time, they
nevertheless decided to produce the software themselves and obtained the expertise to do
this from Huawei's software research institute located in India'.
The last elements needed to produce the router were the microchips and related circuitry.
Huawei did not have the expertise to produce these key components and therefore
purchased them from Motorola. The purchasing agreement with Motorola included the
transfer of knowledge for developing the required components based on Motorola's
microchip platform. This consisted of design toolkits, technical manuals and software.
In addition, Motorola provided technical assistance in the form of an engineer to help
' Iluawet software engmineers in the company's India center learned prograrrimnung and quality management
skills from Indian companies such as InfoSys. These were instrumental it. producing the sotftware required.
not only for routers but also for the company's other products as well.
solve any problems. Therefore, based on reverse engineering of the hardware,
proprietary development of the software, and purchasing of microchip components from
a foreign supplier (along with the platform for designing the other necessary circuitry
involved), Huawei was able to develop its own Internet router.
Huawei describes its routers as having a modular design as well as using a high
performance processor and high speed bus technology. The router equipment uses the
company's proprietary 'VRP system' software that supports fast routing, Quality of
Service, and other features. This is the software that Huawei designed itself. Lastly, as
part of the manufacturing process, Huawei's routers and other data communications
equipment pass stringent quality control tests from production through to shipment. All
of the company's production processes are certified to ISO9001 standards'.
Results
Huawei claims to manufacture (as well as to have designed) all of its routers, including
its high-end corebackbone routers2 . Thus Huawei is able to offer a "total router
solution" including the 1600 series, 2500 series, 2600 series, 3600 low/mid-end router
series, NE08/NE16 high-end routers, and the NE50/NE80 high speed core routers. These
are summarized in Table 6.2.




































Information obtained from IHuawei's website.
SInterviewee #6.
SThe NE80 is due to be commercialized in May 2001, It has a performance of 8OG backplane, 72 Mpps.
(Interviewee #6).
Huawei continues to purchase certain key chips from foreign suppliers. For its high end
routers, the company purchases high-speed network processors from IBM as part of their
cooperation agreement'. This chip is one of IBM's newest products and enables the
routers to process [P cell packets at speeds of 2.5Gbps.
Huawei's series of high-end routers were launched in August and October 2000. These
have since been purchased by Beijing Telecom and Henan Telecom. With respect to its
modular and low-end routers - the 1600, 2500, 2600 and 3600 series - these have been
purchased by financial institutions and government departments". Huawei claims that a
report from the International Data Corporation (IDC) attributes a 13% market share to the
company within China for its routers (although it wasn't clear whether this related to its
low/mid-end routers, or its high-end routers) 3.
In 1999, Huawei sold a total of 33,000 router sets", superceding its sale of 6,000 router
sets the previous year. Together with its other data communications products, router
sales contributed to total revenues of US$ 275 million for the year 2000. This was six
times higher than the US$ 47 million made on such products in 1999 (Huawei press
release).
The routers developed by Huawei are part of its Quidway and Radium series of
networking equipment which include Internet access servers, IP gateways, and ATM
switches. According to the company, these enable it to provide a complete line of
Internet products.
Technology Supplier Relationships
According to a company manager, one of factors that decide whether Huawei produces or
buys a piece of equipment is the profitability of the product. With respect to the above
example, routers are seen to be very profitable products and demand for them is growing
within China. On the other hand, another product that is necessary for data
communications networks are LAN switches. However, according to a Huawei manager,
these no longer have high margins and are correspondingly cheap to purchase5 . For these
reasons Huawei currently prefers to buy them rather than make them.
The examples below demonstrate other reasons for Huawei to purchase technology from
foreign suppliers. This technology comes in the shape of microelectronic components,
other components, or entire pieces of equipment. Additionally, Huawei purchases so-
called 'platforms' (either hardware and/or software) that provide a system of compatible
1 Interviewee #6.
2 The People's Bank of China has placed an order bfor over 100 Quidway R3600 series routers. In a recent
signing of Phase 11 of its intranet project, the bank has selected Huawei's mid-end routers to be used f'r its
core backbone network linking its head office with 9 regional branches. The sale is said to be worth RMB
1.1 million (Huawel press release).
It has not been possible to independently verify the IDC figure quoted.
SA breakdown by router type was not available
Interviewee #6.
standards, as well as a design environment, with which the company can tailor the
microelectronics or software that run its products. Hence the suppliers of these platforms
often also supply certain key components that act as the building blocks for further
development (and on which they make a profit).
Platform Supplier Relationships
IBM Microelectronics
In 2000, IBM signed an agreement to supply components to Huawei and provide the
company access to its R&D facilities'. IBM will supply network-processors (based on its
PowerNP processor) and packet-routing switch technology as well as ASIC parts to
Huawei, who will use these to build its 'next-generation' products. These types of
components are used within routers and SDH equipment. The purchasing agreement is
part of a collaborative R&D effort to make the respective products of IBM and Huawei
work more closely together, thus allowing customers to incorporate both of their
products. In order to do this, IBM will work with Huawei to develop and manufacture
the high-performance ASICs the latter requires for its networking equipment.
A typical piece of communications equipment like a network router utilizes a variety of
chips to efficiently manage and move data2, and in most cases equipment vendors must
rely on multiple suppliers for these chips. However, under this agreement, Huawei is
able to tap IBM's broad suite of networking technology for the building blocks of its
future networking systems. Huawei benefits from this as it does not have to invest
money and manpower in developing a new platform and, in addition it also has access to
IBM's intellectual property and expertise. Furthermore, using IBM's platform to make
their products compatible is advantageous from a marketing perspective.
"Collaborating with IBM will enable Huawei to have faster access to the advanced
networking technologies we need to quickly deliver high-end telecommunications
equipment to our customers across the world. Our joint R&D activities are expected to
further ensure that we can offer our customers fully-optimixed networking systems."
IBM competed with several leading chip suppliers such as Intel for the contract with
Huawei.
Motorola Computer Group
In 2000, Huawei decided to adopt Motorola's Smart Network Platform - including a
highly programmable microprocessor - as a substitute to the ASICs it has traditionally
developed for its equipment. This decision was made because of the rapidly changing
data communications and 'smart network' technologies which necessitate constant re-
' Business Wire (2000b)
2 These high-performance parts commonly include network processors, switching chips, ASICs and control
point processors.
Ojo (2000).
designing of the integrated circuits they use. Motorola's programmable processor
enables Huawei to shorten its design cycles and therefore time-to-market for its products.
Motorola's Smart Network Platfobrm includes a family of processors used in various
pieces of networking equipment which makes them compatible with one another.
Huawei decided to use this platform because of the increasing need for integration
between these various products - hence the logic of purchasing them from a single
supplier to ensure maximum compatibility.
"Motorola's Smart Network Platform is pulling those separate products together and
providing the common application inteiface and tool set that will enable us to leverage
our development in one product area across multiple product families. " -
This supplier relationship is consistent with Huawei's shift away from controlling its own
core technologies to cooperating instead with foreign partners on intellectual property
agreements that allow the company to shorten its design cycles". This new approach to
cooperation is being implemented by Huawei's ASIC design team, which it has
developed into one of the largest and most successful in China.
Texas Instruments
Huawei signed a memorandum of understanding in 1997 with Texas Instruments (TI) for
the latter to establish a digital signal process solutions (DSPS) joint-laboratory within
Huawei's facility in Shenzhen3 . The agreement allowed Huawei to develop world class
communications products such as PBX switching equipment, wireless local loop systems
and base stations using Texas Instruments' technology. TI equipped the lab with
advanced development tools and provided technical support to Huawei who used it to
train its engineers in the latest DSPS technology. The relationship between Huawei and
TI is still ongoing, and in 2000 the company decided to adopt TI's digital signal
processors for its asymmetric digital subscriber line (ADSL) infriastructure equipment ".
VocalTech Communications Ltd.
VocalTech Communications is a leading supplier of Internet telephony solutions - also
known as 'Voice over Internet Protocol' (or VoIP)5 - and is credited with launching this
industry in 1995. Since then, VocalTech has built one of the largest R&D teams
dedicated to Internet telephony and played a leading role in developing standards.






This is the ability to run a telephone service over the Internet using Internet Protocol (IP) standards.
S' El' denotes a teleconmmunications channel of a certain capacity. There are 30 telephone channels per El
line.
In 1999, VocalTech and Huawei announced a joint development, marketing and sales
agreement to deliver Internet telephony solutions to Internet service providers and
telecom carriers throughout China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. The agreement between the
two companies focused on interoperability - allowing products from both companies to
be mixed together to create hybrid end-to-end VolP systems1. In the first contract of this
relationship, Huawei purchased from VocalTech the Ensemble Architecture platform and
all its components, as well as development and training services. In particular, Huawei's
switching equipment will exclusively use VocalTech's award-winning Gatekeeper which
acts as a key control point within a voice network.
Intel Corporation
Intel has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)with Huawei in relation with
the development of the Intel Internet Exchange (IX) Architecture in China2 . The MoU
provides for the setting up of a joint-development laboratory within Huawei's Shenzhen
headquarters.
The IX Architecture is Intel's new approach for designing networking and
telecommunications equipment based on re-programmable silicon and open interfaces.
IX Architecture provides a new level of integration, performance and programmability to
OEMs such as Huawci that are developing network systems. OEMs can use IX
Architecture to design systems without encountering the costs, risks and time penalties
typically associated with ASIC design efforts. It is claimed that IX Architecture-based
systems can be deployed more quickly and upgraded more easily (due to their re-
programmability), thus speeding up time to market. Intel is also introducing a
developer's toolkit to help facilitate product design and enable equipment suppliers to
provide after-sales product enhancements to their customers.
Huawei has also joined the Internet Exchange Developers' Forum. This Forum is
focused on making it easier for third-party developers to create flexible network solutions
based on the IX Architecture. Benefits include in-depth training for building networks
based on Intel's system, as well as early access to roadmaps and specifications.
Product Supplier Relationships
IBM
As part of IBM's agreement to sell components to Huawei and provide R&D support
based on its network chip platform (see above), the American company has also signed
an agreement to supply Huawei with 'next-generation' Internet routers and SDH optical
transmission equipment . As opposed to key components such as microchips, these are
entire pieces of equipment that Huawei would integrate into its own systems. Using
IBM's PowerNP platform to make their products compatible therefore allows Huawei to
Business Wire (1999 and 2000c).
SLiu (2000a).
ChminaOnhline (2000).
easily incorporate its partner's equipment and offer it to customers as, part of an entire
package. This is vtry advantageous to Huawei as it can extend its product offering
beyond its cwn technological capabilities to offer high-end communications systems.
SDL Inc. 1
Huawei signed a supply agreement in 2000 with SDL Inc. (a San Jose, California-based
high-tech company) to supply it with components for the DWDM systems it
manufactures2 . This demonstrates that once a Chinese company such as Huawei has
understood the design and manufacturing process of a high-tech product like a DWDM, it
can forge relationships with top class suppliers of key components as far afield as Silicon
Valley.
Product Development, Manufacturing and Management Support
Huawei has also purchased consulting services and product management tools that it has
used for improving its R&D processes. Although they are not directly incorporated into
Huawei's products, they are included below since they contribute to building Huawei's
technological competitiveness.
IBM
Engineers in Huawei's Beijing research center stated that the company had hired the
consulting services of IBM advise on implementing a comprehensive R&D process
across the company. In the past, IBM had also been hired to consult on employee
compensation schemes, presumably linked to incentive structures to improve Huawei's
R&D effectiveness.
Intersolv
A 1998 purchasing agreement between Huawei and Intersolv was reached so that Huawei
could build an integrated applications development platform using PVCS, Intersolv's
software configuration management solution3. PVCS is a management tool for product
development across the enterprise, which Huawei decided to use to speed up its product-
to-market cycle and improve competitiveness. Intersolv agreed to provide technical
consultation, maintenance and product upgrades. As stated by a software engineer in
Huawei's central research department, "the Intersolv PVCS product family offers strong
capabilities in managing our software assets, thereby speeding up the development of
information technology systems."
SDL has been acquired by JDS Uniphase, a major international supplier of optical components and
subsystems (see Chapter 3).
2 These components consist of 980-nm pump modules and arrayed-waveguide-grating (AWG)
modules. These modules are key components used in both the long distance fiber optic networks
and metropolitan DWDM systems. The agreement runs through 2001 and is expected to be worth
over $20 million. PR Newswire (2000a).
SNewsbyte (1998).
PADS Software Inc.
In 2000, Huawei signed an agreement with PADS to purchase is PADS-PowerPCB
layout system, along with other products. This system provides a powerful design
environment for complex, high-speed printed circuit boards (PCB) manufacturing.
"Huawei represents the type of company that PADS is best equipped to serve - a high-end
user of innovative design solutions with stringent customer requirements and tight time-
to-market demands. With their dedication to high quality and efficient product
development. Huawet required a high-powered, easy-to-use interconnect solution.
Huawet selected PADS Software's products following a rigorous product evaluation,
finding that our solution met all of their criteria." 1
Manufacturing and Other ,lanagement Capabilities
Although the emphasis of this case study has been placed on Huawei's R&D capabilities
and technology acquisition activities, a word needs to be said about the manufacturing
side of the company's operations. After all, it is the selling of products which brings
revenues. Information provided by Huawei shows that 10% of the company's workforce
(roughly 1,600) is involved in production. Large-scale production operations, located
within is modern production center in Shenzhen, are managed through an Enterprise
Resource Planning (ERP) information technology system. The production center itself is
outfitted with "a range of leading-edge automatic production lines".
Huawei has also established within its Shenzhen headquarters a 'pilot test' department,
the function of which is described as 'optimizing' the product development process from
R&D through to final production, so as to ensure the manufacturability of the products
under development. This includes testing the quality of the materials used as well as the
final product itself, such as the structural strength, pipeline smoothness, electromagnetic
compatibility, aging, temperature resistance, and humidity resistance. The department
also reviews the product design so that it is suitable for volume production.
With regards to improving its management capabilities, Huawei has benefited from
consulting services from major international firms. IBM has provided services related to
the installation of company information technology (IT) systems. The consulting firm
Hay has also been employed to implement a human resources management system, and
both KPMG and IBMI have provided advice on financial management. Furthermore.
Huawei has received support from the German National Research Institute of Technology
with regards to implementing production and quality control processes3 .
Business Wire (2000a).
Information obtained from Hluawei website.
'-Huawe (2000a).
Product Range and Commercial Success
The main part of this case study has focused on the development of Huawei's router
equipment. In addition, the company has developed a range of products across various
segments of communications technology (outlined in Table 6.3). This puts into
perspective the company's track record in developing its own products, turning it from its
origins in switching equipment into a technologically diversified company.
Table 6.3 Huawei Product Lines Being Marketed or Under Development'
Fixed Network Mobile Network Data Communications Optical Network
Solutions Solutions Solutions Solutios
SwitchingI GSM 900; 1800 ATM SDH
Optical Access Network GPRS GSR DWDM
Fixed IN Thlurd-Generation (3G) Routers (26XX. 36XX, Metro
NE08,'I6, NE50/80)
STP, BITS Mobile IN LAN Switch OXC
Call Centers Mobile Call Centers Access Server
ETS 450/1900 WLL1 Short Message Center
Source Huawet
Huawei has generally been the technology leader among Chinese producers across all of
the above product categories. For example, in the field of optical transmission, Huawei
was the first domestic company to commercialize a DWDM system in China2 . Huawei's
products also generally beat those of other domestic manufacturers in terms of
transmission capabilities and features (for example in Internet router technology).
Huawei's technological lead relative to its domestic peers is translated into the
company's higher revenue earnings. Huawei's sales revenues have been steadily
increasing from USS 1.08 billion in 1998, to USS 1.5 billion in 1999, to USS 2.65 billion
in 2000. Sales are expected to reach USS 5 billion in 20013.
SThe company also has an ASIC (application-spcific integrated circuit) design center which serices its
various products lines as needed.
Information obtained from Huawei press release.
Information obtained from f luawet web sie.
6.3 C-ISE STUD v 2: ZHONGXLVG TELECOM EQUIPMENT (ZTE) CoRpoRA TON1
R&D Capabilities and Processes
ZTE carries out two types of R&D: one type involves keeping abreast of global trends in
telecommunications technology, the other deals with actual research into the design and
production of particular pieces of equipment. The first type of R&D is carried out within
ZTE's 'Technology Center' which strives to stay informed of innovations and understand
their importance to the company.
The second type of R&D has the aim of mastering the design and production of products
for commercialization. This research focuses on products already on the market (e.g.
supplied by foreign competitors) which the firm wishes to develop itself. ZTE's main
R&D focus lies in optical transmission, data communication, and mobile communication
technologies. These activities are carried out within eight R&D institutes, six located
within China, and two located internationally.
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Korea (ZTE FutureTel Institute)
Research Activities:
Integrated wave division multiplex (WDM): new generations of
optical transmission systems (including passive optical network):
data commumnication products.
Large SPC switchming systems: mobile switchming systems: network
management: intelligent networks; network products; ATM
switching systems; access servers.
Fiber ISDN access networks: PCS access; ATM access switching;
ISDN data terminals.
GSM900 1800 digital cellular mobile communication system:
CDMA mobile commumnication system: mobile handsets.
Third-generation CDMA mobile communications: SDH
transnussion series: wireless access; multimedia videoconferencinmg
system; telecom power supplies: centralized monitoring, automation
of transformer substations: and production testing equipment.
Radio transmitter and receiver products.
Collection and exchange of the latest technological developments.
CDMA mobile commumnication systems.
Source: ZTE
In addition to the institutes listed above. ZTE has invested in several joint-research
initiatives with academic institutions and foreign corporate partners (see below). Some
of these have emerged from the company's 'Post Doctor Station' set up in 1998, which
See Chapter 4 for a general introduction to ZTE.
has proposed eight research projects and established over twenty cooperative agreements
with Chinese universities and science research institutes'.
ZTE claims to invest over 10% of annuals sales into R&D. Out of a total staff of 9,000,
86% hold bachelor degrees or above, 2,000 employees hold master's degrees, and 300
hold PhD or post-doctorate degrees and diplomas. 40% of the company's staff is
engaged in R&D (ZTE 2000). Specifically within the area of mobile systems, ZTE
devotes about 1,800 of its people to R&D. The company is currently strongly focusing
on 3G mobile systems (reportedly the most important R&D program at the company).
Seventy percent of ZTE's R&D effort is taken up in developing software, with the rest
going into hardware development (on which the software is used). Accordingly, about
seventy percent of ZTE's researchers are software engineers".
A company manager that was interviewed claimed that the company's R&D facilities are
stronger than those run by the Ministry of Information Industries (MI!). This was
illustrated by the fact that the company's Nanjing research center has over one thousand
researchers who are young (and thus trained in the latest technologies) as well as
experienced. In contrast, the MlI's institute in Beijing has less researchers, many of
which are relatively old and inexperienced in the latest technologies. This may be a
reason why ZTE was assigned to undertake part of the national telecom research projects
of the government's "China 863 Plan" and the "China Torch Program" (see below), one
of which is in the area of 3G mobile communications (ZTE 2000).
With respect to relationships between ZTE and government telecom institutes,
cooperation seems to occur at the level of system design rather than product design. An
example is the joint venture set up by ZTE in the Congo (the Sino-Congo Telecom
Corporation) to implement a mobile phone system in the capital Kinshasa. At the time,
ZTE itself did not have enough expertise to set up such a system (although it provided the
equipment), and thus drew upon the knowledge of engineers from the MII's institutes to
assist them in this task3. In addition, although ZTE seems to carry out most of its R&D
independently, it does cooperate with university research institutes.
Lastly, the decision-making process at ZTE on whether or not to develop a product is
performed at two levels. Firstly, a decision on whether to carry through or cancel a
project is made by a committee within a particular company R&D institute. This
committee subsequently reports back to a "Technology Center' at the company
headquarters which audits this decision4 . The latter is in effect a coordinating mechanism
to ensure a coherent technology development strategy occurs across the firm.




ZTE 's Participation in National Technology-Building Initiatives
ZTE has participated in, and received recognition for, various state-led technology
development initiatives. As described in Chapter 5, this entails various forms of
financial and technical support from government. In 1996, the company was chosen by
the Ministry of Science and Technology (MST) as one of the high-tech enterprises to
spearhead the 'Torch Program'. It was subsequently given an award by the MST in 1998
for its excellent performance record in the Torch Program during 1996 and 1997. Also in
1998, the company was designated by the State Economic and Trade Commission
(SETC) as one of the national 'centers of technology development'. In 1999, ZTE took
part in the national 'China 863 Plan' for the development of various communications
technologies, including third-generation (3G) mobile communications, integrated access
over optical fiber, and optical transmission systems. Agyin in 2000 ZTE was authorized
to develop three particular technologies under the 863 m.ogram: the baseband processing
for 3G base station systems, the 3G core network, and 3G systems integration'.
A ZTE manager who was interviewed stated that the company contributed the majority of
funds to some of the national projects it was involved in, such as 'China 863'. Therefore,
although theoretically the technologies developed from such State-initiated plans should
be shared, in practice ZTE has been able to claim exclusive use for at least some of the
results".
Joint Research Relationships
Similar to the case of Huawei, ZTE has established joint R&D efforts with academrnic
institutions and other foreign telecom players. These are summarized in Table 6.5.
Development of Dense Wavelength Division Multiplexing (DWDM) Equipment
History of the D WDMt Development Process
In 1998, ZTE established its Beijing R&D Institute to carry out research on Dense
Wavelength Division Multiplexing (DWDM) equipment - a key product used in optical
transmission networks. The decision was made to produce this equipment since it has
proven to be very profitable for firms such as Nortel and Lucent in China. The first
product developed by the institute was an 8 Channel/2.5 Gbps capacity DWDM. Since
then, ZTE has rapidly improved the technical capabilities of their product such that they
can currently produce an 80 Channel/10 Gbps DWDM3. Furthermore, the product
development cycle by which ZTE has kept improving upon each previous model has
significantly shortened since the inception of the institute as demonstrated in Table 6.6.
Information obtained from ZTE's website.
SInterviewee 3.
Interviewee .4.
Table 6.5 ZTE Joint R&D Facilities
Partner Purpose
Beijing University of Posts On November 13, 1999, a joint lab was set up in Beijing with BUPT to
& Telecommunications perform research on optical communication systems, particularly in the
(BUPT) development of OADM equipment. This is one of the major tasks of the
government's '863' program (see Chapter 5).
On August 15, 2000, a second joint lab was set up in Shenzhen with BUPT
to carry out research on optical transmission systems.
University of Electronic ZTE and UEST (a 'national key university') have set up a joint R&D center
Science & Technology of to focus on wireless commumnications, particularly in third-generation
China (UEST) wireless technology.
Texas Instruments (TI) ZTE and TI have established a joint laboratory within ZTE's Shanghai
Institute II to focus on the development of the latest DSP (digital signal
processing) technology. TI will provide a software design platform and
technical support.
Motorola ZTE has set up a joint lab with Motorola in Nanjing. The cooperation will
be based in the fields of data and mobile communication. Phase I of the
project is devoted to developing data communication products such as IP
phone gateways and access servers.
BUPT began R&D activities on high-speed digital optical fiber communication systems and DWDM
systems at the end of the 1970s. Several key products have emerged from the university's research, such
as coherent optical communication systems. 8x2.5Gb/s OTDM optical transrmussion systems. bi-
directional DWDM systems, optical internet. key components of WDM optical fiber systems, systems
architecture configurations, and ATM optical exchange technology.
UEST is a national key university that trains engineers min the field of information technology and is
involved in the national 'informatization' initiative.
Table 6.6 Evolution ofDWDM Product Development at ZTE
Number of Channels Capacity (Gigabits
per second. Gbps)





80 10 Current product, took 3-4 months to develop.
The first products were described as being imitations of competitors' designs and ZTE
developed them by mostly purchasing components from suppliers. Gradually, the
Institute acquired the capability to develop certain key components of the DWDM system
such as the Air Duct Fiber Amplifier (ADFA) which it is now able to design. ZTE still
purchases many of the components for DWDMs from both Chinese and foreign
suppliers, and will continue to do so according the company's sourcing strategy and
design capabilities. For example, the company still purchases certain components
considered to be key, "high-tech" elements of the equipment.
Sources of Technical Knowledge
The Institute researchers identified four main sources of knowledge that helped ZTE
refine its understanding of DWDM technology:
* Technical consultants from universities
* Government research institutes
* Sophisticated customer requirements
* Firm-specific, internally-generated knowledge
Technical Consultants
The company has reportedly often drawn upon consultants from universities for
technical expertise in product design. Indeed, many professors in China's leading
telecommunications universities (formerly under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Posts
and Telecommunications)' also work part-time as consultants to Chinese technology
companies such as ZTE.
Government Research Institutes
Another source of technical knowledge has been obtained through cooperating with
academic and State-run institutes on certain research topics. For example, within the
context of the government-initiated and (partly) funded '863 program', ZTE cooperated
with the Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, the Wuhan Research
Institute, and Datang to produce Optical Add/Drop Multiplex (OADM) systems - another
component within optical transmission systems. The scope of these cooperative
relationships seems to have focused on applied research. The result of these relationships
was a "semi-product" - one that is not yet ready for commercial development but on
which further work needs to be done in order to bring it to market2 . ZTE indicated that it
had invested a lot a money into this program, for which it received two main benefits:
I Along with the ministerial re-organization resulting in the formation of the Ministry of Information
Industry (see Chapter 5), the tramining institutes of the former Ministry if Post & Telecommumnications
(MPT) were converted into "Telecommunications IUmniversities'.
SInterviewee 44.
* The knowledge that it was developing a commercially viable product: the choice of
technology developed was arrived at through various interactions between market
players which agreed that this technology was particularly important for the
development of the industry.
* The Chinese government provides a certain window of time during which the
companies involved in joint development (such as ZTE) have the proprietary
ownership of the technology. Thus the company can make a profit from its efforts by
further developing and commercializing it.
Customer Requirements
Customers such as China Telecom and China Unicomrn provide the sophisticated demand
and the required product specifications to Chinese equipment vendors. This market
sophistication is partly generated by foreign vendors marketing their products to the
government and to the domestic telecom carriers'. The latter then pass information
gained about the latest technical specifications to Chinese companies. According to ZTE
executives, these telecom operators put quality and technology above price in making
purchasing decisions, thus applying pressure to Chinese manufacturers to produce the
most up-to-date equipment if they want to capture market share.
Firm-Specific Knowledge
As one engineer put it: "the most important technical capabilities come from within the
company itself'. This type of knowledge comes from the experience of repeatedly
designing products with ever more capabilities and thus travelling along the learning
curve. The knowledge gained from designing and producing a previous DWDM model is
applied to the next one, gradually reducing the product development cycle.
Lastly, a very important source of knowledge arises from the mobility of labor, as
exemplified by the career path of one of the Institute's researchers. This engineer is
currently a Project Manager responsible for the development of one of the DWDM
subsystems, and has been with ZTE for a year. Prior to this he had worked at the Wuhan
Research Institute (WRI) - a government-run organization under the MII which has a
reputation as a leader within China in the area of optical multiplexing and DWDM
systems. Within the industry, WRI researchers are prized for their knowledge and skills,
and are wooed away by companies such as ZTE who offer high pay packages (including
stock options) and the opportunity to lead their own research teams 2. The basic research
the WRI has undertaken over the past decade in areas of optical technology is thus
diffused to other companies. This is achieved via the knowledge gained by its engineers
who go on to develop commercial applications of the technologies on which they had
previously developed an expertise.




ZTE has successfully commercialized its ZXWM-32 line of DWDM products (however
sales figures were not available). Table 6.7 summarizes some of the optical transmission
products being sold by ZTE, including its DWDM system.
Table 6.7 ZTE Optical Transmission Systems
Model Name Deseription
ZXWM-32 DWDM optical transmission system product series. This includes systems
with transmission capacities of 10Gbps, 20Gbps, 40Gbps and 80Gbps.
ZXSM-150/600/2500 SDH optical transmission system product series. This can be combined
with ZTE's DWDM products to produce transmission capacities of
10Gbps, 20Gbps, 40Gbps and 80Gbps.
ZXSM-150(V2) Compact 155M SDH optical transmission system
Source: ZTE
Table 6.6 above provides more up-to-date information on ZTE's capabilities, specifically
in DWDM optical systems. It shows that the highest capacity system that the company is
currently able to sell reaches 800Gbps (80 channel x 10Gbps per channel). This is a very
respectable capacity in comparison with what foreign companies currently offer,
especially for a technology which is considered to still be relatively immature1.
At the end of 2000, ZTE won a bid to provide DWDM transmission systems for the
construction of China Telecom's optical Metropolitan Area Network (MAN) for the city
of Wuhan. ZTE will provide its ZXWM-32 DWVDM system for this project, which will
enable a transmission capacity of up to 80Gbit/s while flexibly adding or dropping
wavelengths.
Recent Changes in Product Development Strategy
Before 1999, ZTE's objective was to produce in-house all the technology that it sold and
R&D programs were set accordingly. However in the past year the company's
management has changed its product development strategy so as to concentrate on
developing 'core technologies' on its own and purchasing the rest from suppliers. As
explained by an R&D manager, the rationale for this new strategy is two-fold. Firstly,
telecommunications technology changes too rapidly for ZTE to develop everything and
stay technologically up-to-date. Secondly, customers want 'total solutions' which
necessitate a complete range of products that the company does not have. Thus it makes
sense to integrate the products offered by other suppliers in order to satisfy customers
which demanded that a single vendor integrate and install all the necessary equipment.
'Hungjen Wang, MIT (personal communication). However, further investigation would need to be carried
out to ascertain whether ZTE's equipment compares favorably with that of foreign companies in terms of
quality and reliability.
Technology Supplier Relationships
The fact that ZTE is a sophisticated buyer of technology is summed up by the assertion
made by a company executive that "Zhongxing only buys the most advanced technology
from foreign firms". If needed, ZTE thus looks for suppliers of the latest technologies in
order to meet the market's requirements as well as match competitors' offerings.
Furthermore, before purchasing from a foreign supplier the company determines whether
the equipment is compatible with its other products and whether or not it has the
capabilities in-house to produce it.
It is apparent that ZTE has several partnerships with companies that supply it with
platforms to develop certain applications, and in some cases also supplying it with the
necessary components. These are summarized below.
Platform Suppliers
Texas Instruments
TI has established joint labs with ZTE to design digital signal processor (DSP) chips for
use in ADSL access equipment. These labs include DSP development kits and technical
assistance from the supplier. ZTE in turn purchases the components to be used from TI.1
In addition, ZTE has also formed a joint venture with TI and two other Chinese mobile
handset manufacturers to develop DSP chips for 2.5G handsets. Although this is in the
field of consumer electronics rather than infrastructure equipment, it is an extension of
the supplier relationship between ZTE and its US partner. TI has pledged to transfer its
core DSP technologies to all its Chinese cell phone partners, and the alliance plans to
field a GPRS chip set by the end of 2001."
Motorola
ZTE has signed an agreement with Motorola to develop products based on its Smart
Network Platform. The arrangement is similar to that between Motorola and Huawei,
and includes the provision of development tools and assistance in using them.
Vertel Software
Vertel is a leading provider of mediation software3 for telecommunications networks. It
offers a variety of technologies and applications, supporting end-to-end network and
service management with the highest quality of service for network operations.
Liu (2000b).
SThis project is being funded and supervised by the Ministry of Information Industries (Liu 2000).
3 This software enables a variety of devices such as mobile devices to become an integral, intelligent part of
a company's network topology.
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In 2000, Vertel sold the license to its telecommunications management network (TMN)
product line to ZTE for implementation in several wireless projects'. ZTE will build
network management applications that include the Vertel technology for two wireless
service providers based on two different standards, GSM and CDMA. Thus the company
was able to use a software platform developed by a third party to make its mobile systems
technologically competitive, without expending effort on developing one itself.
Manufacturing Capabilities
ZTE has production facilities in Shenzhen, for switching equipment, and in Shanghai, for
mobile equipment. The former are equipped with advanced manufacturing equipment
and testing facilities, and cover an area of over 170,000 square meters. At present,
annual production capacity is equivalent to 20 million lines of switching systems. The
mobile equipment production facilities cover over 10,000 square meters, and monthly
production capacity is currently at about 1,000 sets of carrier frequency for a single shift
(ZTE 2000). In November of 2000, ZTE began the construction of new production
facilities in Nanjing which will occupy an area of 77,000 square meters. These are due to
be completed in 20012. In addition to its facilities in China, in 1999 ZTE has established
a manufacturing plant in Pakistan which went into operation in 2000. ZTE gained ISO
9001 certification in 1995, 1998 and 2000.
Product Range and Commercial Success
Similarly to Huawei, ZTE is a technologically diversified supplier of telecommunications
equipment. The company's product range encompasses fixed networks, mobile
networks, data communication/networking, and optical networks. ZTE's efforts in
technology development across these areas have paid off commercially, as indicated
below:
* ZTE's ZXWM-32, a DWDM optical transmission system, has been awarded network
access licenses by the MII. These have been incorporated into the network in Beijing
and Hunan.
* ZTE switching systems, access network and videoconferencing products have
reached international standards in their level of technology. ZTE's switching and
access products cover 20% of Chinese communication networks, and its
videoconferencing system is incorporated into 60% of newly added capacity in China.
* ZTE was the first Chinese company to develop a viable CDMA mobile
communication system.
* ZTE's series of ATM products have been widely used in China, including its
backbone switch, access switch, access multiplexer, and service accessor.
* IP network platforms, such as the IP phone gateway, manufactured by ZTE have been
successfully running on the public network. Its IP access server has been successfully
Business Wire (2000d).
2 Information obtained from the ZTE web site.
introduced within several provinces in China. Furthermore, its Voice-over-IP access
gateway has been adopted by China Unicom in 93 cities within China.
From a technological standpoint, ZTE's success can be partly measured by its claim to
over 300 patented technologies, ten of which were applied for through its participation in
the government's "China 863 Program" and which are related to the area of third-
generation mobile communications (ZTE 2000).
6.4 SUMMARY
Product Development Strategy and Capabilities
A common theme between Huawei and ZTE is the importance they place in building
their R&D capabilities. They do not rely on establishing joint ventures with foreign
partners to access technology and manufacture new equipment. Rather, they strive to
imitate the competition through their own internal efforts. Importantly, their R&D efforts
are directed at developing the capability to design products that are new to the company,
as opposed to understanding how to manufacture products whose design is handed to
them by foreign partners (as would occur within a JV).
Technology Supplier Strategies
The case studies above confirm the fact that Chinese companies can and do access world-
class technologies through supplier relationships with foreign companies. Many of these
have a strong 'platform' component to them, whereby the Chinese company adopts a
technological framework developed by their supplier. This platform provides an
environment for them to design systems specifically to their needs, and gives them
immediate access to world-class technologies which in many cases their competitors
equally utilize. Suppliers of the platforms also provide technical support to the Chinese
partner, whom they consider to be a valuable long-term business partner'.
The benefits derived by Chinese vendors in using such technology platforms can be
summarized as follows:
* Rapid access to an advanced design and/or system operating environment,
accompanied by technical support.
* A reinforcement of the 'configurational' nature of telecom technology (see Chapter
2). The adoption of a platform can improve the interoperability between the
equipment developed by a Chinese company and that produced by foreign
manufacturers (who either provided this platform, or use this same platform provided
to them by a third party). This means that Chinese vendors may be able rely on the
Leading technology suppliers often vigorously compete with each other to win supplier contracts with
companies such as Huawei and ZTE (Business Wire 2000b).
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ability to integrate higher end technologies into their product offering which they
would not otherwise be able to do.
With respect to discrete product or component suppliers, the examples of Huawei and
ZTE demonstrate that, if they are able to master the design of a high end product such as
a DWDM, they can access the same suppliers of high tech components used to
manufacture them as their foreign competitors probably do (such as the case of SDL Inc.
supplying Huawei).
Sources of Knowledge
The above cases show that Chinese companies can access various sources of knowledge
which they can use to develop their competitiveness in designing and producing high-end
technologies. These are:
* Consulting - either on specific product design issues (e.g. hiring professors from
telecom universities), or on broader R&D management (e.g. Huawei hiring IBM's
consulting services).
* A mobile labor force that is highly educated and skilled.
* Technical support from suppliers
* Internal knowledge management systems
* Government-sponsored cooperation within the industry targeted at developing
specific technologies (such as the 'China 863 Plan').
In addition, it has been stated that researchers from Chinese firms attend international
conferences dealing with cutting-edge technology developments, and have the ability to
absorb this knowledge and bring it back to their companies'. This is an important source
of knowledge for companies such as Huawei and ZTE who have cultivated the capability
to absorb and use this knowledge to design relatively advanced products and close the
gap with the foreign competition.
'Interviewee #5.
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7 Analysis and Discussion
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapters 3 through 5 discussed industry trends, both abroad and within China, as well as
government policies relating to the sector. The previous chapter focused on the case
studies of two domestic companies, Huawei and ZTE, examining their R&D and product
development processes and strategies. This chapter will return to the core question Posed
in Chapter 1. Namely, how can Chinese companies compete against foreign firms in the
high-end technology segments of telecommunications equipment? Underlying this, are
the deeper questions of what strategies the Chinese firms have employed to build their
technological competitiveness, have these have been successful, and what has been the
role of government in these matters?
In Chapter 1, the following three hypotheses were put forward to address this question:
HI Heavy investment in internal R&D capabilities is increasingly becoming an
important driving force behind the success of certain Chinese companies.
H2 Chinese firms are leveraging the 'configurational' nature of communications
technology to avoid the need for costly investment of resources in building
technologies from scratch.
H3 International supplier relationships established by Chinese companies have had an
important impact on their technological, and hence commercial, competitiveness.
The availability of, and ability to purchase, technologies from international sources
has been an enabler for Chinese industry.
The following discussion will address these hypotheses in light of the previous chapters.
7.2 THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC CORPORATE R&D
Characterizing the Corporate R&D of Domestic Companies
The first step in understanding the role of R&D carried out by domestic firms is to define
it in more detail. A useful framework for this purpose is that of Amsden, Tschang and
Goto (2001) discussed in Chapter 2, which proposes a taxonomy for R&D (see Table
2.2). The activities described by researchers from the companies' R&D centers most
closely resemble exploratory, development in terms of the framework's criteria with
respect to research objectives, output, techniques and the qualifications and skills set of
engineers.
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It should be realized, however, that the R&D being undertaken probably contains a high
degree of reverse engineering' - the main purpose being to imitate the most advanced
products on the market, rather than develop entirely new products. In networking and
optical communications, these two firms are close followers of the world technological
frontier, embodied by market leaders such as Nortel, Cisco etc 2. This is to be expected,
since Chinese firms have only begun to actively develop these products in the last three
to four years.
Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 2, the fact that R&D is applied to reverse
engineering does not necessarily change some of its basic characteristics. The skills,
methodologies, and problem-solving activities involved can approach that of 'original'
R&D since, although a model may exist, much essential technology remains tacit and
needs to be discovered through intensive internal effort. This is supported by the data on
researchers' skills within these companies, a large proportion of their engineers having
Master's and PhD degrees. For this reason, Amsden et al.'s framework can be applied to
analyzing the domestic firms' R&D efforts. It should also be noted that advanced
development is another part of the R&D activities undertaken by Chinese companies
given that it is necessary for achieving efficient manufacturing of their products. A
strong indication of this is provided by the case study of Huawei, which describes a 'pilot
test' department within the company whose function is to optimize the manufacturability
of the firm's products .
Responses given by R&D staff from the facilities of Huawei and ZTE indicate that
certain elements of these companies' R&D programs may actually reach into activities
akin to applied research. These correspond to research groups attempting to develop
products that are not yet available on the market. One such example is the development
of third-generation mobile communications technologies. The Chinese government has
obtained certification from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) for a new
domestically developed standard for 3G mobile communications called TD-SCDMA.
Although the technological roots of this standard lie in the current GSM and CDMA
standards, it is still unique and different from the two other 3G standards being developed
by the leading international equipment companies4 . Chinese firnms developing the
hardware and software that will utilize this standard are therefore not imitating or
superficially adapting products already on the market (3G systems are not yet
commercially availables). Therefore there is nothing to reverse engineer or use as a
model for development. It was not possible to tell from the available information how
'Managers interviewed from the research centers maintain that their firms respect other companies'
patents. Therefore there is a possibility that domestic firms are licensing certain technologies from foreign
firms. This is unlikely, however, as it goes against the strategic interests of foreign companies given that
equipment such as DWDM and routers lie in very profitable market segments and they have the option to
export into the Chinese market or sell them through JVs (which better protect their intellectual property).
Further investigations would need to be conducted to reconcile statements made by the domestic companies
and the methods available to them for acquiring technology.
2 As discussed in Chapter 3, the smaller technology companies that supply components and subsystems
(see Appendix 2b for a selected listing of these) are also representative of the world technological frontier.
3 See Chapter 6.
4W-CDMA and CDMA2000.
5 Except in Japan, where a version of 3G, called iMode, has recently been implemented by NTT DoCoMo.
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successful domestic firms have been in this type of research, however it does show that
Chinese companies are beginning to tend towards more applied research as they develop
their internal technological capabilities.
Software Development
Software is an essential aspect of communications equipment, and it is often complex and
time-consuming to develop. The stability, quality and feature-richness of software are
often key differentiating factors for a given hardware technology (especially when it is
mature). Software development is an important aspect of product R&D, as illustrated by
ZTE, where 70% of R&D at the company is focused on software, according to one
manager. However, R&D related to software does not seem to fit into the framework of
Amsden et al., which is mostly geared towards physical goods. Nevertheless, in many
cases software development still qualifies as 'research', and it requires the various
processes of normal product development such as design, testing, de-bugging etc.
Software is also usually developed from scratch (when it isn't licensed) as reverse-
engineering can be near-impossible without access to the proprietary source codes of the
program in question. Therefore, although a lot of R&D effort by the Chinese firms goes
into software development, it is one area in which a different type of classification needs
to be applied. One criterion may relate to the particular level of software complexity,
such as functionality, interactions with hardware and other software, etc.
There are indications that the software skills of Chinese firms are considerable, since
software programming applied to communications equipment and systems can be very
complex. Links with the highly regarded Indian software industry seem to have been
instrumental in some cases (such as for Huawei's development of Internet router
software) 6.
Corporate R&D and Success in Product Development
The case studies of Huawei and ZTE show that these companies have developed
advanced products as a result of their own investment in R&D. The know-how for
manufacturing products such as DWDM systems, Internet routers and other pieces of
equipment in their product portfolios have been acquired through heavy investment in
knowledge-building, rather than as a product of tecmhnology transfer through joint
ventures. This is a particularly salient feature of the four leading domestic firms, and
especially of Huawei and ZTE. Neither of the two have extensively engaged in setting up
JVs with foreign partners, thereby using them to break into a particular product market.
Rather, their products have been self-developed.
The divergence between the 'go-it-alone' road and the JV/technology transfer road
occurred at the beginnings of the industry in China7. Shen (1999) gives an account of
two case studies in the development of SPC switches. One effort, backed by the Chinese
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6 See Chapter 6.
7 See Chapter 4.
government, resulted in the creation of Shanghai Bell (a JV between Alcatel and a
domestic company). The other was an independent effort by a Chinese firm to develop its
own version of the SPC switch, capitalizing on the fact that it could purchase many of the
necessary components from abroad. Similarly, one can draw a mirror image between
many other communications systems sold in China that have been either developed
through joint ventures or self-developed by the four domestic leaders. An indication of
this can be seen in the description of China's industry structure in Chapter 4. There is,
however, a time lag, as in nearly all cases the technologies were initially introduced
through joint ventures and later domestically developed. Nevertheless this time lag is
shortening, as illustrated by Figure 4.2, presumably as a result of the improving
absorptive capacities and technical capabilities of domestic firms.
From this perspective, the R&D efforts of Chinese firms have been a success. They have
enabled these companies to reproduce a portfolio of products that meet market needs and
oftentimes match those produced by foreign competitors.
A Comparison Between R&D in Domestic Companies vs Joint Ventures
In discussing the role of domestic corporate R&D, it is useful to contrast it with that
found in Chinese-Foreign joint ventures. Amsden etal (2001) and Porter (1998) describe
how the most important aspect of a firm's R&D is carried out within its home country.
R&D performed by these companies in foreign countries where they have a direct
investment (such as through a JV), is usually a case of product adaptation (falling under
the 'advanced development' category. China very much conforms to this observation.
Because the products manufactured in Chinese-foreign JVs have, by definition, already
been developed by the foreign partnr, any R&D occurring in these companies usually
relates to the adaptation of existing products for the Chinese market. This is often an
issue of software development, as foreign-developed products need to be made
compatible with Chinese communications standards and protocols. In an interview
conducted at the Beijing International Switching System Corporation (BISC), a joint
venture with Siemens , a manager described that the only 'R&D' the company conducts
is in adapting software originally provided by Siemens.
8 It is a direct competitor with Alcatel's Shanghai Bell JV, also focusing on the production of switching
equipment.
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Analysis of the Case Study Firms' R&D Processes and Strategies
The account given in Chapter 6 of Huawei and ZTE's R&D capabilities and processes
allows us to distill some key actions these firms have taken in order to acquire technology
and build up their technological capabilities.
High Investment of Resources in R&D
Both Huawei and ZTE claim that they invest 10% of revenues into R&D. Furthermore,
in addition to this level of expenditure, the case studies have shown that a substantial
amount of human resources are devoted to R&D activities - approximately 40% for both
Huawei and ZTE. Both companies also have numerous centers devoted to R&D on
particular product lines.
Emphasis on Recruiting, Retaining and Motivating Talent
High quality R&D necessitates high quality human capital with the right skills. A
professor at the Beijing University of Posts and Telecoms (BUPT) asserted in an
interview that one of the biggest challenges for Chinese firms is finding the talent they
require9. This is not surprising since it has been observed that, even in the U.S., there are
talent shortages in areas such as optical communications' 0 . Furthermore, even for the
relatively small number of Chinese graduates with appropriate skills, domestic firms need
to compete with prestigious foreign companies with a presence in China in order to
attract them.
Nevertheless, firms such as Huawei seem to have been relatively successful in the war for
talent. Huawei stands out by the manner in which it aggressively recruits the best and
brightest from Chinese universities and research institutes by paying higher salaries than
the standard for domestic firms. Huawei is also known to give very high salaries to the
students of famous professors, to the extent that some industry observers define the
company's HR strategy as a means of "storing" talent such that it is not made available to
the competition". Datang, another of the four leading domestic firms, has also been
successful in obtaining highly qualified staff trained in the U.S., many of them graduates
of MIT 2.
In many cases, the top domestic firms use their R&D relationships with top-tier Chinese
universities to both promote themselves among students and identify promising
researchers. Furthermore, a high proportion of recruits have Masters or PhD degrees,
which is consistent with the fact that the highly technical nature of the work needs to be
matched by an appropriate skill level' 3 . Domestic firms cast their nets wide when
9 Interviewee #15.
t0 See Chapter 3.
1 Interviewee #15.
12 Interviewee #15.
13 Even undergraduate recruits come with high skill levels since undergraduate education is specialized,
rather than of a liberal arts nature, and many university programs emphasize a high degree of practical skill
by working on research projects throughout a student's education. For instance, students from the Beijing
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looking for skills as they also try to attract experienced researchers from well-respected
institutions such as the Wuhan Research Institute (which is strong in optical technology).
In terms of retaining talent, Huawei is also a good example of how domestic firms have
increasingly been using share options to both keep and motivate staff. However, Huawei
in particular has been known to also lose staff because of its managerial culture, which
some describe as "too American" - a reference to the pressures of the hard-driving work
14
environment.
Use of External Sources of Knowledge
Both Huawei and ZTE have shown an ability to utilize knowledge from outside their firm
in order to complement their own expertise. For example both companies have drawn
upon the knowledge of professors from well-known technical universities acting as
consultants. In this way, domestic companies are able to access the state-funded
knowledge accumulated within the country's academic institutions.
Huawei has also called upon the consulting services of foreign companies. For example,
IBM is advising it on implementing the process of 'integrated product development'.
Although this is more 'managerial' rather than technical knowledge, it is a very important
contribution to Huawei's internal R&D capabilities, enabling it to manage them in a
better, more efficient manner. Two interviewees stated that understanding how to
manage the R&D process is crucial to the success of domestic firms'5 .
Researchers at ZTE have stated that international scientific forums and exchanges have
been a useful source of new knowledge for their company. Their top researchers are
proficient enough to understand the material presented and thus feed it back to their own
organization's R&D processes 16 . This is a tribute to the training provided within certain
academic institutions from which these researchers are recruited. Domestic firms also try
to absorb technical knowledge abroad by placing 'listening posts' in centers of innovation
such as Silicon Valley (both Huawei and ZTE have offices there). These centers are
responsible for tracking trends and innovations in technology, and reporting them back to
their company headquarters.
Lastly, domestic companies have formalized technological exchanges by entering into
R&D cooperation with academic institutions as well as foreign companies. Cooperation
with Chinese academic institutions often occurs within the context of a broader
government program such as the 'China 863 Plan'. One example is the cooperation
between ZTE, Datang, the Wuhan Research Institute, and the Beijing University of Posts
& Telecommunications to develop an Optical Add/Drop Multiplexer (OADM), a key
subsystem of a DWDM optical transmission system. This form of research could
University of Posts & Telecommunications are highly prized because of the practical orientation of the
program. (Interviewee #15).
"4 Interviewee #16. Ren Zhengfei, the ex-People's Liberation Army officer who founded Huawei, is said to




probably best be characterized as exploratory development according to the fri-amework
proposed by Amsden et al. (2000). In this particular case, the result of the four-way
cooperation was a "semi-product" for which further development needed to take place in
order to commercialize it. The participating companies could at this stage bring the
project in-house for further advanced development. A ZTE manager described that
cooperation between his company and academic institutions dealt with more "basic"
R&D than what was conducted within ZTE' 7
Joint R&D relationships with foreign companies ranges from narrow in scope, such as
product adaptations of key components (the most common form), to broader joint
venture-type cooperation on entire systems (relatively rare). The first type of cooperation
is often tied to supplier relationships, examples being the joint R&D labs set up by Texas
Instruments (for DSP chips) and Motorola (for ASIC chips), within both Huawei and
ZTE's own facilities. This kind of R&D probably falls under the definition of advanced
development. Importantly, it provides domestic companies with the capabilities to use
suppliers' design platforms to adapt and design certain key components.
More extensive, joint venture R&D cooperation between domestic and foreign companies
seems to be relatively rare. The only such relationship found is that between Datang and
Siemens, whereby both companies are jointly developing products for the Chinese 3G
mobile standard, TD-SCDMA. Industry observers believe that both companies will share
the intellectual property developed from the relationship18 , however details of this joint
venture were not available. A statement from a manager in Huawei's Beijing institute
may serve to illustrate management's policy with respect to R&D cooperation: "If
Huawei ever decides to cooperate in R&D, it will only do so with companies that can
offer the latest technology. We are not interested in old technologies"' 9 . This may
indicate that domestic firms only justify the tradeoffs that come with R&D cooperation
(e.g. proprietary versus shared intellectual property) if it enables them to acquire up-to-
date or next-generation technologies that would otherwise take much longer to develop
on their own.
A Structured Product Development Process
The process by which Huawei and ZTE develop their products can be conceptualized as
shown below, using information gained from the case studies in Chapter 6.
Product Identification. Firstly, firms identify a particular product or technology they
wish to develop by analyzing market opportunities 20 . For example, Huawei decided to
develop routers because the market in China is growing strongly and they are very




20 However, good judgement may not have been always used in the initial scoping of products. For
example, Huawei spent a lot of money in developing GSM systems without realizing that they would not
be able to capture the share of China's market necessary to make this investment worthwhile. However,
the company may yet be successful in developing country markets (Interviewee #16).
switches (purchasing them instead) due to the high competition and low margins of these
products 21 . Furthermore, Chinese firms actively keep abreast of technological
developments in the field and track demand trends for particular products. This is carried
out via 'listening posts' they have established abroad within centers of innovation, such
as Huawei and ZTE's research centers in Silicon Valley and New Jersey, U.S.A..
R&D Ramp-up. Once a potential product has been identified, a preliminary team of
researchers is set to work on understanding the technology. If the equipment belongs to a
particular line of products the company has already established, this activity generally
takes place within the R&D centers dedicated to it. If R&D on the product is looking
promising, the resources allocated to it are increased and a separate research center may
be established to host the expanded staff (e.g. Huawei's Beijing Institute dedicated to
routers, and ZTE's Beijing Institute dedicated to DWDM systems). ZTE's case
illustrates a process by which the company makes the 'go/no go' decision on a project.
An initial decision on whether or not to continue with a particular project is made by a
committee within the relevant R&D institute. This committee subsequently reports to a
'Technology Center' at the company headquarters which audits the committee's
recommendations and makes a final decision. In this manner, the company coordinates
its product development processes across the firm while delegating a degree of
responsibility to individual research teams 22.
Intepration with Manufacturing. There are several indications that product development
takes place with an eye to manufacturing. For example, Huawei has what it calls a 'pilot
test' department whose function is to optimize the product development process from
R&D through to the production stage in order to ensure the suitability of the product for
high-volume production. It could not be determined exactly what this 'optimization'
consisted of, but it presumably includes elements of 'design for manufacturability'
(DFM) and test assembly of the product.
Cycles of Improvement. Once the first version of a commercial product is finalized,
R&D teams continue producing equipment with higher capacity and more features.
Researchers become more familiar with the technology and build upon what they learned
on the first product. Frequently, researchers with experience in producing the first
product become team leaders and supervisors on subsequent product upgrades 23. The
firm thus reinvests human capital gained from previous projects. The shortening of
product development cycles experienced by ZTE when improving its DWDM systems -
starting with one year and currently down to 3-4 months - serves as evidence that these




23 Interviewees #6 and #7.
A Changing Product Development Strategy
There are some strong indications that the leading domestic companies are beginning to
change their R&D strategies. In the past, the goal of Huawei and ZTE was to develop in-
house all the products that they sold, and their product development strategies were set
accordingly. However, several issues have made them reconsider this approach. Firstly,
there is an acknowledgement that technology in this sector changes too quickly for them
to keep pace with developments in each piece of equipment they wish to sell. Secondly,
there is a demand from their customers for 'total solutions' which encompass a range of
products that they currently do not have the time or resources to develop.
These factors have made the two case study companies consider establishing several
alliances with component and equipment suppliers. This model of technology acquisition
is analyzed in more detail in Sections 7.3 and 7.4 below. A manager from one of ZTE's
research institutes described the ccmpany's new strategy as focusing on the development
of "core technologies" (such as such as software platforms and systems engineering) 24.
However, the impression gained from certain interviews is that domestic companies seem
to be struggling to define the scope of what their technological core competencies should
be.
The Goals of Domestic Firms' R&D Efforts
Chinese firms (and the Chinese government) have expressed the desire that, ultimately,
they wish to develop their own intellectual property (IP). This is mainly because there is
a cost associated with not having proprietary technology. This amounted to at least $US
10 billion in royalties and license fees to foreign companies for the acquisition of first-
and second-generation technology for mobile communications only (AI Consulting
2000f). In an environment in which IP laws are increasingly enforced 25 , domestic firms
find that their cost structures are being affected by obligations to either license
technology or pay royalties. For example, Qualcomm has signed agreements to ensure
that domestic companies developing CDMA equipment will pay royalties for the
technology it originally developed.
On the other hand, joint ventures frequently secure access to the right to produce the
foreign partner's technology in exchange for the latter taking a certain percentage of
equity. This often corresponds to a controlling stake in the joint venture so that the
foreign partner may keep control over its intellectual property. Thus on the one hand,
companies such as Huawei and ZTE are at a disadvantage with respect to joint ventures
given that they need to incur IP-related costs. On the other hand, their efforts to develop
24 Interviewee #3.
25 Although China is known for its lax protection of IP rights, it is having to beef up its record in order to
reap the benefits of WTO accession. Furthermore, communications technology has a higher profile than
many other industries and thus IPR breaches are more obvious. Furthermore, if Chinese companies wish to
export abroad, they may be blocked from doing so if they are found to have infringed IP laws.
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their own intellectual property have enabled them to build up internal R&D capabilities
that Chinese-foreign JVs do not possess.
Self-Development vs. Technology Transfer: the Pros and Cons
It can be argued that self-development, in contrast to technology transfer through
production-oriented joint ventures 26 is, in the long run, the better vehicle for promoting a
dynamic and competitive telecom equipment industry in China. Initially, it is obviously
harder for domestic companies to develop a particular technology since they do not have
a partner willing to provide them with blueprints and know-how, obliging them to spend
time and resources to catch up. However, once this initial hurdle is overcome, they gain
control over the pace and direction of their own technological development (the only
barrier being their own technological capabilities). In this industry, joint ventures are
often subordinate to the foreign partner's interests. They are not necessarily designed to
compete internationally against the foreign partner's own products, and purchasing
decisions regarding key parts and components may favor the foreign partner as it is often
the supplier of these. BISC 27 provides a good example of this kind of arrangement.
Production-oriented joint ventures (the most common kind in China) are set up for the
purpose of manufacturing a particular line of equipment. When the foreign partner
wishes to manufacture in China a different range of products, it will often set up a JV
with a separate factory or institute which has loose or no connections with its other
domestic partners. Many such firms may be owned by the PTIC 28, as described in Tables
4.2-4.6 (see also Appendix 3). However, they may be located in geographically disparate
locations, thus minimizing opportunities for organizational learning. The account given
by Shen (1999) of the switching industry also shows that the interests of enterprises
owned by the PTIC are not necessarily aligned, and rivalry can break out between them.
This indicates that the PTIC probably cannot function as an efficient coordinator of
knowledge transfer among its own enterprises. Furthermore, the task of staff employed
in JVs is not to discover technology, but rather to learn how to assemble it through
instructions and coaching (i.e. technology transfer). Therefore, a production-oriented
joint venture cannot become a technological learning environment in the same way that
domestic manufacturing companies such as Huawei and ZTE have become (at least with
respect to product technologies).
An anecdote based on an interview conducted at a major Chinese-foreign joint venture
(call it 'MFJV') illustrates certain points of the above argument. Although MFJV is
majority-owned by Chinese interests and has achieved 100% localization of
manufacturing, it is still effectively controlled by the foreign management with respect to
strategic decision-making. The Chinese management of MFJV has wanted to expand
into new product areas as they witness demand building for them in China. However,
26 As opposed to joint ventures for which R&D is a large component, such as the Datang-Siemens JV to
develop TD-SCDMA equipment.
27 Beijing International Switching Systems Corporation (a JV with Siemens).
28 The PTIC is a state-owned holding company that owns and manages numerous telecom equipment
facilities across the country.
they have been constrained in doing so by two factors. The first is that the company has
not built up the necessary expertise and internal processes to launch into new products on
their own, and thus relies on the foreign partner to provide them with new technology.
The second factor is that the foreign company itself may have interests in these new
product areas, and it is taking time to decide whether to launch them in China through
MFJV or through different channels (e.g. setting up another JV). Because the Chinese
management of MFJV considers the company to be 'theirs' (i.e. a Chinese firm), these
constraints have often been frustrating for them as they look at opportunities passing
them by.
The pros and cons of self-development versus technology transfer, with respect to
technology acquisition, are summarized in Tables 7.1 and 7.2. The analysis is based on
conversations with managers from domestic and joint venture companies.
Implications for Chinese Industry
In answer to the first hypothesis, it can be said that domestic firms are increasingly
relying upon their own technological capabilities in order to remain competitive, rather
than just competing on price. This has been driven by the increasing sophistication of the
market, which has left them with little choice but to acquire new technologies, and
become better at developing them. Government policies have also played a significant
role in this matter, as discussed below.
According to the observations, the case study firms have chosen the path involving heavy
investment in R&D in order to improve their product technologies. This involves at least
exploratory development, certainly advanced development, and perhaps some elements
of basic research. On the other hand, they have not chosen the path of technology
transfer by establishing joint ventures with foreign companies. From the point of view of
the industry in China as a whole, it seems that domestic firms have significantly upgraded
their technological capabilities. This is in contrast to R&D within the foreign production
joint ventures which remains mostly within the realm of advanced development.
Therefore it can be argued that, in this industry, domestic corporate R&D is becoming
more important as an engine of technological capability building than international
technology transfers through joint ventures. This is matched by the observation that
domestic firms are increasingly manufacturing products that have not yet reached
technological maturity (such as DWDM systems).
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Table 7.1 Technology Acquisition Through Self-Development
Pros Cons
* More control over the results of R&D, and Greater allocation of resources (HRM financial,
potentially greater potential return on the etc.) in order to catch up technologically.
investment. This is due to the domestic firm Gi* reater uncertainty of success.
not having to worry about competing against a
foreign partner's own products in international * Longer time to market (self-development takes
markets. time!).
* Lower intellectual property-related costs. * State funding may tie company to certain
* Freedom to decide what products to develop obligations (such as sharing intellectual
according to the company's own interests, property developed by the company).
Table 7.2 Technology Transfer Through JVs
Pros Cons
* Relatively quick time to market. Can quickly * Do not gain strong capabilities in new product
capture market share. design as the focus is mainly on assembly/
* Ability to focus resources on manufacturing manufacturing.
know-how, rather than R&D, in order to place * Very limited opportunities to create a learning
new products on the market. environment. Management does not gain
experience in running a new product
development program (project execution skills).
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7.3 PRODUCT DEVELOPMENTSTRATEGIES AND THE 'CONFIGURATIONAL' NATURE OF
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY
In his book, Shen (1999) gave an account of two paths in the acquisition of SPC
switching equipment technology by Chinese industry. One path involved a formal
technology transfer process through a joint venture (Shanghai Bell), the other was
through self-development by a set of entrepreneurial state-owned factories and research
institutes. One of Shen's central arguments was that Chinese firms were able to draw
upon the 'configurational' 29 nature of communications technology to develop their own
version of an SPC switching system.
The advantage of a configurational technology, described in Chapter 2, is that recipients
are able to access certain parts of this technology according to their own capabilities, and
it is thus adaptable to local circumstances. Therefore, a company could have the
capability to understand certain aspects of a technology while leaving others as a 'black
box' without necessarily compromising its ability to produce the particular piece of
equipment. In the example described by Shen, Chinese firms were able to produced their
own version of an SPC switch by combining their technological capabilities with
components and modules available from foreign sources. They did not have to
understand how to make everything themselves. As the domestic firms' capabilities
improved, they were able to add features and upgrade their technology accordingly,
gradually opening the 'black boxes'.
The second hypothesis, therefore, proposes that the model of technology acquisition that
involves leveraging the configurational nature of technology is still important today (if
not more so) for the product development paths of Chinese firms. This hypothesis can be
tested in two ways. The first way is to look for evidence of this configurational
characteristic within the communications industry; the second is to observe the behavior
of the firms (i.e. whether they take advantage of this characteristic or not).
How Configurational are Communications Technologies?
As explained in Chapter 2, a 'configurational' technology allows development costs to be
reduced by drawing upon existing component technologies. These can be selected
according to the particular uses of the final product. As illustrated by the case studies, a
technology can be configurational at different levels. At the product level, a particular
piece of equipment can be configurational such that relatively standard components,
modules, software, etc. can be obtained from various sources and used to assemble the
final product. At the level of communication systems, these can be configurational such
that pieces of equipment are compatible enough to be integrated together as a network 30
29 The term 'configurational' with respect to a technology can also be taken to signify qualities of
modularity, inter-operability or compatibility of component elements.
30 The latter definition is an expansion of the framework originally used by Shen (1999) to accommodate
observations made from the behavior of the case study firms.
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Evidence from Technology Trends within the Industry
There are strong indications that the communications industry is tending towards greater
configurability at the level of equipment, as well as at the level of the network.
Evidence for the increasingly configurational characteristic of communications
equipment can be observed from international trends in the industry structure, described
in Chapter 3. The optical communications industry illustrates best the sharper definition
that is occurring between systems providers on the one hand (the OEMs), and suppliers
of components, modules and sub-systems on the other. Although the large, branded,
OEMs still maintain certain capabilities to produce proprietary components for their
systems, they are increasingly relying upon a host of suppliers. This general division of
labor is also reproduced to a certain extent in the data communications and mobile
communications industries. The significance of this is that it signals a greater need for
standardization, configurability and compatibility between components since suppliers
provide these to various OEMs31.
Configurability at the level of the network system is also an emerging trend, as described
in Chapter 3. Increasingly, products and systems provided by different equipment
vendors need the ability to inter-operate across the network. This is being driven by the
fact that the types of services provided by telecom operators are expanding (due to the
convergence of voice and data), and hence one equipment vendor cannot supply every
single product needed by a service provider. As telecom operators increasingly need to
purchase equipment from various vendors, the latter's products have to become inter-
operable so that they may be integrated in a coherent manner. Configurability at the level
of the network is an expansion of Shen's original definition, however it is very relevant to
Chinese firms as they have gone from producing mainly one type of equipment
(switching systems), to providing entire optical, data and mobile communications
systems.
Evidence from Case Study Observations
The best indication that Chinese firms may be taking advantage of the configurational
nature of communications technology in order to better compete, can be found in the
behavior of the case study firms. One such indication is their changing product
development strategy - more alliances with suppliers - as well as the types of products
they are purchasing from suppliers.
3' A map of OEM-supplier relationships presented in Appendix 2a shows that the large systems providers
are purchasing and integrating components and sub-systems that are available on the market from various
suppliers. This corresponds to Shen's notion of a configurational technology.
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The changing product development strategy of ZTE was discussed in the section above
dealing with corporate R&D. Initially, the company's objective was to develop most of
its products in-house. However, two factors seem to have pushed ZTE's management to
re-think their product strategy:
* Customers (telecom carriers) demand end-to-end solutions from their equipment
suppliers32. Although ZTE is one of the largest domestic equipment companies, it
does not have the full line of products necessary to fulfill these demands.
* Communications technology changes rapidly and thus many products either soon
become obsolete or lose much of their profit margins. At present, ZTE does not have
the resources and know-how to stay technologically competitive in every component,
module or piece of equipment that is included within the telecom systems they
provide.
Because both ZTE and Huawei do not rely on technology transfers from foreign partners
in order to introduce new products, they have begun to increasingly rely upon suppliers.
These suppliers either provide them with the products they do not produce in-house, or
provide them with the platforms that enable their products to be made compatible with
those of other firms. The fact that telecom equipment can to a large extent be mixed and
matched (subject to certain compatibility issues), is evidence of the configurational
characteristic which domestic companies are taking advantage of. This is very
reminiscent of the successful development by domestic companies of SPC switching
systems in the early 1990s.
Chapter 6 describes various supplier relationships in which foreign companies provide
Huawei and ZTE with pieces of equipment. The Chinese firms then integrate these into
the systems they sell. For example, according to one manager at Huawei, the company
incorporates a LAN switch manufactured by Intel into its data networking suite of
solutions33. Intel acts as an OEM to Huawei, which actually puts its own brand on their
piece of equipment. In another case, an interview with the sales representative of a well
known U.S. company revealed that it was in discussions with Huawei to provide the
Chinese firm with 'Layer 3' switching equipment 34. According to the salesperson,
Huawei does not currently have the capability to produce Layer 3 switches (although it
needs to provide them to its customers), and thus it is looking for potential suppliers of
this equipment.
32 For example, in the short term, PTAs and China Unicomrn branches have a preference for turn-key
delivery of cellular systems. This allows networks to be installed and revenue to start flowing as fast as
possible, and operators to meet the extraordinary consumer demand for cellular services (Pyramid Research
1999b). This demand for end-to-end solutions will probably expand to other areas of telecommunications,
hence posing a challenge for domestic vendors who have not developed the full range of products
necessary. Thus cooperation agreements with other foreign suppliers for discrete pieces of equipment or
components are important.
33 Interviewee #6.
34 Because these discussion had not been made public at the time of writing, the name of the U.S. company
has been withheld.
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The technology supplier relationships described in Chapter 6 contain several elements
that reinforce the Chinese companies' abilities to leverage the configurational nature of
communications technology. For instance, both ZTE and Huawei have made deals with
Motorola to adopt its 'Smart Network' platform and to design their equipment according
to this platform. This will allow them to integrate their products with those of other
companies which have equally adopted Motorola's platform. Similarly, Huawei and
IBM signed a collaborative R&D agreement to make their respective equipment more
compatible. Examples also exist in which the Chinese companies have adopted software
platforms provided by foreign firms, thus opening their hardware to greater compatibility
35with other companies' equipment .
Benefits Arising from the Configurational Nature of Communications Technology
R&D Strategies for the 'Self-Development' of Products
As indicated by the new product development strategy of ZTE, domestic companies may
be focusing their R&D efforts on certain core products and capabilities, rather than
spreading themselves too thinly. However, Huawei and ZTE currently provide a wide
portfolio of products to their customers. This has implications for their R&D
management, since keeping up-to-date across these technologies is unrealistic for such
relative newcomers. Thus, by drawing upon the configurational nature of
communications technology, domestic firms can focus limited R&D resources onto
particular core technologies, while purchasing the rest from suppliers. This allows the
Chinese firms to respond to their customers' needs while efficiently coordinating
investment in their own technological capabilities.
Improved Time-to-Market and OEM Relationships
Clearly, domestic companies derive important commercial benefits from the fact that the
technology is configurational. By using suppliers to provide them with key components,
equipment. or software, allows these firms to considerably shorten their time-to-market.
They do not have to invest months or years of R&D to produce such products and instead
are able to integrate them with what they currently manufacture in-house.
The emphasis on compatibility between various communications equipment also enables
Chinese firms to enter into two-way OEM relationships. On the one hand, foreign
companies can act as OEMs for a Chinese company (e.g. Intel supplying equipment to be
integrated into Huawei's systems). On the other, Chinese equipment producers can act as
OEMs to foreign firms (e.g. Huawei supplying GSM mobile switching equipment to
Motorola). ZTE has also recently held successful inter-operability tests between its own
CDMA switching equipment and the CDMA mobile systems of Ericsson and Nortel36.
Thus it could potentially act as an OEM to these two companies.
3s These include the agreements between Huawei and VocalTech (for voice-over-IP applications), and Intel
(for its Internet Exchange Architecture p!atfornn).
36 Information from press releases on ZTE's web site.
120
The adoption of certain software and hardware platforms by Huawei and ZTE, enabling
their equipment to be compatible with that of other companies, increases the possibilities
for engaging in these two types of OEM agreements. Either way, Chinese firms have the
opportunity to expand their market.
Implications for Chinese Industry
The above discussion allows us to answer the second hypothesis in the affirmative.
Firstly, communications technology is in certain areas tending towards greater
configurability. Secondly, the case study firms seem to have begun to take this more into
consideration in their product development planning, given limitations in technological
capabilities. Hence they are entering into numerous relationships with suppliers, some
only arms-length, while others are closer partnerships (this is the subject of the next
section).
Therefore, the domestic firms are leveraging the configurational nature of
communications technology to help them compete on the market. In parallel, they are
also managing their R&D efforts in areas in which they wish to develop a competence. It
remains to be seen through further investigations, however, whether this is a trend
pervading the domestic industry37.
7.4 TECHNOLOGY SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIPS
The advantages of a configurational technology can only be realized if required
components and equipment can be readily obtained from foreign suppliers. Hence a third
hypothesis was proposed: that supplier relationships with foreign firms are important
sources of knowledge and technology for Chinese companies within this industry. These
suppliers provide components, modules or 'platform technologies' 38 that have a direct
bearing on the technological competitiveness of domestic firms' products.
Technology Supplier Relationships and Their Role in Technological Catching Up
The beginning of this chapter analyzed the importance of the case study firms' internal
R&D efforts to make their products technologically competitive. We have also
established that the configurational nature of communications technology has enabled
Chinese firms to rely upon foreign suppliers to provide them with technology.
37 Preliminary research indicates that Datang has been recently engaging in similar supplier relationships as
Huawei and ZTE.
38 A platform can be either a software or hardware-based environment around which other software or
hardware is designed. It provides a ready-made framework of standards and interfaces that other
companies can use to design their own value-added products. One such example is Microsoft's Windows
operating system platform.
We therefore now turn our attention to the role of suppliers in this process, and how they
have aided Huawei and ZTE to 'self-develop' their products.
The two case studies in Chapter 6 show that Huawei and ZTE engage with a variety of
different suppliers. These have been characterized together as technology supplier
relationships in order to encompass the notion that they provide the Chinese firms with
technology, encapsulated in various forms. The types of technology supplied to the two
domestic firms range across a spectrum, which includes:
* equipment and components (where the technology is contained within, but not readily
dissociated from, the physical hardware);
* design capabilities (often based upon a platform provided by the supplier);
* consulting services related to product development (managerial know-how); and
* technical tools for improved manufacturing and product development processes.
The first three points deal specifically with acquiring technologies that ultimately get
incorporated into the firms' products, either physically or through improving the
management of R&D. Therefore they contribute to the competitiveness of the
companies' products. The first three forms of technology supply represent relationships
that are progressively more empowering (in terms of upgrading the recipient's internal
capabilities). The first involves arm's-length transactions - simply purchasing
technology as a 'black box'. The second provides the recipient firm with the design
capabilities to develop products or components based on a pre-developed platform39. The
third strengthens the recipient's internal management at a deeper level of the R&D
process, although it is more general and not related to a specific technology. The last
point stands somewhat apart from the rest given its focus on production. Nevertheless,
this is obviously an important aspect of a firm's broader technological capabilities.
The Role of Suppliers in Technological Catching Up
The evidence from the case studies indicates that suppliers have had two potential
impacts upon the domestic firms. The first is that they have enabled Huawei and ZTE to
'punch above their weight' in relation to their own technological capabilities. The second
is that they may have to a certain extent contributed to the firms' R&D capabilities.
Chinese firms' ability to punch above their weight refers to the way in which they have
been able to incorporate their suppliers' technology into their own products without
having to necessarily do all the groundwork themselves. At the simplest level, this is
illustrated by the purchasing of components and sub-systems from foreign sources, some
of them leading international suppliers. For example, SDL Inc. (now part of JDS
Uniphase), has supplied Huawei with components for use in the latter's DWDM systems.
Similarly, ZTE has also been purchasing key high-tech components for its DWDM
39 The supply of key components such as microchips is often accompanied by the supply of a platform.
Generally, this is done so that the recipient firm may design its equipment in a manner that is compatible
with the supplied components and in accordance with the standards used by the supplier.
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systems from foreign sources 40. These are the kinds of arm's-length transactions
described above.
A closer form of cooperation between the Chinese firms and their suppliers has centered
upon the use of specific platform technologies for developing components and systems.
In this case, foreign companies have provided Huawei and ZTE with ready-made
platforms upon which to design specific components. The platform is the technology
provided to the domestic firms. They, in turn, are able to add value by using these
platforms to create new products. Huawei and ZTE therefore have not needed to invest
resources in developing these platforms. However, they are able to reap benefits that
come from being able to customize the design of key components for their equipment in a
cost-effective manner. These self-designed components are also comparable in quality to
those used by competitors in the industry (although their technological performance
depends on the user's design skills).
The contribution which suppliers have made to the case study firms' R&D capabilities
stem mostly from the provision of these platform technologies. This has often entailed
setting up joint-R&D labs for using the platform, providing training and technical
manuals, dispatching technicians to help with trouble-shooting and debugging, etc. Thus
foreign suppliers have contributed to (and even established) the Chinese firms' R&D
activities directly related to these platform technologies. It can be assumed that a certain
amount of knowledge is transferable to other similar R&D activities within the
companies and that their researchers' understanding is enriched by these exchanges. For
example, as part of its agreement to use Motorola's ASIC design pla.form, Huawei's own
ASIC design team (said to be the largest and most successful in the industry41), will work
closely with the supplier to implement it. Nevertheless, further investigations are needed
to determine to what extent suppliers contribute to R&D capabilities beyond the specific
applications they provide.
The third type of technology supply mentioned above relates to consulting services
provided to improve R&D processes at a more general level. This is illustrated by the
training Huawei received from IBM on implementing 'integrated product development
processes' on how to manage R&D within the company 42. Although this may be a
unique case (so far), it is nevertheless an indicator of the types of services that domestic
firms can draw upon to improve their performance. One interviewee stated that one of




42 Exact details of what this training involved and how it has changed Huawei's R&D processes could not
be obtained.
43 Interviewee #12.
Lastly, the fourth type of technology provided by suppliers relates to management tools
and equipment for improving production efficiency. For example, these may relate to
improving software design efficiency, such as Intersolv's PVCS tool; or improving the
design and layout of printed circuit boards, such as PADS' software. Both of these were
purchased by Huawei and included consultation, maintenance and product upgrades on
the part of the suppliers. However, although production is important, these types of
supplier relationships are tangential to the main issue of improving Chinese companies'
product technologies, and are thus beyond the immediate scope of this thesis.
Trends in the International Structure of the Communications Equipment Industry
The trends in the global communications industry described in Chapter 3 raise several
questions with respect to the industry in China. Although China is the largest and,
currently, the most important market for Huawei and ZTE, these companies aspire to
become important global players. Therefore changes that are occurring in the
international industry structure - both for equipment vendors and the telecom carriers
they sell to - will ultimately affect them. Even within their home market changes are
beginning to occur. Although the government has officially banned foreign participation
in the telecom service sector prior to WTO entry, already one exception has emerged in
Shanghai which has the State's blessing (or at least that of individuals with sufficient
influence). Chinese firms therefore need to pay attention to where the industry is headed
(technologically as well as structurally).
One trend that seems to be favorable to the Chinese firms is the vertical disintegration
that is becoming apparent between the OEMs (the systems providers), and the component
suppliers. As explained in Chapter 3, this has been caused by the fact that, in some
sectors of the industry, technological change is taking place more rapidly at the
component level than at the systems level. As the economics of the systems
manufacturing business (core competencies being in software and systems engineering)
diverges from that of the components manufacturing business (R&D driven), an
increasingly large supplier base is emerging (as well as merging). Furthermore, the most
cutting edge, next-generation technologies are to be found within a host of smaller,
privately held companies and start-ups.
The vertical disintegration of the communications industry, producing a base of
component and module suppliers, is particularly advantageous to Chinese companies
such as Huawei and ZTE. Because the development of certain key components is an
R&D-intensive process - requiring specialist skills in short supply even in the U.S. - the
fact that these could be purchased rather than made internally is good for Chinese
equipment firms. Furthermore, the greater component integration that these suppliers are
beginning to provide is also potentially desirable as these manufacturing processes
involve a lot of technical precision and are difficult to carry out44. Thus, purchasing
44 In the optical components industry, for example, some manufacturing processes are so complex that
suppliers who have mastered efficient ways of carrying them out treat these methods as trade secrets.
modules rather than raw components might be able to help Chinese firms improve the
quality of their systems and reduce manufacturing costs.
Changes in the international industry structure have produced some models that Chinese
companies could possibly emulate. Sycamore Networks (in optics) and Avici (in Internet
routers) have followed strategies of outsourcing as much as possible. As relative
newcomers, this has allowed them to rapidly build market share by concentrating on their
core competencies and outsourcing component and module manufacturing. If the
industry structure facilitates the outsourcing by Chinese companies of certain aspects of
product development, they could then focus their limited resources on building up the
core technical competencies that are needed for them to compete.
Lastly, the fact that technological innovation mostly lies within the component/module
manufacturers in Silicon Valley (and other centers of high tech innovation) is another
industry characteristic that Chinese companies could harness. Domestic equipment
vendors could try and tap into this technology and incorporate it into their products, a
strategy that is starting to be facilitated by international consulting firms45.
Implications for Chinese Industry
To answer the third hypothesis, the discussion above indicates that international supplier
relationships are having an important positive impact on the technological
competitiveness of Chinese vendors' products. However, there are several issues that
need to be further addressed.
Firstly, it is safe to assume that the key factors that differentiate foreign companies in the
international market will also be expected of Chinese companies. These are the core
competencies that Chinese firms need to master themselves, and include systems
engineering, software engineering and ASIC design (depending on the particular industry
segment). The technical superiority of these competencies determines the success or
failure on the market. Suppliers cannot be depended upon to provide these, therefore
Chinese vendors must rely on their own investment in R&D.
Secondly, although cutting edge component technologies as well as equipment can be
purchased on the market from a growing and globalizing supplier base, Chinese firms
will probably have to compete with the dominant foreign firms for limited supplies.
Whenever there are supply constraints, suppliers will tend to ration according to the
importance of their customers. Amsden (2000) describes the challenge that Taiwanese
electronics firms have had in attracting suppliers' attention, something that was achieved
by gaining sufficient scale in their operations. Similarly, Chinese firms will have to
signal to potential suppliers by becoming important players in the Chinese market. There
are already indications that successful signaling by Chinese vendors is very important for
attracting suppliers. In an interview with a sales representative of a U.S. firm that was in
discussions with Huawei over supplying it with Level 3 switches, the representative
45 Interviewee #21.
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described reasons for choosing this company over other domestic firms. He stated that
Huawei was a good choice of customer "due to its leading position in the Chinese
industry, its dynamic approach to the market, and its understanding of the technology".
Foreign suppliers, particular smaller ones with limited production capabilities, want to
'bet on the right horse' in order to penetrate the Chinese market. Thus the factors
mentioned by the sales representative are very pertinent.
Lastly, although the industry is increasingly becoming vertically disintegrated, having an
in-house capability in component design and R&D may be an important differentiating
factor. Nortel, for example, still retains such capabilities although it is increasingly
outsourcing to suppliers. The importance of this capability lies in the ability to generate
or spot technological breakthroughs and thus increase the chance of reaping monopoly
rents through technological leadership. It is perhaps too early to expect this kind of
technical expertise within Chinese enterprises, however they may need to substitute for
this in some way. This could be achieved by establishing closer relationships with
organizations that perform more basic kinds of R&D, such as domestic university
research institutes, or perhaps even technology start-ups in foreign countries (e.g. the
U.S. or U.K.).
7.5 AN ASSESSMENT OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES
Having answered the hypotheses above, this section now evaluates the impact that
Chinese government policies have had on the telecom infrastructure equipment sector.
However, at this point it is appropriate to express a caveat, which is that the information
on policies described in Chapter 5 is somewhat incomplete for two reasons. The first is
that the material used was only that which could be obtained from sources published in
English. The second reason somewhat mitigates the first, and is summed up in the words
of a government official who was interviewed: "Most people know the policies that the
government publishes. However it is the policies that aren't published which are the
most important!' 4 6
Policies Encouraging the Domestic Development of Product Technologies
Policies Directly Aimed at Technological Improvement (Technology Policies)
The government's two-pronged effort at encouraging technological development through
foreign technology inflows as well as the building of domestic capabilities (also known
as "walking on two legs") is evident in the policies discussed in Chapter 5.
Firstly, with respect to foreign technology, the government's technology transfer policies
were aimed at harnessing the strong interest of foreign companies to invest in China. In
the telecom equipment sector, the Chinese government strongly encouraged foreign
companies to establish manufacturing joint ventures with local state-owned factories.
46 Interviewee #17.
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The impact that these policies had on the sector as a whole is somewhat mixed. In terms
of transferring manufacturing technology, these JVs have probably been quite successful.
BISC (a Siemens JV manufacturing switches) for example, claims to have localized
100% of manufacturing 47, and this has also been acknowledged by officials within the
MI148. However, the government has expressed some misgivings about the track record
that JVs have had in transferring the technologies of the actual products they are
manufacturing (i.e. the capabilities to understand and design these technologies from
scratch). This issue is discussed in more detail below.
With respect to the case studies of Huawei and ZTE, it is not likely that JVs have had any
direct impact on the companies' technological capabilities. There is no indication in the
corporate history of either firm that they have been involved in joint ventures with
foreign companies. Rather, they have developed their manufacturing capabilities in-
house or bought the services of foreign organizations to help them develop these 4 9
Secondly, with regards to government policies directed at improving the technological
capabilities of the domestic industry, these have consisted of two types: national plans
and more targeted programs. As described in Chapter 6, ZTE has participated in several
of the government's national programs. Under a 'China 863 Plan' initiative, ZTE gained
the capability to develop an Optical Add/Drop Multiplex (OADM) systems - an integral
part of an optical transmission DWDM system. This was done in cooperation with other
companies and university institutes. Under the same Plan, ZTE is also involved in the
development of third-generation mobile communications. The company's participation
in these initiatives allows it to pool its expertise with that of other domestic players and
thus develop technologies which might take longer to create on its own. ZTE has also
been a beneficiary of the government's 'Torch Program' which encouraged the spinning
off of government research institutes and their merging with newly-formed 'science and
technology enterprises'. Thus, from the perspective of individual firms, the
government's technology capability-building programs have had some successful
outcomes.
From a sector-wide point of view, the national plans also seem to have contributed to
upgrading China's technology base. The 'Optics Valley' centered around the Wuhan
East Lake HiTech Development Zone, discussed in Chapter 4, can also be seen as a
testament to the government's efforts in promoting basic research in advanced areas of
telecommunications. The research expertise developed within these areas has found its
way to companies such as ZTE and Huawei who have employed key research staff from
institutions in Wuhan5 °. Furthermore, individual cases such as that of Fujian Casix
Laser"5 also demonstrate that significant expertise has grown within the domestic
industry. In the case of Casix, the company has developed very advanced techniques in
fiber-optic component processing and manufacturing, to such an extent that JDS
47 Interviewee #9.
48 Interviewee #18.
49 Huawei, for example, has cooperated with the German National Research Institute of Technology to
study the application of production processes and quality control.
50 Interviewee #4.
51 See Chapter 4.
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Uniphase - one of the most important global optical component manufacturers - recently
decided to acquire it.
The Chinese government has also stimulated technological development through
incentives and performance requirements for domestic companies. In granting science
and technology enterprises (of with telecom equipment manufacturers are a subset) a
special legal status, the government obliged them to meet certain requirements. These
enterprises were granted rights to establish themselves in special high technology
development zones, have benefited from sophisticated tax concession schemes designed
to promote innovations in product and processes, and have been recipients of preferential
loans and other financing packages. In return, the requirements expected of these
enterprises have included the percentage of technology personnel employed, the
percentage of sales contributed by new products, the percentage of products exported,
and the allocation of retained earnings. This demonstrates that the government hasn't
only relied on the market to provide the right signals, but has been active in directing
investment in particular areas.
Lastly, the government has been pushing very strongly the adoption of the latest
communications technologies in order to provide a modern infrastructure for economic
development. The sophistication of the Chinesc market can be gauged by the fact that the
country is starting to face key decision points on a schedule not dissimilar from that in the
West. For example, the Chinese government began thinking about how to allocate 3G
mobile licenses (and developing its own 3G mobile standard) less than a year after this
was carried out in Europe 2 . Furthermore, the telecom equipment market has been
relatively open to competition from foreign companies since the inception of the
economic reforms, particularly in the higher end of communications technologies. All
these factors provide a challenging environment for a nascent industry. However, by
plunging domestic companies in the 'deep end', the government has not allowed Chinese
firms to be complacent about their own pace of technological development.
Nevertheless, it has at the same time provided a framework to improve the domestic
industry's competitiveness.
Policies Designed to Stimulate Investment in Product Development and Manufacturing
by Domestic Firms
In addition to its policies targeted at domestic technology development, the government
has also tried to ensure that market opportunities exist for Chinese companies. This
provides them the prospect of a return on their investments to upgrade themselves. To
this end, it has instituted 'buy local' policies whereby national carriers and local PTAs
are strongly encouraged to purchase from domestic companies. These initiatives have
been very successful as judged by the results of several 'coordination meetings' in which
domestic service providers and equipment manufacturers were brought together under the
aegis of the government to sign purchasing agreements for switching and mobile
systems53 . The government has also been instrumental in extending financing packages
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52 Interviewee #20.
s3 See Chapter 4.
to domestic equipment vendors and their PTA customers to encourage the purchasing of
local equipment.
Furthermore, the Chinese government's efforts to reform the telecom services sector has
the parallel effect of enlarging the market for both domestic and foreign firms, a fact that
has been readily recognized by Chinese firms 54. However, the resulting increase in
competition in the services sector will hold both advantages and disadvantages for
domestic companies. On the one hand, domestic firms can play on their competitiveness
in price to win contracts. On the other, the greater degree of independence,
accountability and transparency in decision-making on the part of national and local
carriers may weaken the cosy relationships established between domestic equipment
vendors and their customers. Chinese equipment companies will need to become more
competitive on the strength and quality of their technology - something which they are
still struggling to achieve despite their efforts55 . The greater attention given to foreign
markets by domestic vendors has been partly attributed to their desire to prove
themselves to their customers back home, demonstrating their capability to deliver large-
scale, reliable communications systems.
Lastly, the government's influence in establishing favorable market conditions for
domestic firms is evident in how it manipulates the creation of new markets and the
setting of technical standards. For example, one of the factors influencing the timing of
CDMA implementation by mobile telecom carriers is the extent to which domestic firms
have the capability to produce CDMA systems56 . The government wishes to ensure that
Chinese firms are in a position to gain market share and do not find themselves unable to
compete, as happened in the GSM market. With respect to technical standards, informal
government policies are designed to give domestic firms an inside track on the
development of specific communications standards. Since foreign companies need time
to adapt their products to Chinese standards, this give Chinese firms an edge on the
competition. These practices, however, will certainly be called into question upon
China's accession to the WTO (if and when this occurs), as they constitute non-tariff
barriers to trade which are illegal under the GATT treaty.
Policies Encouraging Technology Diffusion
Another aspect of the Chinese government's technology development policies has been
its efforts to diffuse technological learning across the industry. Particularly with regards
to Chinese-foreign joint ventures, the goal of localization policies was to promote
technological (and economic) spillovers from foreign direct investment in the country.
According to government and industry sources as well as the literature, however, the
success of these policies is somewhat debatable57
54 Interviewees #2 and #15.
55 Interviewee #12.
56 Interviewees #1 and #10.
"57 See the discussion at the end of this section.
In a more general way, the loosening of employment restrictions has probably had one of
the most beneficial effects on the diffusion of knowledge. As skilled labor can relocate to
where demand for these skills is most valued, they take the knowledge gained and
transfer it to new organizations. In this respect, the localization of labor (as opposed to
manufacturing) in foreign JVs has had a positive effect, as managers and technicians
trained in these companies eventually leave and join domestic firms. In the case of
Shanghai Bell, the company was considered as a 'big school' that fostered a great number
of qualified engineers. Every year, around 3 to 4 percent of the engineers left the
company to work elsewhere while new ones joined (Shen 1999). The mobility of labor
has also helped to redistribute the fruits of government-funded basic research in
numerous areas of communications technologies. For instance, the leading domestic
manufacturers such as Huawei, ZTE and Datang have actively wooed away engineers
from the Wuhan Research Institute (WRI), as these are highly prized for their knowledge
58of optical communications .
General Government Policies Impacting the Telecom Equipment Sector
There are numerous government policies that have had an important impact on the
telecom infrastructure equipment industry, although they were not designed to target it
specifically. Some of these have been mentioned above, such as the telecom services
sector reforms and human resources policies. One area which has been repeatedly
mentioned by individuals interviewed has been that of equities markets and corporate
governance.
The listing of ZTE and Datang on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges was very
useful to them as sources of capital, however the stock market mechanism is still
immature and not being used to its full potential. For example, the trading of stock
between companies can be a way of aligning interests and promoting cooperation
between domestic companies, however not many telecom equipment companies are listed
in China59. Furthermore, the growth of domestic telecom equipment firms has mostly
been organic60 as they are not able to use the stock markets to merge with and acquire
other companies. The issue of corporate governance also affects the sector as many
telecom equipment companies are state-owned or have complex management and
ownership structures. Thus it can be very difficult for entrepreneurial companies to
acquire each other when there is no transparent or convenient means of buying and
selling ownership rights. This leaves the government as the main actor capable of
pushing these deals through although its judgement may not always be the best for the
companies concerned. Given an appropriate framework for trading equities, such
decisions are probably best delegated to the firms involved.
5 Interviewee #4.
9 Interviewee #3.
60 Apart from initially when ZTE and Julong, for example, were created out of the government-orchestrated
merger of several factories and research institutes.
The Role of Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures in Upgrading Domestic Product
Technologies
As mentioned above, there is some debate about the technological benefits derived from
foreign manufacturing joint ventures in China's telecom equipment sector. Because
technology transfer through JVs has been a central theme of government (and specifically
MPT/MII) policies regarding technology acquisition from abroad, it is appropriate to
devote some attention to these structures.
The example of Shanghai Bell discussed by Shen (1999) provides a good first brush on
several of the issues, the first being that of component localization. Shen describes how
Shanghai Bell found it necessary to game the system by massaging the calculations to
determine the percentage of localization achieved. Furthermore, after several years most
of the items localized were still relatively low-tech components due to the low levels of
domestic investment in the production of higher technology components. Localization
was finally achieved when it made business sense (often as a result of changes in the
macroeconomic environment), not because of government pressure to transfer production
technologies. In the words of a Chinese General Manager of Shanghai Bell: "When
government is pushing us to adopt import substitution, well we will do it, as long as the
interests of the company are not compromised." This also indicates that government
investment is essential if localization of certain key components (such as microchips) is
to be achieved. To this effect, the MII is promoting the development of 'fundamental'
industries, including semiconductors6 1. This clearly benefits domestic firms as well.
Similarly, an executive from a major U.S. telecom equipment company in China who was
interviewed stated that the firm's advertised commitments to localization and local
purchasing were all done according to what made business sense. It would not, however,
localize many of the high tech components that it supplied because it would be too costly
to do so. Another example is that of the Beijing International Switching Systems
Corporation (BISC). In this case a manager described that, although equipment assembly
was 100% localized, the key components were still purchased from Siemens (the foreign
partner)62. Therefore JVs seem to still be highly dependent on their foreign partners for
key technologies which, for various reasons, have not been transferred as part of the
agreement. These examples demonstrate that localization does not necessarily equate
with the transfer of advanced product technologies if these do not make economic sense
to the foreign partner. Therefore the government's ability to manage the substance and
timing of technology transfer can be very limited.
The second issue, that of the transfer of product technologies, is also neatly summed up
by Shen: "It is common knowledge that, through technology transfer, the technology
supplier wants to create markets rather than create competitors" (Shen 1999). The
significance of this is that the foreign partner may agree to transfer manufacturing
technologies as well as carry out the necessary R&D to adapt products to local
conditions, however it will not purposefully transfer its core product technologies to the
61 Interviewee #18.
62 This is one of the ways by which Siemens makes a profit on the venture (interviewee #9).
domestic partner. Several sources agree that domestic firms have become er:cellent at
manufacturing through JV agreements. However, on the whole they do not seem to have
gained significant innovation capabilities nor have they gained the ability to develop on
their own the equipment that they manufacture63.
When judged necessary by the foreign partner, JVs will tend to be structured in such a
way that the foreign company does not lose control over its core product technologies.
For example, in the case of Nortel, this has been achieved by taking a majority stake in
all its JVs so that its share of ownership never falls below 55% (the range being from
55% to 90%). Nortel's production JVs in China are considered to be good at
manufacturing, and those JVs which carry out R&D deal mainly with product adaptations
to Chinese market requirements. If Nortel did not have control over its JVs, it would
provide less support in transferring technology due to concerns regarding intellectual
property protection64. However, it seems that majority control is not absolutely
necessary for the foreign partner to exert its influence. In the case of BISC, Siemens has
a 49% stake, yet it directs the JV's decisions regarding the sourcing of components (the
JV has to stick to a list of approved vendors), and has the ultimate say in important
decisions. What really matters therefore, are the details of JV agreements and the
effective power that the foreign partner wields from being the source of technology to the
joint venture.
In summary, therefore, joint ventures with foreign telecom equipment manufacturers
have probably not been very successful in transferring the know-how necessary for
domestic companies to develop products themselves. Furthermore, it is not clear that this
has ever been the intention of foreign JV companies. For the most part, JVs have been
production-oriented and have successfully transferred the skills related to this type of
operation. With regards to opportunities for learning skills related to new product
development and innovation, these seem to have been at best limited - the objective
being to replicate designs provided by the foreign partner. On the other hand, the joint
ventures have been a good training environment for Chinese managers as well as
engineers, many of whom have gone to work for domestic companies. Furthermore, the
component and manufacturing localization initiatives of these JVs have certainly
contributed to the general economic welfare of the sector.
This is obviously not a conclusive, nor a comprehensive, discussion of the impact of
Chinese-foreign JVs on the domestic technology landscape. More in-depth studies would
have to be carried out in order to gauge this. However, it does highlight some important
issues. These provide a point of reference when assessing the achievements of 'pure'
domestic firms in terms of their learning and innovation capabilities, as well as their
contribution to the domestic industry.
63 Interviewees #10, 17 and 18. See also Shen (1999).
64 Interviewee #10.
7.6 DISCUSSION
Four Factors Contributing to the Technological Competitiveness of Domestic Firms
Having analyzed the research results and addressed the hypotheses, we can now attempt
to answer the main thesis question: how can Chinese companies compete against foreign
firms in the high-end technology segments of telecommunications equipment? Figure
7.1 summarizes the key factors which contribute to the technological competitiveness of
Chinese firms in product technology.
Thus, four factors have been found to contribute to the technological competitiveness of
domestic firms:
1. Configurational technologies. Domestic firms have been able to substitute their lack
of technological capabilities in certain areas by drawing upon technology available on
the market. In certain cases, they have reinforced the configurability of their systems
by applying software and hardware platforms to make their equipment interoperable
with that of other equipment vendors. This characteristic enables domestic firms to
'punch above their weight' in terms of technological capabilities.
2. Internal R&D efforts. Domestic firms have invested heavily in their own
technological capabilities. This has enabled them to be close followers of the world
technological frontier. Although they may not be innovators, their R&D activities
seem to approach that which could be characterized as 'exploratory development'.
The nurturing of these capabilities enables them to successfully unravel the tacit
elements of high-end technologies and thereby self-develop equipment such as high-
end routers and DWDM transmission systems.
3. Technology suppliers and the international industry structure. Domestic firms are
able to leverage the configurational nature the technology due to the availability of
component and subsystem suppliers in various segments of the communications
industry. The growth in the importance of these suppliers is being driven by a
number of trends within the industry, and the fact that it is becoming less vertically
integrated. The ultimate effect is that domestic firms find themselves in an
environment in which they are able to access technology through international supply
chains.
4. Government policies. Government has been crucial in investing in the technological
capabilities of the industry as a whole. Investment in the educational system and in
national technology development plans have created a foundation of well-trained and
experienced engineers. Performance standards, incentives and financing packages
have been used by government to encourage the building up of technological
capabilities within firms. Joint research programs and the encouragement of
technology diffusion has enabled firms to acquire certain core technologies on which
to build upon.
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Foreign Direct Investment
One important source of technology that hasn't been included in the framework above is
foreign direct investment (FDI). In the two cases studied, foreign investment does not
seem to have played a major role in the building of technological capabilities - neither
Huawei nor ZTE, for instance, has been involved in a major joint venture with a foreign
firm. Nevertheless, FDI has had an impact on the sector as a whole and should not be
disregarded.
With respect to production JVs, however, these no longer seem to represent the major
source of technological capabilities for domestic firms that was originally hoped for. The
opportunities for technological learning within these companies is generally limited in
scope to advanced development. Therefore JVs do not form an ideal training ground for
engineers wishing to obtain the capabilities to manage R&D programs or undertake
research that is more exploratory or basic in nature. These skills can only be obtained in
domestic firms that invest in R&D (or within universities and government R&D
institutes). Furthermore, if China accedes to the WTO, it isn't clear to what extent the
government will be able to coerce foreign companies into establishing JVs, transferring
technology, and localizing, beyond that which makes normal business sense.
Foreign direct investment through JVs or WOFEs may still be beneficial to the domestic
industry by exposing it to new product technologies, and therefore new models to
emulate. Nevertheless, the value of this will be lower if the latest foreign products can
simply be imported (as they initially tend to be), or if domestic firms are able to obtain
this information through their own efforts at tracking international trends in technology
(as some of them already do).
The greatest value that FDI may have for the Chinese telecom equipment industry is
investment in the companies that supply components and subsystems to the first tier
equipment vendors such as Huawei and ZTE. This would overcome the potential
shortages that arise as well as reducing the costs of managing international supplier
relationships. There is a risk, however, that this may 'crowd out' the development of
domestic capabilities in these areas (which the government regards as strategic). Other
sources of value from foreign direct investment are the spillovers relating to production
and project execution capabilities. Managers trained in foreign-invested companies
would acquire valuable skill in these areas which they could apply when they move to
domestic companies. This is particularly important since the lack of adequate
management skills was one of the shortcomings of domestic firms that was most often
quoted by interviewees.
Other Sources of Competitiveness
Although the focus of this thesis has been on the acquisition of product technologies, this
is only one facet of a company's competitiveness. Clearly, other functions such as
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production, financial management, investment, sales and marketing, etc. are crucial to a
company's competitiveness.
An issue particularly relevant to the Chinese context (as well as late industrializing
countries in general), relates to corporate governance. Bad corporate governance can be
a severe hindrance to a company's competitiveness, as the case of Julong seems to
illustrate.
Limitations of the Study and Further Research
Huawei and ZTE are the two largest firms - and probably the most competitive - among
the domestic telecom equipment companies. Therefore, they serve as very good subjects
of analysis in trying to understand the factors that have contributed to the development of
indigenous technological capabilities in China. Nevertheless, one of the major
shortcomings of this research is that other domestic firms such as Datang and Julong have
not been included. Datang, in particular, has been involved in the development of
relatively advanced technologies, and its joint venture with Siemens to develop third
generation mobile equipment is unique in the industry. Thus the generalizability and the
completeness of the above analysis needs to be strengthened through further research.
With respect to applying the findings of this research to other industries or countries,
several issues need to be considered. First of all, there are certain factors that are
country-specific to China. One of these is the size of the home market, which has been
an undeniable advantage to domestic firms. For example, government policies have been
able to channel demand towards Chinese firms and this has been an important
contribution to their growth. The size of the Chinese market has also provided the
government with much negotiating power vis a vis foreign companies eager to gain a
foothold. Another factor is that the Chinese government has put much effort in
developing basic research in the field of telecommunications technology, thus producing
relatively well-trained engineers and university graduates. Without this, it would
probably have been much harder to develop technological capabilities at the level of the
firm.
There are also industry-specific factors that should be considered. One issue that
distinguishes this industry from other electronics or IT sectors is its relatively high R&D
intensity. Unlike consumer electronics, the step changes in telecommunications
technology can be very large and thus necessitate significant investment in R&D
capabilities in order to keep up. Taiwanese notebook producers, for example, may only
need to invest in advanced development capabilities (their competitiveness arising from
manufacturing and integration capabilities). However, companies in the telecom
equipment sector may not be competitive without investing in more exploratory or basic
research given that the rules of second mover advantage do not necessarily apply to them
(this is discussed in more detail in the last chapter).
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8 Conclusions
The previous chapter analyzed the questions and hypotheses related to the research
undertaken. The purpose of this chapter is to widen the discussion and understand how
these findings correspond to existing theories and frameworks on industrial development
in 'late-industrializing economies"' such as China. In particular, this will focus on the
theory of 'second mover advantage', as discussed by Amsden and Chu (forthcoming).
The theory of second mover advantage was developed to explain the success of certain
firms in late-industrializing economies. This theory proposes a set of characteristics that
many of these firms (or 'latecomers') share, and which explain the basis for their
competitiveness. Because the set of Chinese firms studied in this thesis fall under the
category of latecomers, it is interesting to understand to what extend they follow, or
diverge from, the models proposed by Amsden and Chu.
Second movers are, by definition, latecomer firms that operate behind the 'world
technological frontier' and are therefore forced to compete according to a set of
competitive advantages that are suited to their circumstances and the products they
manufacture. "First movers" are firms typically located in industrialized countries that
began to exploit a technology at the beginning of its product cycle - when it was still
relatively new, subject to frequent and relatively radical innovations in its basic design or
capabilities, and thus was able to reap monopoly profits (high margins) for its producers 2.
Second movers, on the other hand, are those firms that exploit mature products that are in
the middle or end of their product lifecycle. Such products may still reap good profits in
a market with growing demand, however, these are typically characterized by paper-thin
margins. In both cases, the technology has become standardized and relatively well
defined (more so the more mature a product is).
According to the theory, both first and second movers exploit the same generic set of
advantages in that both are the first in their respective domains to invest in optimal-size
plants, managerial and technological resources, and marketing. However, latecomers and
first movers differ in the precise way in which these advantages are implemented, in
accordance to their respective competitive positions3. More specifically, the theory
1 In this context, late-industrializing economies are defined as those countries that possessed a history of
manufacturing experience prior to World War II. These include China, Taiwan, S. Korea, Malaysia,
Indonesia, and India in Asia; Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile in Latin America; and Turkey in the
Middle East (see Amsden, 2000, for further details). These countries are variously known as "emerging
economies" or "newly industrialized economies", although these definitions may encompass a wider set of
nations of which they are a part.
2 In this sense, a 'first mover' is not necessarily the veryfirst company to create a technology, but is part of
a set of companies that derive their competitiveness from being at the world technological frontier. A
'second mover' is a latecomer from a developing country that is the first to exploit a set of competitive
advantages suited to the mature products they produce.
3 See Amsden and Chu (forthcoming) for a detailed comparison of first and second mover competitive
advantages.
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behind 'second mover advantage' arises from five key themes: product maturity;
economies of scale and scope; project execution skills; ramping up; and globalization and
nationalization 4 . The extent to which second mover advantage theory applies to firms
such as Huawei and ZTE will therefore be assessed according to these themes.
Product Maturity
There is a question as to whether the products manufactured by the case study firms are
considered to be 'mature' or not. This can be a very difficult question to answer with
respect to telecommunications equipment, one reason being that they are composed of
both hardware and software. Some major changes in the functions of communications
products can occur through new software development while not having to make
fundamental alterations to the core hardware technology. Such software is often
proprietary and subject to rounds of innovations, separate from hardware innovations 5,
and can be complex and time-consuming to develop6 . New life can be breathed into a
piece of equipment or system through innovative breakthroughs in software design.
Therefore, in this industry, whether a product is mature or not has to be very narrowly
defined according to a specific product. This is a level of resolution which could not be
obtained in the research for this paper but which should nevertheless be taken into
consideration in future analyses.
Another aspect of communications technologies regards the way in which new products
evolve. Although the basic technology of a piece of equipment may stay the same,
product innovations introducing higher transmission capabilities, say, essentially start a
new product cycle. For example, the basic technology for DWDM optical transmission
(which both Huawei and ZTE produce), has been around for a few years, however the
leading firms such as Nortel and Lucent are constantly improving on it in terms of higher
transmission capabilities. Each of these could be considered a new product since
capacity upgrades are highly valued by customers and thus reap monopoly profits for
those companies able to produce them. Therefore, it is hard to say that "DWDM
equipment is mature" - one would have to refer to a particular 'generation' of equipment
and its related specifications. Again, this level of detail could not be obtained in the
research undertaken, but is important to bear in mind in future work.
As described in Chapter 4, Chinese firms first began to produce mature products -- SPC
switches - that were first introduced into China through joint ventures, notably Shanghai
Bell. This same pattern was observed with respect to mobile systems (also mature
products), although the development of Chinese systems seems to have taken longer than
that of the switches, due to the higher complexity of the technology. Most recently,
Chinese firms began to develop DWDM optical transmission systems. According to
ZTE, the company developed their first commercially viable system in about a year,
4 See Amsden and Chu (forthcoming) for a detailed explanation of second mover theory.
5 This make it different to the PC industry, for example, where the software is standardized (although still
proprietary).
Huawei, for instance, spent most of its time developing the software for its Internet routers, while the
hardware architecture was easier to reverse engineer.
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which seems like a very short amount of time given the high technology involved.
Currently, domestic companies are attempting to develop third-generation mobile
systems (on their own and through partnerships with foreign companies), which have not
yet been widely commercialized in industrialized countries.
Economies of Scale and Scope
The theory of second mover advantage has mostly been applied to industries producing
consumer products (such as electronics devices, cars, etc.) or components (such as
semiconductors). In all cases, these are products which are suited to high volume
production in assembly lines. This is in contrast to the industry examined within this
thesis which develops equipment and systems for the telecommunications infrastructure8 .
Furthermore, not all of this equipment is suited to volume production but rather to labor-
intensive batch production due to the difficulty of automation 9 (e.g. optical equipment),
and the nature of the market. With regards to the market, it is composed of a relatively
low number of telecom carriers and/or business enterprises (compared to the mass
market), depending on the product, and the equipment is usually built-to-order and in
accordance to different customer specifications. These characteristics are inherently
unsuitable and inefficient for high volume production (Garvin, 1981).
Given the above observations, it is not clear to what extent economies of scale in
production play a role. Obviously there is a certain plant size of minimum efficiency1o
however it is not certain that this should be much larger than that found in "first movers"
given that high volume production is generally not applicable to infrastructure equipment.
Second mover theory also posits that scale is important to many latecomers as a signaling
system to foreign companies in order to win OEM and ODM contracts (as Taiwanese IT
firms have). However, the Chinese telecom equipment firms considered in this research
mainly sell products under their own brand and thus do not necessarily seek OEM
contracts. In fact, some foreign companies serve as OEM/ODMs to the Chinese firms
(e.g. Intel and IBM). This is probably due to the fact that Chinese firms mainly sell to
their own market and thus they do not currently have to worry about the weakness of
their brand in foreign markets. Furthermore, Chinese firms to not mainly compete on
their ability to produce discrete products, but on their ability to install networks and
communications systems that comprise several pieces of equipment ('total solutions').
Therefore it is not clear that these firms would necessarily be concerned with the types of
sales channels that are more relevant to consumer goods and which form the basis of
SFigure 4.2 describes the phenomenon by which the time lag between initial product introduction by
foreign companies and indigenous production is shortening.
' This differs to handset production which falls under consumer electronics.
9 See Chapter 3.
'0 The Chinese government played an important role in consolidating the initially large domestic SPC
switching industry given that many producers had inefficiently small plant sizes. This large proliferation
was encouraged by the low barriers to entry (the technology was licensed without much restriction by the
pioneering domestic companies).
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many OEM/ODM contracts for latecomers". However, OEM contracting may still be an
opportunity for them as a valuable source of revenues.
Nevertheless, signaling is important to domestic companies. Instead of mainly resting
upon their production capabilities, it mostly relates to their (potential) market share and
their technological capabilities. It is also not directed at customers, but directed to
suppliers. Suppliers typically want to sell to customers who are strong players in the
market. In particular, smaller high-tech suppliers with limited production capabilities
want to enter into contracts with customers who will guarantee a source of business and
cash flow for their companies. As described in Chapter 3, high tech components in this
industry undergo shortages and therefore Chinese firms must compete with larger
established players for the attention of suppliers in order to not get cut off from their
sources of critical components. An important way in which companies display their
'worthiness' is by showing a potential to become major players in the market. The fact
that the Chinese market is so large and that the Chinese government will back domestic
firms in capturing market share is one factor that can attract suppliers. However, what
differentiates domestic companies from one another as 'better customers' are their
respective technological capabilities. These indicate greater potential both at home and
abroad.
Lastly, it is not clear to what extent economies of scope come into play with companies
such as Huawei and ZTE. Amsden and Chu describe how scope was important with
Taiwanese firms in the IT sector which used the skill of integration to spread fixed costs
of design and prototyping among different customers. In the case of the telecom
infrastructure equipment industry, different categories of communications equipment
(e.g. optical, networking and cellular) are radically different from each other in design
and technology. This limits the potential economies of scope in design.
Project Execution Skills
Project execution skills have been very important for the domestic firms studied. Both
Huawei and ZTE, have employed professional staff at the highest levels of the company.
This may have been expected for ZTE, given that it is a state-owned company, however
even Huawei - a private firm - is not under family control but has a hierarchical structure
of professional management. Nevertheless, corporate governance may be an issue for
other state-owned domestic companies in the industry, for example Julong. Although top
managers may be professionals, the real strategic decision-makers may not be managers
within the company but instead are appointed officials. There is no doubt that effective
project execution has been essential to the remarkable organic growth undergone by these
companies and their expansion into various areas of communications technology. This
relates to the characteristic of many latecomers which have tended to diversify into
unrelated lines of business - project execution skills gained in one area being applied to
other areas (for example, the growth of Korean chaebols). However, domestic firms in
the industry studied have tended to remain within the same broad business of
" For example, the subcontracting by major PC brands of notebook and desktop manufacturing to
Taiwanese firms.
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communications equipment, although they are diversified within this area. This may be
due to the fact that the sector is profitable enough to sustain a focus in the industry, or
may be due to government policy pressures.
Although project execution skills in one area may have been used by domestic firms to
spearhead diversification into another area of communications equipment, technological
capabilities have generally been the limiting factor. Products developed by Huawei and
ZTE have not been defined by the usual characteristics of maturity which are that the
technology is relatively available through subcontracting and technology transfer
agreements. Thus the pace of diversification of the Chinese companies considered here
has usually depended upon the pace of their reverse-engineering and R&D efforts (having
not engaged in joint production JVs with foreign companies). Therefore the
management of 'R&D' processes, as opposed to mainly production processes, has been
one of the biggest concerns of these firms.
Ramping up
In light of the fact that scale economies do not seem to be as important in this industry as
in other fields of electronics and IT, the fast ramping up of production is probably not so
much of a focus for the firms studied. The first 'ramping up' that needs to occur is in the
product development process. After a promising market or technology trend is identified,
the domestic firms have had to devote considerable efforts in undertaking preliminary
studies, putting together a team of suitable engineers, expanding the team and often
moving it to dedicated R&D centers. Because of the enormous front-end effort of self-
development (as opposed to technology acquisition through technology transfer),
production ramping up takes second place.
Furthermore, in some cases it seems that technologies have not been entirely de-bugged.
For instance, certain microchips provided for Huawei's Internet routers by foreign
suppliers necessitated some lengthy de-bugging by the suppliers' engineers because the
components were new on the market. This adds weight to the argument that equipment
produced by the firms studied does not entirely fit the definition of 'mature products',
and thus does not confer the advantages enjoyed by second movers in other industries.
Globalization and Nationalization
This part of the second mover advantage theory postulates that second movers arise from
the changes in industrial st ructure caused by product maturation. That is, a movement
from foreign direct investment (FDI - designed to protect proprietary foreign technology)
to foreign indirect investment and subcontracting on an OEM or ODM basis (when
products are mature or patents have run out).
In the case of the telecom infrastructure equipment industry in China, the most important
manufacturers today have not emerged from joint ventures (FDI), nor do they seem to be
heavily involved in subcontracting arrangements with foreign companies, even for
mature products such as switching equipment. Several reasons may account for this.
Firstly, the size of the home market is large enough to support production that is not
based on subcontracting for foreign companies. Secondly, in cases where Chinese firms
are beginning to sell abroad, they are aiming for cost-sensitive developing country
markets where they are able to successfully compete on price against foreign
manufacturers. Thus they do not have a need for subcontracting arrangements given that
they are able to market themselves independently.
Conclusions
The above discussion suggests that second mover advantage theory does not apply
wholesale to firms such as Huawei and ZTE. It seems that these companies need to
compete under a somewhat different set of paradigms than firms in other electronics and
IT industries. This is accounted for by the fact that, although products may be relatively
mature, firms still need to invest significant resources in reverse engineering and R&D
capabilities to acquire the technology. Furthermore, the type of market in which they





Appendix 1: List of Interviewees
Telecom Companies (Chinese)
1. Marketing Supervisor, ZTE Corp.
2. International Marketing Representative, ZTE Corp.
3. Vice-Director, Shanghai Research Institute I, ZTE Corp.
4. Engineer, Beijing Research Institute, ZTE Corp.
5. Mobile Business Manager, ZTE Corp.
6. Chief Manager, Beijing Research Institute, Huawei Technologies.
7. Engineer, Beijing Research Institute, Huawei Technologies.
8. Senior Engineer, PTIC Information Industry Corporation.
9. North China Market Director, Sales Division, Beijing International Switching System
Corporation (BISC).
Telecom Companies (Foreign)
10. Senior Manager, Government Relations & Strategic Development, Nortel Networks.
11. Senior Specialist, Strategic Development, Nortel Networks.
12. Managing Director, Product Marketing Development, Optical Networking Group,
Lucent Technologies.
13. Sales Manager, Extreme Networks.
14. Assistant Sales Manager, Mobile Products, Siemens.
Academic Institutions
15. Executive Dean of the Graduate School, Professor of Management Science and
Information Management.
16. Assistant Professor, School of Economics and Management, Qinghua University.
Chinese Government
17. Chief, State Information Center, Ministry of Information Industry.
18. Senior Engineer, Ministry of Information Industry.
19. Chief Engineer, Ministry of Information Industry.
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Consultancies and Market Analyst Firms
20. Managing Director, BDA (Beijing).
21. Chief Telecom Analyst, Frost & Sullivan (Beijing).
22. Consultant, McKinsey & Co. (Beijing).
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Appendix 2: International Perspective on the Telecom
Equipment Industry
* APPENDIX 2A: NETWORK OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN COMPONENT SUPPLIERS AND
SYSTEMS PRODUCERS
* APPENDIX2B: SELECTED PRIVATELY-OWNED COMPANIES
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ApPENDIXlA INTERNATIONAL OPTICAL EQUIPMENT INDUSTRY NETWORK (SELECTED RELATIONSHIPS)
Systems Provider: COlnponellt Supplier: Customers:
Alcatel, Cisco...
Huawei. ..
Alcatel, Cisco, Nortel, Marconi, ADC Telecom...
Cisco, Sycamore, Coming, IDS Uniphase...
Nortel









Lucent Microelectronics Lucent. ..
Finistar
JDS Unfphase







Alcatel Optronics Alcatel, ONI Systems, Sycamore...










Source: Based on information/rom Merrill Lynch (2000) and MSDW (2000)
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Notes on Appendix 2a
* The information above is not complete as not all relationships between component
suppliers and their customers have been shown.
* Only publicly-traded component suppliers have been included above.
* Several component companies directly supply certain service providers and infrastructure
suppliers, in addition to the systems providers.
* JDS Uniphase outsources some manufacturing to Celestica.
* OCPI is 69.3% owned subsidiary of Furukawa.
* Stratos is 84% owned by Methode.
APPENDIX 2B SELECTED PRIVATELY-OWNED COMPANIES
Optical Systems Providers
These are a selection of new entrants in the optical systems markets, each of which offers






























SSource: Merrill Lynch (2001)
Optical Component Suppliers
These are a selection of small, private companies which hold numerous cutting edge and
potentially 'disruptive' technologies 2:



















2 Source: Merrill Lynch (2000), and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (2000).
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Appendix 3: List of Chinese Companies and Foreign
Joint Ventures in the Telecom
Infrastructure Equipment Industry
APPENDIX 3A CHINA PTIC INFORMATION INDUSTRY CORPORATION
Wholly-Owned Factories
PTIC Houma Communications Cable Factory
Main Products: Optical Cable
Cable
Location: Houma, Shanxi
PTIC Xi'an Communications Equipment Factory





Chengdu P&T Communications Equipment Factory
Main Products: No. 7 signal monitor
DWDM
MDF
Amplitude Moderation CATV transmitter and receiver
Location: Meishan, Sichuan
Beijing P&T Communications Equipment Factory
Main Products: GSM system and handset
Digital Microwave
Location: Beijing
PTIC Beijing Telecommunications Equipment Factory




PTIC Tianjin Communications Equipment Factory
Main Products: Postal bag, electric tourist vehicle, accumulator tractor, transportation system for the
letterbox.
Location: Tianjin
Tianjin Telephone Equipment Factory
Main Products: Magcard, Magcard Telephone set and management system
IC Card, IC Card phone and system
Location: Tianjin
PTIC Jingdezhen Communications Equipment Factory
Main Products: Fixed wireless access equipment
MDF
Centralized surveillance system
Intelligent traffic signal machine
Location: Jingdezhen, Jiangxi
PTIC Guiyang Communications Equipment Factory




PTIC Zhuzhou Communications Equipment Factory
Main Products: Modularized Lightening proof for the communication power lines
Location: Zhuzhou, Hunan
PTIC Ji'nan Communications Equipment Factory
Main Products: Postal container, postal vehicle
Location: Zhangqiu, Shandong
PTIC Guilin Telecommunications Equipment Factory





PTIC Luoyang Huanghe Motorcycle Factory
Main Products: Motorcycles
Location: Yanshi, Henan
PTIC Guiyang Communications Machinery Factory
Main Products: High-speed sorting machine
Location: Guiyang, Guizhou
PTIC Guilin Communications Equipment Factory
Main Products: GSM short message service system
Large Capacity Voice mail
Location: Guilin
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Shanghai Telephone Equipment Factory
Main Products: Digital subscriber switch
Power supply for the intelligent high frequency switch,
Video doorbell phone system
Semiconductor discharger
Coin telephone set
Cordless phone, incoming phone
Location: Shanghai
Holding Companies
Great Dragon Information Technology Co., Ltd.
Main Products: HJDO4 SPC digital exchange
IC card phone and system
Location:
Shanghai Posts and Telecommunications Equipment Cc., Ltd.
Main Products: Optic-transmission equipment
AFC system
Voucher printer
Cash register POS system
Location: Shanghai
Chengdu Cable Co., Ltd.
Main Products: Optic Fiber, Optical Cable, cable
Location: Hi-tech Development Zone, Chengdu
Zhejian Eastcom Communications Co., Ltd.




Wireless Optic Access Network
Location: Hangzhou, Zhejiang
Nanjing P&T Equipment Co., Ltd.
Main Products: Data communications products (CDPD, POS, ISDN adapter, desktop video
conference)
MDF




Chongqing Communications Equipment Co., Ltd.
Main Products: PDH products
Optic transmission equipment
Location: Chongqing
Guangzhou P&T Equipment Co., Ltd.
Main Products: IC Card public payphones and management systems
Optic transmission systems
MDX200 Integrated Access Network System
Location: Tianhequ, Guangzhou
Wuhan Zhouji Telecom Power Supply Group Co. Ltd
Main Products: Centralized Monitor and control system for telecom power
Power room and air-conditioning
Low voltage variable switchgear assemblies
Sealed batteries
Location: Wuhan
I Haugzhou Hongyan Electrical Appliances Co., Ltd.




Beijing Matsushita Communications Equipment Co., Ltd.
Main Products: GSM handsets and systems
Pagers
Location: Tianzhu East Road Beijing Airport Industrial Development, Beijing
Shanghai Radio Communications Equipment Manufacturing Co., Ltd.




Shenzhen Lingyun Electronics Co.. Ltd.
Main Products: Telephones, Portable MP3
Location: Bao'an District, Shenzhen
Zhuhai Peace Telecommunications Industry Company
Main Products: SIM cards, pagers, handset batteries
Location: Zhuhai, Guangdong
'Full Ownership' Enterprises and Affiliated Units
Centel Telecommunications Co., Ltd.
Main Products: Network management, billing, and supervision and testing systems for mobile, local
and No. 7 signal networks
Access routers
ISDN terminals
Internet information technology service systems
Location: Xicheng District, Beijing
Beijing Taili Technology Development Company
Main Products: Mobile communications equipment
Location: Beijing
PTIC Peace Communications Technologies Company
Main Products: 114 national telephone number query system
Internet file information management system
Integrated EMS postal management system
Network call center platform
Location: Xicheng District, Beijing
Beijing Optical Communications Technology Co., Ltd.
Main Products: SDH optical fiber transmission system,
SDHI access network
Online testing system
Local integrated transmission network management system
Location: Xicheng District, Beijing
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PTIC R&D Center
Main Products: IPA enterprise-level gateway system




Further Affiliated Companies and Units (products produced not specified):
* PTIC Beijing Company (Beijing)
* PTIC Hangzhou Company (Hangzhou)
* PTIC Guangzhou Company (Guangzhou)
* PTIC Xiamen Company (Xiamen)
* PTIC Shanghai Company (Shanghai)
* PTIC Shanghai Telephone Equipment Company (Shanghai)
* PTIC Wuhan Company (Wuhan)
* PTIC Changchun Company (Changchun)
* PTIC Zhengzhou Company (Zhengzhou)
* PTIC Tianjin Company (Hedongqu, Tianjin)
* PTIC Xi'an Company (Xi'an)
* PTIC Chengdu Company (Chengdu)
* PTIC Guilin Company (Guilin)
* PTIC Nanjing Company (Nanjing)
* PTIC Harbin Company (Nangang District, Harbin)
* PTIC Designing and Planning Institute for Engineering (Beijing)
* Research Institute for Telecom Standardization (Beijing)
* PTIC Training Center (Beijing)
* China Communication Industry Paper (Yuzhongqu, Chongqing)
Joint Ventures (Mutual Shareholding Companies)
Beijing Ericsson Mobile Communications Co., Ltd.
Main Products: GSM handsets and systems
Location: Industry Development Zone, Tianzhu Airport, Shunyi, Beijing
Lucent Technologies Shanghai Optical Fiber Co., Ltd.
Main Products: DACSH, SDH Transmission EquipmentAccess Network Equipment
Location: Shanghai
Shanghai Shindengen Communications Equipment Co., Ltd.
Main Products: High-frequency switch power supply
Location: Shanghai
Beijing Haihong Communications Systems Co., Ltd.
Main Products: Postal saving computer network
Location: Haidan District, Beijing
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Shandong Huari Battery Co., Ltd.
Main Products: Closeed Storage Batteries of varied capacity
Location: Zhanggiu, Shandong
Beijing Hongna Postal Articles Co., Ltd.
Main Products: Philately articles
Location: Fengtai District, Beijing
Hangzhou Motorola Cellular Equipment Co., Ltd.
Main Products: CDMA system equipment
Location: Economic and Technological Development Zone, Hangzhou, Zhejiang
Hangzhou Eastcom Cellular Phone Co., Ltd.
Main Products: GSM, CDMA handsets
Location: Economic and Technological Development Zone, Hangzhou, Zhejiang
Lucent Technologies Beijing Optical Cable Co., Ltd.
Main Products: Optical cable
Location: Economic and Technological Development Zone, Beijing
Beijing Changxinjia Information Technology Co., Ltd.
Main Products: Network audio player, digital cameras, wireless sound box
Location: Haidan district, Beijing.
APPENDIX 3B FUJITSU
Fujitsu (China) Co., Ltd. Established in 1995. Promotes business activities in China,
including partnerships with local investments and staff training.
Representative Offices: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Xi'an.
Joint Ventures
Shanghai Fujitsu Telecommunications EauiDment
Main Products: FETEX-150 printed circuit boards and other switch components
Ownership: Fujitsu (68%); Shanghai First Telecom Equipment Plant (32%)
Staff: 110
Location: Shanghai
North China Fujitsu Telecommunications Equipment Co., Ltd.
Main Products: Responsible for sales, maintenance and technical support of ATM switches and other
systems for LAN/WAN network.




Jiangsu Fujitsu Telecommunications Technology Co., Ltd.
Main Products: FETEX 150 systems




Fujian Fujitsu Communications Software Ltd.




Nanjing Fujitsu Telecommunications Equipment Co. Ltd.
Main Products: SDH/PDH.fibre-optic transmission systems
Ownership: Fujitsu (40%); Nanjing Telecommunications Factory (60%)
Staff: 300
Location: Nanjing
Notes: In 1998, sales at Najing Fujitsu totaled $36.7m (a 77% increase from 1996 sales). Similarly, its
staff figures have also climed from 163 in 1996 to 300 in 1999.
Xi'an Fujitsu Telecommunications Equipment Co. Ltd.
Main Products: Radio and mobile communication systems




APPENDIX 3C LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES
Wholly-Owned Companies (check: should be only TWO)
Lucent Technologies Qingdao Telecommunications Equipment Co. Ltd.
Main Products: 5ESS-2000 public switching equipment
Staff: Over 800, mostly in engineering or management positions
Location: Qingdao
Note: This is Lucent's largest switching equipment production plant outside the US.
Lucent Technologies of Shanghai
Main Products: Optical digital transmission systems, including SDH
Location: Shanghai
Lucent Technologies of Tianjin Cable Co. Ltd.
Main Products: Cable products
Location: Tianjin
Lucent Technologies Beijing Fiber-Optic Cable Co. Ltd.
Main Products: Fiber-optic cable
Location: Beijing
Note: This has become Lucent's largest production facility outside the US for fiber-optic cable.
Joint Ventures
Lucent Technologies Shanghai Fiber Optic Co. Ltd.
Main Products: Fiber optic products
Ownership: Lucent (56%); Shanghai Optical Communications Development (20%)
Location: Shanghai
Guoxin Lucent Techno;ogies Network Co. Ltd.
Main Products: Specializes in R&D of network management and technology consulting services
Ownership: Lucent, China Telecom and Shanghai PTB
Location: Shanghai
Lucent Information and Communications of Shanghai
Main Products: Software
Ownership: Lucent, Shanghai PTA
Location: Shanghai
R&D Facilities
Bell Labs & Peking University
Main Products: Software technologies
Location: Beijing
Bell Labs & Shanghai Jiaotong University





Tianjin NEC Electronic & Communications Industries
Main Products: n/a
Ownership: Tianjin NEC Electronic & Communications Industries (25%); Tianjin PTA and NEC
affiliate Sumitomo Shoji Kaisha
Location: Tianjin
Wuhan NEC Fiber-Optic Communications Industry Co.
Main Products: SDH/PDH fiber-optic transmission systems
Ownership: NEC (35%); Chanjiang Fiber Optic Industry Group (51%); Sumitomo Shojo Kaisha
(14%)
Location: Wuhan
Xi'an NEC Radio Communications Equipment Co. Ltd.
Main Products: SDH based large-capacity microwave communications systems
Ownership: NEC (41%); NEC China (19%); No. 4 Research Institute of the MII (40%)
Location: Xi'an
Beijing Telecommunications Equipment Factory
Main Products: NEC-500 DMW radios
Ownership: NEC; Beijing Telecommunications Equipment Factory
Location: Beijing
Guilin NEC Radio Communications Ltd.
Main Products: SDH based microwave systems
Digital local access systems/wireless local loop
Ownership: NEC (60%); Lijiang Radio Factory (40%)
Location: Guilin
APPENDIX 3E NORTEL NETWORKS
Joint Ventures
Guangdong-Nortel Telecommunications Switching Equipment Ltd.
Main Products: DMS Super Mode products, digital access, multimedia data systems (including
CDMA equipment).
Ownership: Nortel (62%); China National Hua Xin PTA Bureau, Hebei PTA, Henan PTA, China





Main Products: Meridian 1 communications sytem
Ownership: Nortel; Tongguang Electronics Co.
Staff: 400
Location: Shenzhen
Shenyang Nortel Telecommunications Co. Ltd.




Shanghai Nortel Semiconductor Corp.




Advanced Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp. of Shanghai









Main Products: DMS core development
Location: Guangdong
Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications - Bell Northern Research




Siemens Business Communications Systems Ltd. (SBCS)
Main Products: Hicom 300E and Hicom 100 digital telephones and desktop telecommunications
products
Application products and services such as PhoneMail product line, ISDN
applications networking, PBX/computer applications, automatic call detail




Siemens Shanghai Mobile Communications
Main Products: Sets of GSM mobile equipment, including base station systems and mobile
terminals.
Ownership: Siemens (60%); Shanghai PTA, Shanghai Audio & Visual Co. and No. 1 Institute of
the MII.
Location: Shanghai
Note: Adapted BISC's EWSD switches for cellular applications.
Siemens Shanghai Communications Terminals Ltd.
Main Products: Wire, wireless and cordless telephones
Ownership: Siemens Corp.; Shanghai Guangdian Co. Ltd.
Location: Shanghai
Beijing International Switching System Corp. (BISC)
Main Products: EWSD switches and mobile switching centers
Ownership: Siemens (40%); Beijing PTA (2.73%); Beijing Enterprise Ltd. (40%); Beijing Wire
Communications Plant (8.6%); Beijing Comprehensive Investment Co. (8.67%)
Staff: 1,500
Location: Beijing
Siemens Communications Systems Ltd.
Main Products: "Last mile" products for telecommunications networks with focus on systems using
fiber-optic and radio technology
Ownership: Siemens (50%); Chengdu Posts and Telecommunications Equipment Factory;
Chengdu Telecommunications Cable Co. Ltd.
Staff: 700
Location: Sichuan
Siemens Optical Fiber Cable Ltd.
Main Products: Entire range of fiber-optical cables, including terrestrial and fiber ribbon cables.
Ownership: JV with local cable company in Chengdu
Location: Chengdu
Siemens Telecom Power Supply Ltd.
Main Products: Siemens GR60 telecom power supply and Siemens UPS
Ownership: n/a
Location: Shanghai
Guangzhou Nanfang Transmission Systems
Main Products: PDH and SDH fiber-optic transmission systems





Beijing Ericsson Communications Systems
Main Products: MD110 PBX and AXE local and mobile exchanges
Ownership: Ericsson (40%); Beijing Wire Communication Plant (60%)
Location: Beijing
Note: 20% of transmissions systems sold in 1998 were manufactured by this joint venture (the rest was
imported).
Beijing Ericsson Mobile Communications
Main Products: GSM/TACS base stations, handsets, mobile network design and implementation
Ownership: Ericsson; Radio Factory No. 506; Radio Factory No. 508
Location: Beijing
Dalian Ericsson Communications
Main Products: CO switch and cellular system support for N.E. China
Location: Dalian
Nanjing Ericsson Communications
Main Products: Switching/cellular system support, transmission equipment
Ownership: Ericsson; Panda Group; Nanjing Radio Factory
Location: Nanjing
Note: Approximately 70% of hardware components for Ericsson's AXE 10 switches sold in China are
produced by this joint venture, as well as from its Beijing joint ventures.
Shanghai Ericsson Simtek Electronics
Main Products: Complete Line Interface Circuits
Location: Shanghai
Wuhan Yangtze Ericsson
Main Products: SDH equipment
Location: Wuhan
Guangzhou Ericsson Co.
Main Products: RBS and channeling equipment
Ownership: Ericsson; Guangdong PTA, Guangdong Radio Factory
Location: Guangzhou, Guangdong
Guangdong Ericsson Mobile Communications Co.
Main Products: Provides GSM and TACS infrastructure engineering services
Ownership: Ericsson; Guangdong PTA
Location: Guangzhou, Guangdong
Note: Ericsson and the Wuhan Research Institute established a joint venture in 1999 for transmission





Main Products: Develop solutions for data and telecoms with a focus on network access software
Location: Shanghai
Note: This R&D center cooperates with the Wuhan Research Institute, Beijing University of Posts and
Telecommunications, Beijing Institute of Technology, and Beijing Design Institute.
APPENDIX3H ALCATEL
Alcatel has 20 telecom equipment manufacturing companies in 11 cities in China
covering switching, microwave transmission systems, optical fiber lines, fixed wire and
wireless access systems and mobile infrastructure equipment.
Joint Ventures
Alcatel Shenyang Telecommunication Co., Ltd.
Main Products: Wire and wireless phones
Ownership: Hong Kong Alcatel (China) Co. Ltd; Shenyang Telecom Bureau;
Location: Shenyang
Fujian Alcatel Communications Technology Co. Ltd.
Main Products: Wire and wireless phones
Ownership: Alcatel (China) Co. Ltd.; Fujian Bamin Telecom Ltd.
Location: Fujian
Shanghai Bell Telephone Equipment Manufacturing Co. (Shanghai Bell)
Main Products: S 12 switches
Ownership: Alcatel (32%); MII-Huaxin (60%); Belgian Government (8%)
Location: Shanghai
Shanghai Bell - Alcatel Mobile Communications
Main Products: GSM base stations, control equipment, mobile switches, digital handsets
Ownership: Alcatel; Shanghai Bell
Location: Shanghai
Shanghai Belling
Main Products: Custom CLSI chips for S 12 switches, ISDN, ADSL and ISM equipment
Ownership: Shanghai Bell; Shanghai Radio Factory No. 4
Location: Shanghai
Alcatel (Chengdu) Communications Systems Co.
Main Products: PDH/SDH fiber-optic transmission systems
Ownership: Alcatel; Meisheng Telecommunications Equipment Factory
Location: Chengdu
Alcatel Chongqing
Main Products: DMW technology with Alcatel Telettra for 1.5 GHz systems
Ownership: Alcatel Telettra and MII Factory No. 716 (ex-MEI)
Location: Chongqing
Alcatel (Beijing) Transmission System Co. Ltd.
Main Products: Small, medium and high-capacity DMW systems, including STM-1 I SDH microwave
Ownership: Alcatel (50%); PTIC Factory No. 506 (50%)
Location: Beijing
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Tianjin Alcatel Electromagnetic Wires and Cables Ltd.
Main Products: Copper wire and cables for electrical coils






Nokia (Suzhou) Telecommunications Co.
Main Products: GSM base stations and cellular network transmission products
Location: Suzhou, Jiangsu
Joint Ventures (Mobile Communications)
Beijing Nokia Hang Xing Telecommunications Co.
Main Products: Mobile digital switching centers, base station controllers and fixed digital switches
Ownership: Nokia; Hang Xing Manufacturing Co.
Location: Beijing
Beijing Nokia Mobile Telecommunications Ltd.
Main Products: GSM digital cellular systems and mobile phones
Ownership: Nokia; Beijing Telecommunications Equipment Factory
Location: Beijing
Dongguan Nokia Mobile Phones Co.
Main Products: Mobile phones and accessories
Ownership: Nokia; Dongguan Telecommunications Development General Co.
Location: Guangdong
Fujian Nokia Mobile Communications Technology Co.
Main Products: GSM 900/1800 technical services
Ownership: Nokia; Fujian PTA
Location: Fujian
Chongqing Nokia Telecommunications




Joint Ventures (Mobile Communications)
Shanghai Motorola Paging Products
Main Products: FLEX pagers
Ownership: Motorola; Shanghai Radio Communications Equipment Manufacturing Co. Ltd.
Location: Shanghai
Hangzhou Motorola Cellular Systems Ltd.
Main Products: CDMA digital cellular infrastructure equipment and services
Ownership: Motorola; China National Posts & TelecommunLications Industrial Corp; Eastcom
Location: Hangzhou, Zhejiang
Hangzhou Motorola Cellular Phone Ltd.
Main Products: GSM infrastructure equipment
Ownership: Motorola; Eastcom; Zhejian Technical Import-Export Corp (ZTIEC)
Location: Zhejiang
Note: under this agreement, Eastcom can make and distribute Motorola's latest GSM cell site equipment to
cellular operators in China, and distribute all of Motorola's GSM base station equipment.
n/a = information not available
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Appendix 4: Selected Chinese Government Policy
Statements
Partial summary of comments by Wang Jianzhou, former Director-General of the MII's
integrated planning department, made at a coordination meeting held in Beijing
(November 1998), outlining current and future strategies':
* Investment in research will be increased to develop Chinese telecommunications
products, so that China will become less dependent on imported technology;
* Chinese telecom operators should give priority to domestic products when the price
and quality are similar to imported products;
* Chinese-foreign joint ventures are expected to speed up technology transfer to their
Chinese partners, increase the proportion of locally sourced raw materials and
develop new products to meet market demand;
* China will actively participate in the process of developing IMT-2000, the third
generation CDMA standard.
Summary of the Circular regarding the strengthening ofsupervision and control, to
promote the healthy development of the mobile telecommunications production industry,
distributed by the State Council (1998)2:
* The value-added of production in China's infant industry is low, and technology
transfer is low. China must improve its domestic management and production.
* China should avoid construction duplication. Therefore, provinces and ministries
cannot approve joint ventures or wholly-owned foreign enterprises that product GSM
systems, unless the equipment is to be exported. GSM negotiations underway should
be stopped, and any contracts recently signed should not be executed. GSM imports
must be "controlled".
* Permits allowing network access and contract signings must be "controlled". GSM
production enterprises should be more closely supervised to ensure technology
transfer, higher export-to-domestic sales ratios and a larger percentage of locally
sourced inputs. Customs shall crack down on smuggled equipment, especially
handsets.
* China should support domestic industry with Chinese intellectual property. 5% of
installation fees (1998-2000) will be dedicated to support mobile telecommunications
research. Bonds should be issued to assist in R&D efforts. Research priority should
be given to mobile telecom equipment with Chinese intellectual property.
' Pyramid Research (1999b)
2 Pyramid Research (1999b)
* China should choose and support three to five state-level mobile communications
R&D centers, and encourage R&D centers overseas to obtain technology. Personnel
and funds should move smoothly overseas to support these centers.
* The Ministry of Science & Technology and the MII should work together on the
research and development of the third generation (3G) mobile communications
system (IMT-2000), and actively work with the international telecommunications
union in setting technical standards for 3G mobile telecommunications.
Partial summary of an MII implementation proposal, Implementation plan to speed up the
development of China's mobile telecommunications industry, (1998):
* Shanghai Bell and Alcatel is the only JV that has a high level of technology transfer.
Datang is the only company that can currently produce mobile exchanges and base
stations. Mobile systems produced by Huawei, Zhongxing, Jinpeng and Julong are
preparing for tests in these areas.
* The main problems confronting the entirely Chinese manufacturers include
inadequate investment, high risks as they are competing against JVs and WOFEs and
foreign patents that can greatly increase production costs.
* Once the products with Chinese intellectual property reach the "network access
standard", then a procurement policy of giving priority to these products should be
adopted.
* Market Share targets for the mobile industry:
% market share for domestic
goods vendors
% of locally sourced components for
JV/WOFE manufacturing in China
Year 2001 2003 2001 2003
Mobile 40% 70% 60% 80%
switches
Base stations 25% 50% 40% 60%
Handsets 10-15% 30% 40% 60%
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